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Introduction
Maren Borkert and Tiziana Caponio
1 From the nation state to the city: the emergence of local
integration as a European policy issue
Whereas international migration primarily concerns the territorial so-
vereignty of nation states, being defined as persons crossing national
borders, integration touches upon the social boundaries of nations.
These geographic and social boundaries constitute the nation state as a
collective agent. Immigrants moving into the nationalised territories
and societies raise questions about the permeability of established
boundaries. Thus, immigration and the integration of newcomers are a
national concern in most member states of the EU and abroad.
Lately, however, it has become increasingly accepted that the major-
ity of immigrants, particularly in Europe, are living in cities and small
towns in rural areas (Penninx et al. 2004). Consequently, the aware-
ness that migrant integration takes place at the local level has entered
current political and scientific discourses on integration.1 In fact, the
acceleration of international migration movements after World War II
and increasingly since the mid-1980s, has pressured municipalities
throughout Europe to adopt pragmatic solutions to emerging migra-
tion-related needs (Castles & Miller 2003: 4). However, not all local ac-
tors involved share the same experience and history in migrant integra-
tion: while non-governmental actors such as the German AWO or the
Italian Caritas have a long-standing record in migrant-related social
work, the issue has entered the political agendas of most European city
councils more recently. Facing the local effects of globalisation, the
transnationalisation of labour markets and an increase in international
mobility, municipalities throughout Europe have turned to questions of
social cohesion and the sustainable development of local markets and
communities. Likewise, addressing key questions of today’s societies,
local integration strategies have increasingly attracted the attention of
European institutions, particularly the European Commission. But em-
phasis on the creative power of local actors in matching migration poli-
cies with economic and social needs, though in line with the principle
of subsidiarity, seems to be motivated also by hegemonic structures in-
side the European Union.
In this section we will first analyse local integration as a European
policy concern, reconstructing the timeline of political events and
publications that might shed new light on the emergence of this issue
on the European agenda. Secondly, we will retrace the main develop-
ments in the scientific research dealing with local-level policymaking
on migration-related issues. In the third section we will introduce the
new contributions of this book to the existing literature on local policy
and policymaking.
In recent decades, international migration movements have become
a major political concern worldwide (see e.g. Thra¨nhardt 2003). Simul-
taneously, these migration movements are a consequence and a sign of
the increase in international interdependence provoked by processes of
globalisation. Both globalisation and migration are putting nation
states to the test. As Hollifield formulates it, modern states are cur-
rently facing a severe dilemma between globalised markets and na-
tional civil rights. The so-called liberal paradox stands at the very basis
of most migration debates in contemporary Europe: While economic
interests have a lasting effect on the opening of national borders, the
international political order and internal political system are built upon
differentiation and the exclusiveness of power (Hollifield 2003: 35).
The question of integration, i.e. who needs to be integrated into what
and how, refers to the core of self-perception and self-identification of
societies that are at the destination of persisting migration movements
towards Europe. But how do Europeans identify themselves?
One of the most explicit statements on immigration was made by
the European Council within the context of the 2000 Lisbon Strategy.
Within the Lisbon Program, the Council expressed its intention of
‘making the European Union the most competitive economy in the
world and achieving full employment by 2010’, identifying immigra-
tion as one potential approach to compensate for the negative impact
of demographic ageing and labour-force shortages that the labour mar-
kets of many European member states continue to experience. The
Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was introduced to enable the de-
velopment of national action plans. But the OMC caused the European
Council objectives to become muddled, and the results achieved by the
national action plans did not satisfy the expectations (COM (2005) 24
final; SCADPLUS 2007). A local approach appeared to be more pro-
mising. In 2006, Rotterdam mayor Ivo Opstelten invited policymakers
and practitioners acting at local and European levels to the conference
Integrating Cities: European Policies, Local Practices. The stated aim of
the conference was ‘to find ways for better cooperation’. Integrating Ci-
ties was realised in close collaboration with European Commission
vice-president and head of the Directorate-General Justice, Freedom
and Security Franco Frattini. Representatives from EUROCITIES, a
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network of 130 major European cities, attended the conference along
with the Committee of Regions and other European High Commis-
sioners. The list of participants showed a mixture of European and
sub-national experts and practitioners. Following the conference, Mi-
gration Policy Group (MPG) director Jan Niessen elaborated a common
position paper in which he highlighted opportunities for innovation
and challenges for EU cities posed by the arrival of large numbers of
new residents. A fundamental thesis of his position paper affirms that
‘integration is essentially a local process’ (Niessen & Engberink 2006).
Integrating Cities was considered so successful it was followed up by
the conference Integrating Cities II, held one year later in Milan.2 Inte-
grating Cities II explicitly addressed the city level as a major arena for
implementing the 2005 European Common Agenda for Integration.
The common goal of strengthening the city’s voices in European poli-
cies on immigrant inclusion culminated in the so-called Milan Declara-
tion, signed on 5 November 2007 (see Milan Declaration 2007).
The Milan Declaration and the conferences indicate the emergent at-
tention of European institutions towards processes, practices and poli-
cies of local migrant integration. Local solutions and management stra-
tegies are considered crucial for identifying, developing and diffusing
new integration models across Europe. Thus, specific funds are intro-
duced to promote benchmarking and policy-learning processes across
European member states and municipalities. Here, a pattern becomes
apparent among European institutions: they address simultaneously
the nation state and sub-national-level entities as implementation
agents for integration and innovation. Some political statements at the
EU level display, indeed, the aptitude to move integration matters
downwards to the city level (and outwards to civil society associations).
Yet, if we look at policy action, this trend appears to be far less definite.
With the beginning of 2007, a new Framework Program on Solidar-
ity and Management of Migration Flows was established by the Eur-
opean Commission (COM (2005) 123 final), which was designed to im-
prove management of migration flows at the EU level and to strength-
en solidarity between member states. This Framework Program has
four dimensions. The first one concerned the integrated management
of external borders and was accompanied by the establishment of an
External Borders Fund applicable from 1 January 2007. The second di-
mension pertained to asylum policy and prolonged the European Refu-
gee Fund. The third related to the social, civic and cultural integration
of third-country nationals and established the European Integration
Fund. The fourth dimension concerned the fight against illegal immi-
gration and the return of so-called third-country nationals who reside
illegally in the EU, setting up a European Return Fund (see DG Justice
and Home Affairs 2008).
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The European Integration Fund (EIF), of special relevance for inte-
grating so-called third-country nationals in Europe, is based on pre-
vious experiences made with the Integration of Third Country Na-
tionals (INTI) programme. INTI was a funding programme for activ-
ities concerning the integration of people who are not EU citizens. On
the basis of these (fruitful) experiences with INTI, the European Com-
mission launched the idea of an European Integration Fund during the
Dutch presidency aimed at: 1) facilitating the organisation and imple-
mentation of admission procedures for migrants, 2) contributing to the
organisation and implementation of introduction programmes and ac-
tivities for third-country nationals, 3) increasing civic, cultural and poli-
tical participation of international migrants in the host society, 4)
strengthening the capacity of national organisations for accommodat-
ing the needs of different immigrant groups, 5) strengthening the host
society in managing increasing diversity and 6) increasing the capacity
of member states to develop and evaluate integration policies. In total,
financial resources allocated to the EIF amounted to E 825 million over
the time period 2007-2013.3 Basically, the EIF is implemented in an-
nual programmes laid out by the beneficiary member states4 (see DG
Justice and Home Affairs 2008), while 7 per cent of the total annual
resources are assigned to Community Actions, directly pursued by the
EU Commission.
At first it seems that this implementation procedure contradicts the
political affirmations that integration takes place at the local level, and
reinforces the nation state as the main actor for integration concerns.
Are we observing a discrepancy between political claims and policy pro-
gramming at the European level? To answer this question we take a
closer look at the establishment of the European Integration Fund. Be-
fore the current structure of the EIF was institutionalised, some regio-
nal governments, among them the Italian region of Emilia-Romagna,
developed diverging ideas for managing integration in Europe. Their
sketch of an integration model for Europe was strongly oriented to-
wards the sub-national level and addressed regional and local authori-
ties as main actors for implementing integration policies.5 However,
these attempts were unsuccessful; instead the beneficiary member
states designated national authorities as responsible for the European
Integration Fund. But other factors – the process of European integra-
tion and the role that member states assume in it – may also have had
an impact on integration policymaking in Europe. In the area of immi-
gration policies the situation of individual member states has been
marked by a shift of responsibilities up to the level of the EU. Indeed,
Europe’s external borders are officially managed and controlled in a
joint effort with shared facilities (e.g. FRONTEX). But while member
states experienced a net sovereignty loss with regard to the protection
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of their own borders, labour market concerns and social cohesion stay
within national competence (see also Geddes 2007). Today’s integra-
tion policies continue to be defined largely by national traditions and
the perception of the ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983) of the
nation (Brubaker 1992; Soysal 1994). However, local needs and experi-
ences highlight some trends of convergence in Europe: There are simi-
larities in the challenges that migration poses to local governments
and services in the receiving communities throughout Europe. These
trends challenge nation-bound policy programmes on integration and
instead ask for local input on integration policymaking. The project
known as Cities for Local Integration Policies (CLIP), financed by the
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working
Conditions, studies concrete integration measures and projects in the
areas of housing, diversity management, intercultural and inter-reli-
gious dialogue, ethnic entrepeneurship in over twenty European cities.
CLIP shows that the cities themselves have a great interest in develop-
ing successful local integration practices as they often pay the price for
failed integration (Bosswick, Heckmann & Lu¨ken-Klaßen 2007). Leg-
ally, however, municipalities largely depend on regional, national and
European frameworks, each of which constitutes the basis for local
integration.
Even if the nation state as integration policy actor has been recently
strengthened by European institutions, regional and local activities on
integrating migrants and on setting up dialogues structures at the sub-
national level continue. On 13 and 14 March 2008, the European Regio-
nal and Local Authorities for the Integration of Migrants (ERLAIM) pro-
ject, led by authorities of the Emilia-Romagna region, invited regional
and local policymakers and practitioners to a conference intended to im-
prove information flow from the EU to the sub-national level. During
the EU Policy and Funding for the Integration of Migrants conference,
ERLAI6 members reaffirmed the relevance of regional and local experi-
ences in integrating migrants, pointing out the lack of detailed and
structured information on the part of EU institutions.
2 The study of local integration policy in Europe: where are we
and where we are going?
Throughout the 1990s, immigration scholars in Europe focused on the
nation state as the key dimension for understanding processes and po-
licies of immigrants’ integration. Various typologies have been devel-
oped to describe national immigrant policies. From a juridical perspec-
tive, for instance, jus soli and jus sanguinis citizenship models have been
distinguished (see Brubaker 1992); from an economic perspective,
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Gastarbeiter systems have been opposed to settlement-oriented systems;
and from a socio-political perspective, at least three different models of
integration have been put forward: assimilationist, multiculturalist and
pluralist (Soysal 1994).
However obvious these typologies of European integration models
may seem, they have been criticised for being too simplistic (Favell
2001), with the risk of overshadowing how integration actually takes
place in the different contexts where immigrants happen to live and
work. When it comes to local integration practices and policies, these
typologies certainly have to be treated with caution: They neither ex-
plain the variation in integration measures between different munici-
palities of the same nation state, nor elucidate observed trends of con-
vergence and divergence in integration practices across European cities
(Penninx & Martiniello 2004: 156). As a consequence, the local dimen-
sion of immigrant policy has emerged to the fore, attracting the atten-
tion of an increasing number of European researchers working in dif-
ferent countries.
Yet, not to throw the baby out with the bathwater, one has to ac-
knowledge that typologies still represent a reference point in the debate
on immigrant policy and policymaking, as well as in the emerging lit-
erature on its local dimension, as pointed out by most of the contribu-
tions collected in this book. This is why in the first part of this section
we shall start by elucidating the main conceptual categories underlying
research in this field, both classic concepts and new notions that have
being emerging in local-level studies. In the second part, we will pre-
sent the main lines of development of the existing literature on local
immigrant policy and policymaking. A general trend can be high-
lighted, beginning with descriptive case studies (often collections of
case studies) focused on policy content, to more recent theoretically or-
iented comparative research designs, addressing mainly issues of pol-
icymaking. However, being still at an early stage, the analysis of local
policy processes on immigration-related issues reveals a number of
gaps and inconsistencies. Critical nodes for future research in the field
are also considered in the third part of this section, in an attempt to
contribute to the further development of a promising perspective for
the study of immigrants’ contexts of daily integration in Europe.
2.1 The debate on policy models: relevance for today’s research on local
policy and policymaking
The phenomenon of migration is a rather complex discipline to study.
Thus, in the course of time researchers have developed more or less
complex models to compare and identify different social realities and
to test empirical findings. With regard to integration, Anglo-American
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researchers were particularly influential in investigating and interpret-
ing the effects of migration in receiving countries. As early as the
1920s, the Chicago School started theorising the process of how mi-
grants adapt to a mainstream American society imagined as being
predominantly White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP).7 Focusing on
European migration in American cities, scholars such as Park, Thomas
and Znaniecki recognised that the process of ‘assimilation’, which
would equalise newcomers to the standards of the majority population,
is likely to last for more than one generation. With this assertion, the
Chicago School introduced two basic aspects to modern migration re-
search destined to animate scientific debates even today: the matter of
time and space.8
While the urban context has been a prominent one for studying the
evolution of migration societies in the US, integration research in
Europe developed in a different way. The level of immigration to Eur-
ope started to rise sharply after World War II and contributed to the
transformation of European societies into the culturally diverse socie-
ties that we live in today. In fact, the immigration of workers and
their subsequent settlement in Northern and Western Europe in the
1950s and 1960s was succeeded by the rising of Southern European
states such as Italy and Spain, considered to be ‘classic countries of
emigration’, which became the destinations of international migration
movements in the 1980s. Today, Central and Eastern European states
are destined to become Europe’s new immigration lands (Castles &
Miller 2003: 7f).
In response to the socio-political awareness that migration is a Eur-
opean reality and therefore needs to be managed,9 scientific tools were
adapted successively to identify and reveal migration-related data. More-
over, national policy models on migration and integration developed, in-
fluenced by country-specific peculiarities such as the overall political cul-
ture or ‘national’ position on migration. Within migration research,
these models differ from one another in being more assimilationist or
more appreciatory in recognising ethnic-cultural differences. European
member states can then be clustered according to their applied policy
model as more ‘assimilationist’ (usually identified with France), multi-
cultural (United Kingdom, Netherlands) or functionalist-pluralist (the
German Gastarbeiter policy) countries.
The assimilationist model defines the nation as a political commu-
nity which newcomers enter by will or by birth. Thus, whoever is born
on the soil (ius soli) or willing to adopt the national culture and political
rules (ius domicili) is admitted into the community. The assimilationist
model has been criticised, however, as a policy based on a one-sided
process of adaptation. On the other hand, the multicultural or pluralist
model defines the nation as a political community constituted by cul-
INTRODUCTION 15
tural-ethnic heterogeneity. This entails that newcomers be granted
equal rights in all spheres of society, and by implication that they re-
spect certain key values while keeping their cultural-ethnic heritage
and autonomy (Han 2000: 287; Castles & Miller 2003: 249-252; Trei-
bel 1999: 83-102). Castles and Miller identify two main variants of the
multicultural model: the ‘laissez-faire approach’ typical of the US,
where cultural diversity and ethnic communities are accepted, while it
is not seen as a genuine task of the state to sustain and protect ethnic
cultures and equality among ethnic groups. The second variant refers
to multiculturalism as a government policy based on a societal consen-
sus to accept cultural differences as well as on state policy to secure
equal opportunities and rights for all. Castles and Miller attribute this
variant particularly to Australia, Canada and Sweden (2003: 251). Last
but not least, the guest worker policy model reflects, according to Cas-
tles and Miller, Germany’s classic approach to immigration based on
matching immigration with labour-market demands and needs. Na-
tionhood is defined on the basis of birth and descent (ius sanguinis)
and, as a consequence, naturalisation of newcomers is regarded as ex-
ceptional and dependent upon a difficult and demanding process.
It is questionable, however, how far these policy models actually re-
flect and display the reality of everyday interethnic interactions in socie-
ties. While this typology is an instrument for identifying and distin-
guishing ideological discourses at the national level, it shows certain
limitations in distinguishing between nation states and sub-national ac-
tors in admitting and incorporating newcomers (Alexander 2004; Ire-
land 2007; Money 1999). In fact, as it has never been proved that the
French model is more assimilationist than the British one, neither can
we possibly verify how far these models have been implemented in
their country of reference as such studies are largely missing (see also
Borkert 2008). Here, research on the local dimension of migration pol-
icy and policymaking can help to reassess both concepts and models
against the background of new empirical findings, referring not to
macro-institutional structures but to policies and services implemented
and carried out at a regional, provincial and/or city level.
This book provides some interesting examples of how traditional,
state-level concepts can be revised and applied to the study of policy-
making at a local level. For instance, Vermeulen and Stotijn (this vo-
lume), in order to make sense of policy practitioners’ implementation
strategies for immigrant youth employment, refer to De Zwart’s (2005)
dilemma of recognition. According to De Zwart, general policies aimed
at combating group inequalities do not recognise groups as being rele-
vant to policymaking, while targeted policies may run the risk of perpe-
tuating differences and inequalities among groups. Assimilationism
(‘denial’ in De Zwart’s terms) and multiculturalism (‘accommodation’),
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are regarded as alternative strategies which do not necessarily exclude
one another, as pointed out by De Zwart’s third proposed policy ap-
proach, replacement, which constructs the targets of redistributive poli-
cies in such a way as to avoid recognition while still allowing for bene-
ficial redistribution among the groups.
Another attempt to revise ‘old’ concepts in relation to the analysis of
local policymaking is provided by Caponio’s discussion (this volume
ch. 2) of grassroots multiculturalism. Apart from official discourse on
policy recognition, this contribution points out how cultural mediation
can be conceived more prosaically by street-level bureaucrats as an in-
strument to cope with the everyday challenges of immigrants’ per-
ceived diversity. Community workers and operators with an immigrant
background are hired by Italian municipalities, not necessarily on the
basis of a political programme open to cultural recognition, but rather
as a strategy to avoid the stress of dealing with diversity and to mini-
mise challenges to established bureaucratic routines.
As is clear, the particular aim and achievement of this book is that of
turning a new eye on processes of policymaking at the local level, and
exploring what we have called the local dimension of migration poli-
cies. The models debate lies in the background, setting the main terms
of reference in the analysis of local policy trajectories. Yet, such terms
of reference are neither static nor established once and for all: the ex-
amples provided clearly point out how the investigation of the local di-
mension of migration policymaking can provide interesting inputs for
the rethinking and reformulation of classic concepts.
2.2 Where we are: Local integration policy between networks and politics
First attempts to collect systematic information and data on local-level
policies for immigrants were carried out in the mid-1990s in the con-
text of international projects such as the UNESCO Multicultural Poli-
cies and Modes of Citizenship in European Cities (MPMC), in 1996,10
and the OECD report Immigrants, Integration and Cities. Exploring the
Links (OECD 1998), including cities in Australia, the US and Canada.
Local policy is essentially identified with city-level policy and, even
more narrowly, with the interventions carried out by local/municipal
administrations. To this list, the later Ethnobarometer programme
should be added. Launched in 2001 with a contribution from the Ita-
lian government and of a number of European foundations, it aimed
at reviewing local policies in nine cities in Europe.11
The main common feature of these studies was their promotion of
large-N comparisons across cities in different national – European and
non-European – contexts. To this end, each project devoted considerable
effort to the specification of the main dimensions and/or variables for
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data collection and analysis. Yet, the results hardly met such an ambi-
tious goal; descriptive case studies adopting a vague comparative
perspective prevailed. The main exceptions were the comparative studies
carried out by Alexander (2003, 2004, 2007) who, based on the
UNESCO MPMC programme, built up a comprehensive typology of
European cities’ different attitudes and policies towards their foreign po-
pulation. However, his focus is on cities’ official policy priorities, with lit-
tle attention to implementation and policymaking processes.12
Still within the context of the programme, a number of small-N
comparisons were also carried out.13 These studies yielded a far more
complex picture, showing the interplay between official/formal local
policy priorities and the various actors dealing with immigrant integra-
tion. Moreover, along with the UNESCO MPMC programme, other re-
search studies have been undertaken in different local contexts, not
only in cities but also in neighbourhoods and regions, thus contribut-
ing to the accumulation of an increasing corpus of data and knowledge
on local policy for immigrants in Europe.
In this emerging literature, two research streams can be identified:
the first is essentially concerned with bottom-up policymaking pro-
cesses on immigrant integration, in order to account for the actors in-
volved and the networks mobilised on the issue; the second looks at
top-down implementation of legislative provisions on immigration,
with particular attention to the practices adopted by the local branches/
agencies of national/regional institutions such as the Home Office, the
Labour Ministry, etc.
As for the first stream, two different approaches to the study of lo-
cal policymaking on immigrants’ integration can be identified: a plur-
alist approach, emphasising issues of immigrants and civil society
participation; and a power approach, looking more closely at the role
of politics and political actors. The pluralist approach actually began
to develop in the early 1990s, when a few pioneering researchers
questioned the primacy of national-level politics and argued for the in-
creasing relevance of local governments in promoting institutional ar-
rangements aimed at providing opportunities for immigrants’ partici-
pation and inclusion (Joly 1992; Rex & Samad 1996; Vertovec 1996;
Leggewie 1993). According to Mahnig (2004), these studies implicitly
assumed that local governments are more inclined than national ones
to pragmatically respond to immigrants’ needs.
This pragmatic attitude of local policymaking has been also noted by
more recent studies such as those carried out by Marques and Santos
(2004) on immigrants’ participation in Oeiras, a suburb of Lisbon, and
by Moore (2004) on conflict mediation in Marseille, Toulouse and Man-
chester. Both studies show how immigrant policies are more the result
of local-level mediation practices, than of official – national or local –
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policy models. Moore (2004) illustrates how French cities, in their at-
tempts to come to terms with immigrant-origin youth unrest, do not act
much differently from English ones: if recruiting mediators in order to
link up immigrant groups is officially pursued in the UK, in France it re-
presents an established informal practice. In Oeiras, on the other hand,
town hall policy does not officially recognise immigrant or ethnic-parti-
cularistic demands. Yet existing neighbourhood, sport and leisure asso-
ciations are composed mainly of immigrants and actually represent the
interests and channel the needs of the African resident groups.
Meanwhile, research studies on Southern European cities have also
pointed out the crucial role played by autochthonous NGOs, charities
and civil movement associations that provide various services and offer
political support for immigrants’ rights claims (Campomori 2005; Zin-
cone 1998; Esteves 2008; More´n-Alegret 2002). A ‘crowding out’ effect
has been noted wherein native associations mobilising on behalf of im-
migrants actually become the main recipients of municipal funding
and partners in policymaking, thus preventing immigrants from form-
ing their own organisations (Caponio 2005).
In contrast with pictures emphasising mediation and local-level ne-
gotiation, a number of studies have focused on power relations in the
development of immigrant policies in European cities. A case in point
is the research study carried out by Mahnig (2004) on Paris, Berlin
and Zurich that looks at how the presence of immigrants became a
political issue in these cities forcing the issue of integration onto the
political agenda. According to this analysis, the first local initiatives
on immigration were aimed essentially at responding to the emerging
perception of immigrants as a threat to social peace and public order
by the local society. A similar perception can be found in the cases of
Nanterre and Champigny (De Barros 2002, 2004): immigration be-
came an issue as early as the 1960s, after French residents’ protested
against the bidonvilles where Maghrebians and Portuguese immigrants
lived. Local authorities and, in particular, the communist party govern-
ing the two cities, responded by joining the protest and using it as a
tool to put pressure on the national government.
The role of political actors has been addressed in the case of Italian
cities as well (Caponio 2006; CeSPI 2000; Campomori 2005). In-
depth studies carried out in both southern and northern cities question
the relevance of politics in the everyday programming and running of
municipal services; the efficiency of established administrative struc-
tures and the capacity for networking with native and third-sector orga-
nisations seem to be more relevant. Yet, politics may set the frame for
legitimate action in the development of immigrant policies thus indir-
ectly influencing what can be done and what should be avoided (or at
least not overly emphasised).
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The second research stream identified above is implementation re-
search, generally aimed at analysing how national/regional laws and
policies are carried out by local responsible agencies and whether and
to what extent the stated goals are achieved (Zincone & Caponio
2006). The classic top-down implementation framework has been
adopted mainly for the investigation of immigration policies such as
procedures of regularisation in Greece (Skordas 2000) and Italy (Zuc-
chini 1998) or access to long-term residence permits in Austria (Ja-
whari 2000) and Italy (Fasano & Zucchini 2001). A chief finding of
these studies is that administrative discretion is one of the main
sources accounting for deviation from expected goals and policy failure.
A number of studies have focused more closely on civil servants’ beha-
viour and their administrative cultures, regarded as factors having a
crucial impact on everyday implementation of labour-market provisions
in Germany (Cyrus & Vogel 2003), residence permit renewal in Greece
(Psimmenos & Kassimati 2003) and Italy (Triandafyllidou 2003) and
access to protection for refugees in the UK14 (Du¨vell & Jordan 2003).
What emerges is a substantial continuity among established adminis-
trative practices, directed essentially at controlling and restricting im-
migrants’ presence.
A small number of implementation studies have also focused on na-
tional and/or regional social integration programmes. Gaxie et al.
(1999), for example, analysed the implementation of the contrats de
ville (city contracts) in nine French cities,15 to find out whether, and to
what extent, the official goal of empowering local governance was actu-
ally pursued and achieved. The empirical evidence contradicts expecta-
tions, since the city contracts policy often resulted in routine and
purely symbolic consultation on the part of regional/local political
authorities, reluctant to lose control over potentially hot immigration
issues.16
Between top-down implementation analyses and bottom-up ap-
proaches stand a number of studies looking at immigrant policies in the
context of urban segregation processes. The study of majority/minority
relations in metropolitan areas and of the related dynamics of segrega-
tion/separation in the urban environment is a classic topic in American
urban sociology since the Chicago School, which has also attracted over
the course of decades urban geographers, social anthropologists, urban
economists and political scientists. The literature on the different as-
pects of segregation processes is huge, especially in the United States
but, more and more, also in Europe, the UK being in first place.17 Some
of these studies are concerned with the impact of urban regeneration
programmes, usually targeting neighbourhoods suffering conditions of
economic and social deprivation, but often leading to gentrification in
the renewed districts and segregation in other peripheral areas (Fonseca
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2008; Semi 2006; Briata 2007). Other studies investigate the relations
between urban segregation and welfare policies, especially as far as pub-
lic housing is concerned. If initially scholars focused mainly on cities in
liberal, conservative corporatist and social-democratic welfare states (see
the contributions collected in Musterd and Ostendorf 1998), more re-
cent research has also taken into account Southern Europe (Allen et al.
2004; Malheiros 2002; Arbaci 2008).
Along with urban policy, another emerging research stream devel-
oped in the context of the UNESCO UN HABITAT programme focuses
more broadly on the impact of migration for urban governance (Balbo
& Tuts 2005: 1-14), taking into account not only European cities, but
also urban areas outside of Europe which are pivotal in different regio-
nal migratory systems.
2.3 Where we are going: Key issues for future research
As is clear, existing literature on the local dimension of policymaking
on immigrants’ integration is extremely diversified in terms of research
approaches and theoretical perspectives. In order to develop a more co-
herent future research agenda, we identify here four key issues arising
from this literature and envisage possible research paths that may con-
tribute to the enrichment of the debate on local policy and
policymaking.
The first critical point arises from the observation of a trend of conver-
gence among local immigrant policies on some pragmatic solutions to
perceived ‘common challenges’, i.e. the amelioration of housing condi-
tions and residential concentration, and the improvement of diversity
both in democratic bodies and municipal administration (Borkert et al.
2007). However, there is still a lack of systematic research on how com-
mon challenges pressure municipal policies towards convergence. On
the contrary, as mentioned, a number of studies openly challenge such
an assumption by pointing out that local policy on migration-related is-
sues is more likely to respond to NIMBY (an acronym for the exclama-
tory ‘not in my backyard’) reactions on the part of national residents,
rather than to the needs of the foreign immigrants living in the city.
In order to find out whether and to what extent a trend towards con-
vergence can actually be identified, it should be first and foremost re-
cognised that the intrinsic complexity of local policymaking processes
may be observed at different levels in the institutions concerned, i.e.
the high-level political arena, the middle-level implementation net-
works and the bottom-level bureaucratic practices. Patterns of conver-
gence and divergence may differ across these different levels. In high-
level decision-making arenas, where official policy priorities are envi-
saged, political actors are likely to play a key role in framing answers
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in accordance with their perception of the electorate’s preferences,
which are not necessarily favourable to immigrants (see Helbling in
this volume). In middle-level implementation networks, institutional
pre-existing arrangements concerning relations between public admin-
istration and private/civil society organisations are crucial. Such institu-
tional arrangements are likely to vary considerably across European ci-
ties, reflecting different welfare state traditions as well as different pat-
terns in civil society mobilisation (see also Aybek in this volume). Yet,
trends towards convergence appear particularly relevant as far as bu-
reaucratic practices are concerned: in the context of access to services,
immigrants’ needs are often dealt with informally by civil servants, op-
erators of NGOs and volunteers, leading to some pragmatic answers
and solutions to everyday pressures (see Vermeulen & Stotijn and Ca-
ponio ch. 2 in this volume).
Multi-level governance is another key point for future research.
Many studies mention the relevance of intergovernmental relations in
setting opportunities and constraints for local-level administrations,
but do not actually explore them systematically. There are exceptions of
course, as pointed out by the implementation studies taking into ac-
count complex integration programmes (Damay 2002; Gaxie et al.
1999) and by some contributions in this book (see Fourot on Canada).
Another example of analysis concerned with multi-level governance is
the study carried out by Favell and Martiniello (2008) on the policy-
making processes on immigrant integration in Brussels, also addres-
sing the role of the EU. Yet, generally speaking, while there is wide
acknowledgment of the relevance of supra-national, national and regio-
nal institutions in local immigrant policy, relations among these differ-
ent institutions are only rarely investigated.
A third issue to be mentioned relates to the research-policy nexus. As
far as local-level policymaking is concerned, this is a particularly relevant
point as shown by a wealth of programmes entailing research on best
practices, conditions for mutual learning across cities and transferabil-
ity. The CLIP project is a case in point, since it seeks the direct participa-
tion of cities in identifying policy needs and shaping bottom-up an on-
going research design. However, there is still a lack of knowledge and
systematic analysis of the role of experts in local-level immigrant policy-
making: How are experts identified and selected? What role are they
supposed to play? What are their relations with the other actors involved
in decision-making and with politicians in the first place? If the re-
search-policy nexus is still an under-explored field (Zincone & Caponio
2006), it is even more so in terms of the local level.
Finally, from a methodological point of view, a crucial area for future
research is represented by the spreading of comparative systematic ana-
lysis, both cross-city and cross-country. Of course, research designs un-
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dertaking comparison across different contexts, including cities outside
of Europe might appear somewhat puzzling, since it is difficult to con-
trol for a number of crucial variables, not least the national integration
models, which are central to European literature. Nonetheless, much
depends on the research goal: if we are to identify common challenges
and patterns of convergence in local policymaking, maximising var-
iance in terms of selected cities and national contexts can only
strengthen the argument. In any case, to explore how policymakers in
different cities/provinces/regions cope with immigration pressures and
immigrant needs would undoubtedly enrich our knowledge of the dy-
namics of migration decision-making.
3 The content of the book
This book is the result of activities conducted within the context of the
IMISCOE European Network of Excellence. Specifically, it arises from
the work of IMISCOE Cluster C9, a research group focusing on the
multi-level governance of migration. The development of a research
programme on local-level immigrant and immigration policy was one
of the main tasks of the cluster’s work in 2007, as highlighted by the
international conference The Local Dimension of Migration Policymak-
ing held in May 2007 in Turin.
Four of the book’s six chapters are actually the result of papers pre-
sented at the conference, as it allowed early-stage researchers working
in the field to present their work and discuss it with peers and senior
researchers. The conference was based on a call for papers, to which
some 35 young scholars responded and out of which twelve papers
were selected for presentation. This selection revealed some interesting
features – but also critical points – of today’s research on local policy
and policymaking. They include:
– The crucial relevance of comparison, especially across regions/
provinces/cities in a single country, but also more and more taking
into account local contexts within different countries;
– The growing interest in the issue of governance, intended both as in-
tergovernmental relations between different layers of government
and as horizontal network relations between public and non-public
organisations;
– The lack of systematic research on local-level policymaking in
Eastern European countries, especially of studies adopting the so-
called ‘policy approach’, i.e. focusing on local level policymaking
processes.
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This final point is particularly relevant for developing a future re-
search agenda on the local dimension of migration policy and policy-
making. Local-level policymaking is rarely addressed by scholars in
Eastern Europe, where research on migration is just gaining momen-
tum. This may result from the highly centralised state structures char-
acterising these countries, which is probably a legacy of the past com-
munist regimes. However, the debate on convergence/divergence on
local migration policy and policymaking could be newly enlightened
by also looking at the policy process in Eastern European emergent
immigration cities/regions.
This book intends to provide a contribution to the existing literature
on local-level migration policymaking by presenting a number of stu-
dies carried out in very different national contexts: namely, Italy, Ger-
many, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Canada. We are fully aware
that these countries do not exhaust the range of possible relevant cases
in the study of the local dimension of migration policy and policymak-
ing. A major gap exists not only in the lack of a contribution on East-
ern Europe, but also in the lack of a chapter addressing a case study in
the Nordic welfare-state countries. However, as pointed out in the final
comparative chapter, this book is intended as a first attempt to explore
the various dimensions of local policymaking. It starts from some in-
teresting pieces of research already carried out in this field. More sys-
tematic and theoretically grounded research, though indeed needed, is
beyond the reach of this book.
Though all the collected contributions deal with local-level policy-
making, they address different dimensions of integration, i.e. citizen-
ship, welfare services, vocational training and employment, and reli-
gious diversity. Moreover, the studies display a great variety in the theo-
retical and methodological approaches adopted by the authors. This
regards first and foremost the theoretical point of view: whereas Capo-
nio’s (ch. 2) and Vermeulen and Stotijn’s chapters aim to shed new
light on policymaking processes and accounting for different local-level
policy responses, Aybek and Fourot are more interested in policy legacy
and institutional analysis. Helbling, meanwhile, deals with the factors
at a local level that explain naturalisation politics and ground people’s
understanding of membership in a nation. Variations are evident from
a methodological standpoint as well: while most chapters present com-
parative qualitative case-studies, Helbling adopts a large-N comparative
research path. Such diversity in the theoretical focus and methodologi-
cal approaches represents a characteristic feature of this book, that de-
monstrates how research on local policymaking is not necessarily con-
fined to the ‘thick description’ of one case, but on the contrary draws
its strength from comparison, either qualitative or quantitative.
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The contributions to the book, while not exhausting all the possible lo-
cal issue areas as identified by Alexander (2007), address three key policy
domains: the legal-political domain, which addresses the civic incorpora-
tion of migrants/ethnic minorities in the host polity; the socio-economic
domain, which concerns social inclusion policies; and the cultural-reli-
gious domain, which includes policies related to minority religious and
cultural practices as well as to inter-group cultural relations. The final
chapter of the book intends to draw some comparative conclusions on
local policymaking processes in these different domains, while provid-
ing a basic theoretical toolkit for a more unitary and consistent frame-
work of analysis of the local dimension of policymaking.
The first dimension, i.e. the legal-political one, is dealt with in Hel-
bling’s contribution on naturalisation policy in Switzerland. The chap-
ter takes a comparative perspective in an effort to explain why in some
municipalities more candidates for naturalisation are rejected than in
others. Three political and cultural factors are considered: different un-
derstandings of citizenship, i.e. diverging ideas of what it means to be-
come a Swiss citizen; the strength at the local level of the Swiss Peo-
ple’s Party, namely the major Swiss right-wing populist party; the im-
pact of direct democratic decision-making procedures, which may
provide an opportunity for right-wing populist parties to mobilise the
people. The analysis reveals that these three factors have a significant
impact on rejection rates, while socio-economic and socio-structural
factors such as unemployment rates, the ratio of foreigners living in a
municipality and the ratio of applicants from Muslim countries have
no influence. The contextualisation of the Swiss case in the still very
scarce literature on the implementation of naturalisation laws shows
how local/regional authorities’ attitudes towards the question of who
has the right to become a citizen is a major neglected issue in migra-
tion policy research.
Three contributions address the socio-economic dimension of local
migration policy and policymaking. Caponio (ch. 2) looks more gener-
ally at Italian cities’ welfare policies, while Aybek provides an account
of employment in German cities and Vermeulen and Stotijn discuss
vocational training in a Dutch city and a German city. Caponio (ch. 2)
deals with the accommodation of cultural difference in Italy by compar-
ing Milan, Bologna and Naples, three cities that represent very differ-
ent contexts in terms of economic situation as well as cultural and poli-
tical traditions.18 According to the analysis, at the level of official politi-
cal priorities an opposition emerges between the assimilationist
approach pursued by the administration of Milan and the multicultural
one promoted by that of Bologna, while Naples lies in between. How-
ever, the reconstruction of implementation strategies points out a con-
vergence towards practices of formal and/or informal recognition of
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cultural differences in making services accessible/available for immi-
grants, even though this does not necessarily coincide with a move to-
wards inclusion and participation of immigrant organisations in
policymaking.
Vermeulen and Stotijn, for their part, provide an interesting example
of cross-city and cross-country comparison by looking at how Amster-
dam and Berlin policymakers and policy practitioners deal with youth
unemployment among immigrant groups. They argue that local policy-
makers are confronted with what De Zwart (2005) calls ‘the dilemma
of recognition’, which refers to whether local governments should pur-
sue general or targeted policies to combat group inequality. Vermeulen
and Stotijn show how, in the two cities, policy practitioners working
with unemployed immigrant youth have responded to the dilemma of
recognition with their own pragmatic solutions, which are considerably
independent of the official policy integration framework.
The issue of migrant youth unemployment is also dealt with in Ay-
bek’s contribution, focusing on local-level interaction in Germany be-
tween the highly institutionalised vocational education and training
(VET) system and less-established networks on immigrants’ integra-
tion. The study considers two local contexts – Munich and Frankfurt/
Main – with the purpose of discovering which factors and governance
dynamics may help the development of new approaches to implement-
ing VET programmes aimed at catering to the needs of immigrant
youth, currently the main beneficiary of VET in Germany.
Finally, Fourot’s study deals with the cultural-religious domain. It in-
vestigates the settlement of new mosques in the cities of Montreal and
Laval, both located in the Province of Quebec. This chapter looks at
four sets of factors: intergovernmental relations in particular between
provincial and municipal levels of government; the discourses sur-
rounding the accommodation of ethno-cultural and ethno-religious de-
mands in the two cities; relations among local actors, especially elected
officials and municipal public servants; and the forms of mediation be-
tween municipalities and ethno-religious groups. Fourot points out
how these factors have an impact on the processes of institutionalisa-
tion of religious pluralism in the two cities. A key element is repre-
sented by the degree of personalisation of mediation channels: whereas
personalisation leads to a political process of institutionalisation, non-
personalisation leads to administrative institutionalisation.
As is evident, the studies presented in this book not only analyse dif-
ferent dimensions of integration policy, but start also from very differ-
ent research questions and theoretical perspectives. Yet, in the last con-
cluding chapter, an attempt is undertaken by Caponio to provide a
more coherent comparative framework aimed at elucidating the rele-
vance and the main characters of the local dimension of migration pol-
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icymaking in the five countries considered in this book: Switzerland,
Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and Canada. The notion of local migra-
tion policy arena is introduced, intended as a policymaking field struc-
tured around specific issue areas or dimensions of migration policy.
Local migration policy arenas take shape in specific national contexts
and systems of state-periphery relations. However, national legal frame-
works do not appear to be sufficient in order to understand how local
migration policy is actually worked out. To this end, particularly pro-
mising appear the analysis of patterns of similarities and differences in
the local-level responses and policymaking processes across the five
countries considered and in the three issue areas of migration policy
analysed by the contributions to this book: citizenship, welfare services
and religious diversity.
While tentative and provisional, such a comparative exercise yields a
first important result: the local dimension of migration policymaking
matters. This should be taken seriously by future migration policy-
oriented research in the sense that it has an undeniable relevance in all
the countries considered, despite differences in the state structures and
models of centre-peripheral relations. Efforts to make sense of how this
local dimension does currently take shape and operate require systema-
tic and theoretically oriented research programmes. Comparisons
across cities in different countries, although difficult and tricky in
many respects, represent a crucial frontier for the development of mi-
gration studies.
Notes
1 See, for instance, ‘Challenges for Local Integration Policy in Germany and the US’, a
wokshop held in April 2006 in Berlin. The workshop was part of the Transatlantic
Discourse on Integration conference programme organised by the European Forum
for Migration Studies (efms),with the support of the German Marshall Fund of the
United States.
2 Integrating Cities III was hosted by the City of Berlin on 2 April 2009.
3 In 2007 the EIF started with E 65 million. In 2008, the fund reached E 78 million
and in 2009 E 98 million. In 2010, it will reach E 106 million, in 2011 E 132 mil-
lion, in 2012 E 163 million and in 2013 E 183 million.
4 With the exception of Denmark, all member states participate in the EIF. UK and
Ireland have opted in.
5 These ideas and concepts were articulated in personal conversations with one of the
authors.
6 European Regional and Local Authorities on Asylum and Immigration (ERLAI),
www.emiliaromagnasociale.it/wcm/emiliaromagnasociale/home/immigrazione/Er-
lai/Presentation.htm.
7 This frequently used term is generally attributed to Baltzell (1964).
8 On this, see also Bommes and Morawska (2005: 224).
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9 See, for instance, a speech by Frattini entitled ‘Enhanced mobility, rigorous integra-
tion strategy, and zero tolerance on illegal employment: A dynamic approach to Eur-
opean immigration policies’, which was delivered on 13 September 2007 at the High-
Level Conference on Legal Immigration in Lisbon (http://soderkoping.org.ua/
page15679.html), the Commission Communication ‘A common immigration policy
for Europe’, MEMO/08/402, issued on 17 June 2008 (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
ReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/08/402) as well as the report ‘Moving Europe:
EU research on migration and policy needs’ by Giulia Amaducci, EUR 23859 (ftp://
ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/fp7/ssh/docs/ssh_research_migration_20090403_en.pdf).
10 See www.unesco.org/most/p97. Seventeen cities took part in the project: Amsterdam,
Antwerp, Athens, Barcelona, Birmingham, Brussels, Cologne, Lie`ge, Marseille, Mi-
lan, Oeiras (a suburb of Lisbon), Paris, Rome, Stockholm, Tel Aviv, Turin and Zurich.
11 Brussels, Lisbon, Manchester, Mannheim, Murcia, Rotterdam, Stockholm, Toulouse
and Turin.
12 To fill this gap, in-depth case studies on Paris, Amsterdam, Rome and Tel Aviv have
also been carried out by Alexander (2007). However, he is much more concerned
with changes in local-level migrant policy models than with reconstructing local pol-
icymaking processes and networks.
13 See the contributions in Penninx et al. (2004).
14 These have been published in a special issue of the Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies that was edited by Jordan, Stra˚th and Triandafyllidou (2003).
15 See also the study by Damay (2002), on the implementation of the Integration-Coha-
bitation Programme promoted by the Brussels region in 1990.
16 See also Borkert (2008) on the achievements of integration policies in Italy.
17 For a state-of-the-art report see Kohlbacher & Reeger (2005: 49-55).
18 This chapter is based on a paper presented at the 2007 Compass Annual Conference
(held from 3-4 July in Oxford), in a workshop entitled ‘Southern European integra-
tion models’, chaired by Alessio Cagiano.
References
Alexander, M. (2003), ‘Local policies toward migrants as an expression of host-stranger re-
lations: A proposed typology’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 29 (3): 411-430.
Alexander, M. (2004), ‘Comparing local policies toward migrants: An analytical frame-
work, a typology and preliminary survey results’, in R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Marti-
niello & S. Vertovec (eds.), Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics
and Integration Policies, 57-84. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Alexander, M. (2007), Cities and Labour Immigration. Comparing Policy Responses in Am-
sterdam, Paris, Rome and Tel Aviv. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Allen, J., J. Barlow, J. Leal, T. Maloutas & L. Padovani (2004), Housing and welfare in
Southern Europe. Oxford: Blackwell.
Anderson, B. (1983), Imagined Communities. London: Verso.
Arbaci, S. (2008), ‘Housing and urban regimes in Southern European multiethnic cities:
Structural mechanisms of ethnic residential marginalisation by spatial dispersal’, in
L. Fonseca (ed.), Cities in Movement. Migrants and Urban Change, 45-78. Lisbon: Cen-
tro de Estudos Goegra´dicos.
Balbo M. & R. Tuts (2005), ‘Introduction’, in M. Baldo (ed.), International Migrants and
the City, 1-16. Venice & Nairobi: UN-HABITAT.
Baltzell, E. D. (1964), The Protestant Establishment: Aristocracy and Caste in America, New
Haven: Yale University Press.
28 MAREN BORKERT AND TIZIANA CAPONIO
Bommes, M. & E. Morawska (2005), International migration research. Constructions, omis-
sions and the promises of interdisciplinarity. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Borkert, M. (2008), Integration von Zuwanderern in Italien. Gesetzliche Grundlagen, poli-
tische Akteure und die Umsetzung integrationspolitischer Maßnahmen in der Emilia-Ro-
magna. Universita¨t Bamberg: PhD Dissertation.
Borkert, M., W. Bosswick, F. Heckmann & D. Lu¨ken-Klaßen (2007), Local integration poli-
cies for migrants in Europe. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the Eur-
opean Communities VIII. www.eurofund.eu.int/pubdocs/2006/31/en/ef0631en.pdf.
Bosswick, W., F. Heckmann & D. Lu¨ken-Klaßen (2007), Housing and integration of mi-
grants in Europe. Straßburg/Dublin: Council of Europe.
Briata, P. (2007), Sul filo della frontiera. Politiche urbane in un quartiere multietnico di Lon-
dra. Milan: Franco Angeli.
Brubaker, R. (1992), Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany. Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press.
Campomori, F. (2005), ‘Integrare l’immigrato? Politiche di accoglienza a Vicenza, Prato e
Caserta’, in T. Caponio & A. Colombo (eds.), Stranieri in Italia. Migrazioni globali, in-
tegrazioni locali, 235-266. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Caponio, T. (2005), ‘Policy networks and immigrants’ associations in Italy. The cases of
Milan, Bologna and Naples’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31 (5): 931-950.
Caponio, T. (2006), Citta` italiane e immigrazione. Discorso pubblico e politiche a Milano, Bo-
logna e Napoli. Bologna: Il Mulino.
Castles, S. & M. Miller (2003), The age of migration (3rd ed.). Basingstoke: Palgrave Mac-
millan.
CeSPI (2000), ‘Migrazioni e politiche locali: L’esperienza italiana nel quadro europeo’, in
Migrazioni. Scenari per il XXI secolo, 833-948. Rome: Agenzia Romana per la prepara-
zione del Giubileo.
COM(2005) 123 final, Proposal for a decision of the European Parliament and Council estab-
lishing the European Return Fund for the period 2007–2013 as part of the General pro-
gramme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/Lex-
UriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005PC0123(04):EN:HTML.
COM(2005) 24 final, Communication to the spring European Council. Working together for
growth and jobs. A new start for the Lisbon Strategy. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri-
Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0024:FIN:EN:PDF
Cyrus, N. & D. Vogel (2003), ‘Work-permit decisions in the German labour administra-
tion: An exploration of the implementation process’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 29(2): 225-255.
Damay, L. (2002), ‘The integration-cohabitation programme of the government of the
Brussels Region: Mutations of public action and construction of norms’, paper pre-
sented at Ecpr Joint Sessions, Turin, 22-27 April 2002.
De Barros, F. (2002), ‘A contribution of local administration and courts to immigration
related issues in France between 1945 and 1991: From a local shanty-town problem
to a “social mixity” national key-word’, paper presented at Ecpr Joint Sessions, Turin,
22-27 April 2002.
De Barros, F. (2004), ‘From the local to the national. Local Governance and the genesis
of the ‘social mix’ policy from the 1950s to the 1990s’, French Politics 2: 117-144.
De Zwart, F. (2005), ‘The dilemma of recognition: Administrative categories and cultural
diversity’, Theory and Society 34: 137-169.
DG Justice and Home Affairs (2008), Solidarity and management of migration flows.
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/funding/intro/funding_solidarity_en.htm.
Du¨vell, F. & B. Jordan, (2003), ‘Immigration control and the management of economic
migration in the United Kingdom: Organisational culture, implementation, enforce-
INTRODUCTION 29
ment and identity processes in public services’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Stu-
dies 29(2): 299-336.
Esteves, A. (2008), ‘Hosting policies in Lisbon and Washington DC: The role of local ac-
tors in the integration of immigrants’, in L. Fonseca (ed.), Cities in Movement. Mi-
grants and Urban Change, 107-124. Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Geogra´ficos.
Fasano, L. & F. Zucchini (2001), L’implementazione locale del testo unico sull’immigrazione,
in Fondazione Cariplo-Ismu (ed.), Sesto rapporto sulle migrazioni 2000, 39-50. Milan:
Franco Angeli.
Favell, A. (2001), ‘Integration policy and integration research in Europe: A review and cri-
tique’, in T. A. Aleinikoff & D. Klusmeyer (eds.), Citizenship Today. Global Perspectives
and Practices, 349-399.Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace.
Favell, A. & M. Martiniello (2008), ‘Multi-national, multi-cultural and multi-levelled Brus-
sels: National and ethnic politics in the “Capital of Europe”’, in L. Fonseca (ed.), Cities
in Movement. Migrants and Urban Change. Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Geogra´ficos.
Fonseca, M. L. (2008), ‘Immigration, urban change and new directions of social inclu-
sion policies: The urban community development program ‘K’CIDADE’ in Lisbon’,
in L. Fonseca (ed.), Cities in Movement. Migrants and Urban Change, 11-44. Lisbon:
Centro de Estudos Geogra´ficos.
Gaxie, D. et al. (1999), ‘Les politiques municipales d’inte´gration des populations d’origine
e´trange`re’, Migrations E´tudes 86, March.
Geddes, A. (2007), ‘The Europeanization of what? Migration, asylum and the politics of
immigration,’ in T. Faist & A. Ette (eds.), The Europeanization of National Policies and
Politics of Immigration, 49-70. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Han, P. (2000), Soziologie der Migration. Stuttgart: Lucius and Lucius.
Hollifield, J. F. (2003), Offene Weltwirtschaft und nationales Bu¨rgerrecht, in D.Thra¨nhardt &
U. Hunger (eds.), Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat, 35-
57. Leviathan Sonderheft 22/2003, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Ireland, P. (2007), Immigration, integration and everyday life in Europe’s neighborhoods,
Draft Workshop Paper. www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CIS/papers/Ireland_Immigration.
pdf.
Jawhari, R. (2000), Wegen U¨berfremdung abgelehnt. Vienna: Braumu¨ller.
Joly, D. (1992), ‘Grande Bretagne: minorite´s ethniques et risques de se´gre´gation’, in D.
Lapeyrronie (ed.), Immigre´s en Europe: Politiques locales d’inte´gration, 111-139. Paris: La
Documentation Franc¸aise.
Joppke, C. & Morawska, E. (eds.) (2003), Towards assimilation and citizenship. Immigrants
in liberal nation-states. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
Jordan, B., Stra˚th, B. & A. Triandafyllidou (2003), ‘Comparing cultures of discretion’,
Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 29 (2): 373-395.
Kohlbacher, J. & U. Reeger (2005), ‘Residential segregation, housing market and immi-
grants’, in L. M. Fonseca & J. Malheiros (eds.), Social integration and mobility: Educa-
tion, housing and health, 22-55. Lisbon: Centro de Estudos Goegra´dicos.
Leggewie, C. (1993), Multikulti. Berlin: Rotbuchverlag.
Mahnig, H. (2004), ‘The politics of minority-majority relations: How immigrant policies
developed in Paris, Berlin and Zurich’, in R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Martiniello & S.
Vertovec (eds.), Citizenship in European cities. Immigrants, local politics and integration
policies, 17-37. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Malheiros, J. M. (2002), ‘Ethni-cities: Residential patterns in the Northern European and
Mediterranean metropolises – implications for policy design’, International Journal of
Population Geography 8 (2): 107-134.
Marques, M. & R. Santos (2004), ‘Top-down and bottom-up reconsidered: The dynamics
of immigrant participation in local civil society’, in R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Marti-
30 MAREN BORKERT AND TIZIANA CAPONIO
niello & S.Vertovec (eds.), Citizenship in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics and
Integration Policies, 107-126. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Milan Declaration (2007), Integrating cities. Milan declaration. www.integratingcities.it/
allegati/MilanDeclaration.pdf.
Money, J. (1999), Fences and neighbors. The political geography of immigration control.
Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
More´n-Alegret, R. (2002), ‘Gobierno local e inmigracio´n extranjera. Aproximacio´n a los
casos de Barcelona y Lisboa durante los an˜os 90’, Migraciones 11: 25-81.
Moore, D. (2004), ‘Migrants as mediators in a comparative perspective’, in R. Penninx,
K. Kraal, M. Martiniello & S. Vertovec, Citizenship in European cities. Immigrants, local
politics and integration policies, 127-138. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Musterd, S. & W. Ostendorf (eds.) (1998), Urban segregation and the welfare state. Inequal-
ity and exclusion in Western cities. London/New York: Routledge.
Niessen, J. & G. Engberink (2006), Position paper. Integrating cities: European policies, local
practices. http://integratingcities.nl/INTEGRATING_CITIES_position_paper.doc.
OECD (1998), Immigrants, integration and cities. Exploring the links. Paris: OECD.
Penninx, R. & M. Martiniello (2004), ‘Integration policies and processes: State of the art
and lessons’, in R. Penninx, K. Kraal, M. Martiniello & S. Vertovec (eds.), Citizenship
in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies, 139-163. Alder-
shot: Ashgate.
Penninx, R., K. Kraal, M. Martiniello & S. Vertovec (eds.) (2004), Citizenship in European
cities. Immigrants, local politics and integration policies. Aldershot: Ashgate.
Psimmenos, I. & K. Kassimati (2003), ‘Immigration control pathways: Organisational
culture and work values of Greek welfare officers’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 29 (2): 337-371.
Rex, J. & Y. Samad (1996), ‘Multiculturalism and political integration in Birmingham
and Bradford’, Innovation 9 (1): 11-31.
SCADPLUS (2007), A new start for the Lisbon Strategy. http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/
cha/c11325.htm.
Skordas, A. (2000), ‘The regularisation of illegal immigrants in Greece’, in P. de Bruyck-
er (ed.), Regularisations of illegal immigrants in the European Union, 343-387. Brussels:
Bruylant.
Semi, G. (2006) ‘Il ritorno all’economia di bazaar. Attivita` commerciali marocchine a Por-
ta Palazzo’, in F. Decimo & G. Sciortino (eds.), Stranieri in Italia. Reti migranti. Bolog-
na: Il Mulino.
Soysal, Y. N. (1994), Limits of citizenship. Migrants and postnational membership in Europe.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Thra¨nhardt, D. (2003), Der Nationalstaat als migrationspolitischer Akteur, in D. Thra¨nhardt
and U. Hunger (eds.), Migration im Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und National-
staat, 8-34 Leviathan Sonderheft 22/2003, Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag.
Treibel, A. (1999), Migration in modernen Gesellschaften. Soziale Folgen von Einwanderung,
Gastarbeit und Flucht, 2nd edition; Weinheim and Munich: Auflage, Juventa Verlag.
Triandafyllidou, A. (2003), ‘Immigration policy implementation in Italy. Organisational
culture, identity processes and labour market control’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration
Studies 29 (2): 257-297.
Vertovec, S. (1996), ‘Berlin multikulti: Germany, “foreigners” and “world openness”’,
New Community 22 (3): 381-399.
Zincone, G. (1998), ‘Illegality, enlightenment and ambiguity: A hot Italian recipe’, South
European Society and Politics 3 (3): 43-81.
Zincone, G. & T. Caponio (2006), ‘The multi-level governance of migration’, in R. Pen-
ninx, M. Berger & K. Kraal (eds.), The dynamics of migration and settlement in Europe.
A state of the art. IMISCOE Joint Studies. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
INTRODUCTION 31
Zucchini, F. (1998), ‘L’implementazione della politica pubblica per l’immigrazione: I casi
di Torino e Brescia’, in Fondazione Cariplo-Ismu (ed.), Terzo rapporto sulle migrazioni
1997, 173-189. Milan: FrancoAngeli.
32 MAREN BORKERT AND TIZIANA CAPONIO
1 Naturalisation politics in Switzerland:
explaining rejection rates at the local level
Marc Helbling
1 Introduction1
The way one gets a passport in Switzerland is very different from the
procedures in other countries. To my knowledge, Switzerland is the
only nation state in the world where naturalisations happen at the local
level. Every municipality, be it a town of 100,000 or a village of 400 in-
habitants, is accorded the right to decide who can become a Swiss citi-
zen. As regulations on the national and cantonal (sub-national) levels
are very sparse, each political local entity decides on the formal proce-
dure and criteria according to which its alien residents are naturalised.
Given the high degree of autonomy possessed by municipalities in this
policy field, the naturalisation procedures, the applied criteria, and con-
sequently the ratio of rejected candidates vary greatly from one munici-
pality to another.
In the last few years, after discriminatory decisions were made, the
Swiss system of naturalisation has aroused a great many political and
judicial debates, especially when candidates from the former Yugosla-
via were refused Swiss citizenship in municipalities where the popula-
tion has decided on applications by secret ballot. Opponents of this sys-
tem criticise the arbitrariness of the municipal decision-making pro-
cesses because they expose the candidates to the attitudes of the local
population and politicians. They demand that procedures be standar-
dised and decisions be made exclusively by the local administration or
by the executive body and no longer by the population. In July 2003,
the Swiss Federal Court rendered a verdict according to which popular
votes by ballot on naturalisation requests violate the Swiss Constitu-
tion. In May 2004, it further declared that decisions during municipal
assemblies have to be made by open ballot. Since the Swiss Federal
Court regards naturalisations as purely administrative procedures, it
has declared that justifications for the decisions, and possibilities for
appeals against such decisions on this subject, must be made available.
These two rights, according to the Swiss Federal Court, are not guaran-
teed by the system of votes by ballot. Advocates of the existing system
object that these verdicts violate the autonomy of the municipalities
and the democratic rights of the Swiss citizens. They claim that the po-
pulation of each municipality should have the right to decide according
to which procedures and criteria foreigners are naturalised.
Surprisingly, although local naturalisation politics in Swiss munici-
palities constitutes a timely political issue in Switzerland and provides
a unique opportunity to study citizenship politics, this topic has been
inadequately studied so far. The political debates on legal norms have
been accompanied by judicial studies treating the question of the con-
stitutionality of local naturalisation procedures (Auer & Von Arx 2000;
Thu¨rer & Frei 2004). At the same time, ethnographic studies have
gone beyond the legal aspects of citizenship and demonstrated, among
other things, the complexity of local citizenship politics by means of
single case studies (Arend 1991; Centlivres 1990; Centlivres et al. 1991;
Steiner & Wicker 2000, 2004; Achermann & Gass 2003). In particular,
the works collected in Steiner and Wicker (2004) and the case study of
the town of Basel in Achermann and Gass (2003) deliver helpful in-
sights into the various aspects and moments of municipal naturalisa-
tions. However, these studies treat the question of why some municipa-
lities pursue a more restrictive policy than others only at the margins,
if at all. So far, Piguet and Wanner (2000: 66-74) and Bolliger (2004)
provide the only, even if explorative, investigations that attempt to ex-
plain policy outcomes in citizenship politics.
This chapter seeks to explore local naturalisation politics more sys-
tematically, applies a comparative perspective and takes the question of
causality more seriously, in an effort to explain why in some municipa-
lities more candidates for naturalisation are rejected than in others. I
will put forward three political and cultural factors to help us under-
stand why some municipalities pursue a more restrictive naturalisation
policy than others. Given the high degree of Swiss federalism and the
autonomy of local units in citizenship matters, one first expects to find
different understandings of citizenship, i.e. diverging ideas of what it
means to become a Swiss citizen. While such ideological aspects cer-
tainly play a crucial role, I will further account for the contentious and
political nature of citizenship politics. This will lead us to account for
the political actors in these municipalities and how influential they are
in local politics. I argue that municipalities in which the Swiss People’s
Party – a major right-wing populist party – is powerful reject more
applicants than others. Finally and especially in light of the recent
controversies, I will also test whether or not direct democratic decision-
making procedures lead to more rejections. I will argue that such
institutions provide an opportunity for right-wing populist parties to
mobilise the people. Moreover, the rule of anonymity favours discrimi-
natory decisions as social control and external checks are absent to
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inhibit selfish behaviour. The analyses will reveal that these three
factors have a significant impact on the rejection rates. I will further
show that socio-economic and socio-structural factors such as the
unemployment rates, the ratio of foreigners living in a municipality
and the ratio of applicants from Muslim countries – nowadays the
largest immigration group in Switzerland – have no influence. The size
of a municipality, its degree of urbanity or whether it is situated in a
specific language region have no impact, either.
The next section will present in more detail how foreigners are nat-
uralised at the local level in Switzerland. Then, I will specify why it is
preferable to operationalise the naturalisation policy of a municipality
with the rejection and not the naturalisation rates. As I will argue, the
latter depends on both the demand and the supply side, while the for-
mer primarily reflects the actual citizenship policy. In order to get some
ideas how to explain local naturalisation politics, I will in a next step
discuss various studies that have explored local and regional naturalisa-
tion and immigrant politics in different European countries. Most of
these works came to the conclusion that it is mainly political and cul-
tural factors that help us understand the various policy outcomes. On
the basis of this general idea I will then present in more detail three ar-
guments and explore to what extent they help explain the local naturali-
sation policies. In light of the increasing political debates over the nat-
uralisation of immigrants from Muslim countries, I will test the model
for both the general rejection rate and that of this particular group.
2 What is to be explored: naturalisation procedures in Swiss
municipalities
A Swiss citizen is not only a member of the national community of his
or her country, but also of a canton (i.e. sub-national state) and of a
municipality. Accordingly, a foreign resident applying for citizenship
gets naturalised at all three levels. The sequence of decision-making
with regard to naturalisations between the three political levels differs
from canton to canton. However, in each case the procedure on the lo-
cal level constitutes the crucial part of the process. Whereas the deci-
sions of the Confederation and the cantons constitute rather formal
and administrative procedures on the basis of very few but clearly spe-
cified criteria, the municipalities make mainly political decisions. The
federal law on citizenship merely stipulates that only those foreign resi-
dents can be naturalised who have lived in Switzerland for at least
twelve years, respect the legal order, do not compromise the interior
and exterior safety of the country, and are integrated and familiar with
Swiss habits and customs. The first three criteria are quite clear, easy
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to verify and are always checked by the federal administration. As for
the questions of integration and familiarity, not only do they constitute
vague requirements, but they also are judged exclusively by local
actors.
Which local actors are involved in the decision-making processes?
The local administration is in most cases in contact with the applicants
during the entire naturalisation procedure. They inform them about
the formal aspects of the process and check whether certain criteria for
naturalisation are fulfilled. Often they also discuss with candidates
whether they have any chance of getting a Swiss passport and make re-
commendations to the political bodies (local parliament or naturalisa-
tion commission, etc.) involved in the process. In almost all municipa-
lities a naturalisation commission composed of local politicians dis-
cusses in detail the dossiers and makes recommendations to those who
make the final decisions. Sometimes dossiers are circulated several
times between the various collective bodies involved in the decision-
making processes. It might also happen that the local parliament or
the executive body makes recommendations before the final decisions
are made. Final decisions are made in some municipalities by the en-
tire population, either by ballot or during a municipal assembly. In
other municipalities, it is the local parliament or the executive body
which decides who can become a Swiss citizen.
The candidates often have to pass some kind of exam or interroga-
tion to verify that they are familiar enough with the Swiss political sys-
tem, Swiss history, and the language of the particular region. There ex-
ists a wide range of different naturalisation policies, from very gener-
ous to very restrictive. In some municipalities, a complete integration
of the naturalisation candidates is presumed after twelve years of resi-
dence in Switzerland. In other municipalities, applicants have to prove
their degree of integration by passing tests or by showing how well
they are acquainted with the Swiss citizens of their municipality. How-
ever, it would be too simplistic to range the municipalities exclusively
along such a scale, since naturalisation procedures also differ with re-
gard to the issues that mould the respective debates. In some cases,
language ability constitutes the crucial element of the contest. It may
happen that some actors in a specific municipality require that the ap-
plicants speak Swiss German, whereas for others it suffices that they
have a good command of any of the four national languages. In still
other municipalities, the question at the centre of debates is whether
applicants can be naturalised who are benefiting from social security
or disability insurance is.
The local administration and decision-makers decide whether and to
what extent candidates have to pass such tests or interrogations. The
criteria can therefore differ among municipalities even within the same
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canton. Formal regulations at the local level are rare and, when they ex-
ist, the criteria that have to be fulfilled are formulated in a very general
way. Decisions therefore depend even more on the interpretations of
municipal politicians or the opinions of the local population. Moreover,
it appears that various actors are involved in municipal naturalisations
and that the evaluation of the candidates’ dossiers occurs at different
stages. Naturalisations can therefore be compared to decision-making
processes in other political fields where political actors have to come to
an agreement as to which policy should be pursued.
3 What is to be explained: the rejection rate
Given the high degree of autonomy possessed in the naturalisation
field, municipalities pursue different citizenship policies. While some
prefer a high degree of integration and require that candidates fulfil
many criteria, others have a more liberal position and put up only a
minimum level of requirements. To analyse why some municipalities
pursue a more restrictive naturalisation policy, how the dependent vari-
able was operationalised – i.e. the outcome of naturalisation politics –
must be specified. At first glance, the naturalisation rate, i.e. the ratio
between the yearly number of naturalisations and the number foreign
residents, appears to provide a useful indicator. These data have already
been used in other studies on local naturalisation politics (Piguet &
Wanner 2000; Bolliger 2004) and are easily accessible since they are
provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office. However, the applica-
tion of this indicator poses a problem as it depends on both the de-
mand and the supply side. A low naturalisation rate might be ex-
plained by either a restrictive naturalisation policy and/or because the
demand on the part of the foreign population is low. Moreover, since
the ratio is measured within the overall foreign-resident population,
changes of the naturalisation rate might tell us more about the immi-
gration flows (the denominator in the calculation) than about the de-
sire of foreign residents to become naturalised (Ludwig 2004: 509-510;
see also Bultmann 1999: 206-212). For the following analysis, however,
an indicator that depends on the supply side only is needed, for I am
not so much interested in why somebody applies for Swiss citizenship.
Rather, I would like to know why in some municipalities the naturali-
sation policy is more restrictive than in others. I propose, therefore, to
analyse the local naturalisation policy by means of the rejection rate:
that is, the ratio between the rejected and the submitted applications.
Once the applications are handed in, naturalisation candidates no long-
er have control over them; whether they are rejected or not depends en-
tirely on the supply side: that is local citizenship policy.
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Although the validity of this indicator is much better for what I seek
to explain, it is somewhat problematic for two reasons. First, it does
not consider that certain candidates interrupt their applications during
the procedure. It may happen that applicants are recommended to
withdraw their dossier when it appears that they do not fulfil all criteria
for naturalisation (often because of insufficient command of language).
Unfortunately, such information is not at my disposal. In interviews
with the responsible officials at the local administrations it appeared
that most municipalities do not know exactly how many dossiers are
not passed through to the final decision. However, most of them told
us that withdrawn applications are normally resubmitted some years
later, for example, after candidates have improved their linguistic profi-
ciency. As a relatively long period of twelve years is analysed, such ap-
plications should not strongly affect the validity of my indicator. Sec-
ond, the indicator does not consider either that some alien residents
might not apply because they do not expect to be naturalised in muni-
cipalities with a restrictive naturalisation policy. Such a deterrent effect
is difficult to measure and could only be analysed by interviewing po-
tential candidates who did not apply for Swiss citizenship. Such data
have not been collected systematically so far, since studies analysing
the reasons to acquire the citizenship of one’s host country have either
left out this question or concentrated on freshly naturalised candidates.
In Switzerland, ethnographic studies not only investigated the moti-
vations of potential candidates to apply for Swiss citizenship, they were
also interested in the factors leading candidates from the idea for ap-
plying to the actual application (Centlivres et al. 1991: 157-160; Acher-
mann & Gass 2003: 173-179). Interestingly, the studies reveal that such
decisions are not always consciously taken and cannot be explained by
clearly distinguishable factors. Rather, they often seem to be accidental
and the result of a combination of causal factors and specific circum-
stances. It was found that foreign residents often apply only after they
inadvertently acquired necessary information about the formal proce-
dure or after friends or relatives have drawn their attention to the op-
portunity to naturalise themselves. These studies also discuss the dis-
comfort naturalisation candidates have with some aspects of the proce-
dure and reveal that some applicants experience the naturalisation
procedure as exhausting, complicated and even humiliating to a certain
extent.
Although such information reveals attitudes of candidates towards
the naturalisation procedure, those are the statements of persons who
were not deterred from submitting their application. They do not ne-
cessarily help us know whether or not – or, for that matter, how many
potential candidates – did decide not to submit an application. On the
other hand, however, these studies show that potential candidates seem
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to know the naturalisation procedures and how difficult it is to get nat-
uralised because they are often in contact with persons who have al-
ready been naturalised. Therefore, one can assume that some people
are deterred from submitting an application in municipalities with a
restrictive citizenship policy. But it is unlikely that such a deterrent ef-
fect lowers the rejection rate since it cannot be assumed that the local
decision-makers would accept more applicants if such persons sub-
mitted a naturalisation request. On the contrary, it is likely that even
more candidates would be rejected in municipalities with a restrictive
understanding of citizenship, assuming that such deterred persons
would constitute borderline cases. In this case, the rejection rate would
be even higher in such municipalities, and the difference between local
settings with a generous and restrictive naturalisation policy even more
pronounced.
To obtain information on the rejection rates and further information
on the formal aspects of local citizenship politics, the administrations
of 207 municipalities were contacted in the summer of 2003 to com-
plete a questionnaire.2 Despite the fact that citizenship politics consti-
tutes a highly politicised issue, there were no major difficulties in ob-
taining the requested information. Seventy-eight per cent (N=162) of
all 207 municipalities responded, and 74 per cent (N=154) provided us
with their average rejection rates for the period between 1990 and
2002. For the selection of the municipalities, I resorted to a dataset
comprising data of three national surveys in all Swiss municipalities in
1988, 1994, and 1998 executed by Ladner and his colleagues (see inter
alia Ladner 1991). This dataset provides important information on the
socio-economic and political structures of nearly 80 per cent of all
Swiss municipalities, which were used for my analyses. Since almost
no systematic information on local citizenship politics has been at my
disposal, the only selection criterion was the size of the municipalities.
I assumed that the ways according to which decisions are taken and
opinions are formed are different in urban and rural areas.3 Accord-
ingly, I first selected all municipalities in the dataset with more than
10,000 inhabitants (N=107), and randomly selected 100 municipalities
among the remaining communities with fewer than 10,000 residents
which are documented in the Ladner file.
Let us now take a closer look at the rejection rates of the municipali-
ties in the sample. To make valid explanations, it must be certain that
there is enough variance in the dependent variable and that the differ-
ences of rejection rates are significant. This refers to a central aspect of
this study, namely that different practices of citizenship within a nation
state are observable. Not even the most orthodox essentialist or cultur-
alist would assert that all citizens of a nation state have exactly the
same understanding of citizenship. To counter their arguments, that
NATURALISATION POLITICS IN SWITZERLAND 39
the differences are significant must be demonstrated. To that end, it
must be ensured that high rates are caused by a relatively high number
of rejected applications. Keep in mind that 50 per cent of the roughly
2,800 municipalities in Switzerland have fewer than 1,000 inhabi-
tants. Consequently, the number of naturalisation applicants is very
low in these municipalities. The rejection of one or two candidates
would already have a high impact on the rejection rate. For example, in
one municipality of the sample, only four dossiers were submitted be-
tween 1990 and 2002, and one of them was rejected. Without looking
in detail at this particular case, it would be too risky to conclude that
this municipality pursues a restrictive citizenship policy by rejecting 25
per cent of the submitted applications.
Surprisingly, I found that in almost all municipalities where only up
to ten applications were submitted between 1990 and 2002, none of
them was rejected (Helbling & Kriesi 2004: 46-48; see also Piguet &
Wanner 2000: 56-58). Does this mean that small communities pursue
a more generous citizenship policy? Given the very small number of
candidates, it is hard to tell, since the acceptation rate depends on very
few individual cases. Of course, it might be that in such municipalities
foreigners are better integrated, as it might be assumed that they have
more contact with the local population and become faster accustomed
to local customs and traditions. Therefore, they meet with less resis-
tance of the local population when they seek to become a full member
of their municipality. However, an opposing argument is also quite
conceivable. It might be that in such places of mostly rural character
the municipal citizens are less willing to accept new members because
they are less used to being in contact with foreigners and much sooner
consider their municipality as a homogeneous community than citi-
zens of larger towns do. Considering the small size of these commu-
nities, negative decisions are anticipated more easily and potential can-
didates deterred from submitting their dossiers.
To be sure that there are significant differences among the various
rejection rates, I decided to sort out those cases in which fewer than
ten applications have been submitted in the period under investigation
from 1990 to 2002. These cases correspond roughly to the group of
municipalities in my sample with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. From
the 154 municipalities providing data on submitted and rejected appli-
cations, 48 cases are not considered for the following analyses. In the
remaining 106 cases an average number of 336 applications were sub-
mitted, the standard deviation being 391. The rejection rate varies be-
tween 0 and 50 per cent, has a mean rate of 9.6 and a standard devia-
tion of 10.6. I thus can be sure that the rejection rate varies consider-
ably and that the variation is caused by a substantial number of
rejected applications. Excluding cases with few applications for natura-
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lisation implies, of course, that any statements about citizenship poli-
tics in very small municipalities not be made.
4 Looking for explanations: local citizenship politics in Europe
Let us now turn to the question of how to explain diverging local citi-
zenship policies. To this end, I first look at studies that have explored
local citizenship politics in other European countries. Diverging appli-
cations of citizenship laws and understandings of nationhood are not
found only in Switzerland. With regard to the implementation of natur-
alisation laws, the one case that probably comes closest to the Swiss
system is Germany, where citizenship law is regulated at the national
level but executed by the La¨nder (sub-national states) (see Hagedorn
2001a, 2001b; Ludwig 2004; Dornis 1999, 2001; Bultmann 1999).
The La¨nder are accorded the competence to organise the naturalisation
procedure and to decide who fulfils the criteria for being naturalised
and who does not. A crucial difference between the two countries is,
however, that in Germany an administrative body decides on applica-
tions. This does not foreclose the possibility that different standards
may be applied: various studies have shown that naturalisation rates
and citizenship politics differ significantly between the La¨nder (Hage-
dorn 2001a, 2001b; Dornis 1999, 2001). The varying applications of
federal citizenship laws in Germany are often explained by the political
orientation of the regional governments and the attitudes of the autho-
rities that are involved in the decision-making process. Hagedorn
(2001a, 2001b), for example, observed changes in naturalisation poli-
cies when the political majority of a Land switched from right to left or
vice versa. More interestingly, she has shown that the number of natur-
alised foreigners depends on the attitudes of the representatives of the
regional administrations (see also Bultmann 1999: 196-202). Thra¨n-
hardt (1999) has even revealed that in one Land differences exist at the
local level between different naturalisation offices, depending on the re-
sources of the responsible authorities, and how they control the docu-
ments of the applicants. Dornis (2001: 76-85) explored how language
tests and the verification of the candidates’ documents varies among
the La¨nder, and discovered that individual officers regularly encourage
applicants to withdraw their application if the officers have the impres-
sion that they have little chance of being naturalised. Hagedorn
(2001b: 40) reports that it sometimes happens that the authorities pro-
tract the procedures on purpose when they consider the regulations too
generous for certain candidates.
In other countries, divergent practices of citizenship can be ob-
served, too. Waldrauch and Cinar (2003) and Cinar and Waldrauch
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(2006) present diverging implementation policies and integration re-
quirements at the regional level in Austria. They explain regional dif-
ferences with the indeterminate nature of the integration require-
ments. Some provinces require that applicants adapt to the ‘Austrian
way of life’, be active in local associations and have a high level of lan-
guage proficiency while other provinces are much more liberal. There
are also differences concerning the fees for acquisition of Austrian na-
tionality. North (1985, 1987) examined the administrative structure of
the American naturalisation programme, and came to the conclusion
that the formal procedures and the approaches of the examiners vary a
great deal among district offices. There are differences with regard to
how language tests are evaluated and how and when people are per-
suaded to withdraw their dossiers when they seem not to be qualified
for naturalisation. He has demonstrated that rejection rates vary be-
tween 0.0 and 11.5 per cent (North 1985: 38-39). Differing implementa-
tions of the naturalisation laws can even be observed in highly centra-
lised states such as France. Weil (2004: 377-387) observed applications
that clearly contradict the idea of a voluntaristic citizenship model with
which France is often associated. In some regional offices, candidates
are even manifestly dissuaded from applying for French citizenship.
While Costa-Lascoux (1996: 149) reports that the assimilation of candi-
dates is tested very differently from one regional office to the other, Ha-
gedorn (2001b: 43-44) found that candidates are often refused for lack
of assimilation. Since the degree of assimilation is exclusively judged
by regional officers, arbitrary decisions cannot be excluded (see also
Fulchiron 1996).
Variations in the national consciousness can be observed not only in
the context of naturalisations, but also, more generally, when local inte-
gration politics and how municipalities manage ethnic diversity are
analysed. It is often argued that cities have always been more con-
fronted by problems related to migration than nation states are, and
thus constitute more interesting cases to analyse (Rogers & Tillie 2001;
Rogers 2000; Penninx et al. 2004b; Favell 2001). In those studies, it is
argued that the local political structures shape the ways migrants are
integrated. Although an influence of the national citizenship regime
on local politics can sometimes be detected (e.g. Garbaye 2004), var-
ious empirical studies have demonstrated that forms of local integra-
tion and citizenship policies cannot be explained (at least not exclu-
sively) by their rootedness in a national system. The essays collected in
Penninx et al. (2004a) demonstrate that in various countries local poli-
tics towards immigrants varies a lot, and that this heterogeneity is
mainly attributable to differences between local political systems and
prevailing citizenship paradigms. Ireland (1994), Koopmans (2004)
and Bousetta (1997) demonstrate that local integration regimes and ci-
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tizenship frameworks have an impact on the way, and on the degree to
which, immigrants participate in political debates. Garbaye (2000) has
explored how two cities in France and the United Kingdom manage
ethnic diversity and identifies three elements which explain the differ-
ent approaches: the relations between central and local governments,
the organisation of political party systems and the organisation of local
government. It is particularly interesting to observe that even in a
country such as France cities make differential use of their existing dis-
cretionary power to integrate foreigners (Moore 2001, 2004).
5 The arguments and how to operationalise them
Studying naturalisation and migration politics at the regional or local
level permits us to abolish the idea of homogeneous nation states and
to demonstrate that citizenship can take different forms and meanings
within a nation state. All of the aforementioned studies partly explain
differences in naturalisation or migration politics by the different atti-
tudes of the regional authorities and politicians towards the question
of who has the right to become a citizen of their country. The fact that
different citizenship or migration policies are pursued within a country
suggests that these policies cannot simply be explained by national citi-
zenship models. Rather, it is necessary to explore how these models
are applied and how this implementation depends on local understand-
ings of citizenship and political constellations. In other words, it is cul-
tural and political factors that explain the diverging citizenship policies
– how people perceive Swiss citizenship and how they struggle over
the question of who can be admitted for naturalisation. To specify this
idea, I develop three arguments.
The first argument draws on Brubaker (1992) and Favell (1998) who
argue that it is cultural idioms and political traditions that explain the
respective citizenship policies. Brubaker’s (1992) comparison of citi-
zenship politics in Germany and France is probably the most promi-
nent study adopting this approach. According to him, differences in ci-
tizenship politics and immigrants’ attitudes towards naturalisation are
due to the fact that France represents a republican, expansive, and as-
similationist model of citizenship, while Germany defines citizenry as
a community of descent that is very restrictive towards non-German
immigrants. Similarly, Favell (1998) explains the divergent responses
to ethnic and racial groups in France and the UK in terms of each na-
tion’s public philosophy and political tradition. According to him, it is
France’s republican tradition that favours a policy of integration rather
than accommodation and consequently opposes separate Islamic insti-
tutions because this arrangement would violate the state’s ideological
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commitment to integrating individual outsiders into the French politi-
cal culture. On the other hand, in the UK, more emphasis is placed on
allowing separate groups to retain their distinctive identities. As a con-
sequence, Islamic groups and the development of independent Muslim
communities are recognised through public policy.
To be sure, Swiss municipalities are no nations. It might nonetheless
be the case that different understandings of what it means to be part of
the Swiss nation prevail at the local level. As it is hardly possible to dis-
tinguish clear citizenship models such as Brubaker and Favell have pro-
posed, I prefer a continuous scale, which differentiates how restrictive
or exclusive the understanding of citizenship of a certain municipality
is. At one end of the scale are those municipalities with a very liberal
understanding of citizenship. At the other end (though allowing for
several options between the extremes), are those municipalities with
very hostile attitudes towards immigrants. To measure cultural idioms
or public philosophies Brubaker (1992) and Favell (1998) rely on offi-
cial discourses, political decisions, etc. In this case, I had to resort to al-
ternative sources, since written documents hardly exist and interviews
with local actors were not possible for such a large sample. To find out
how restrictive the understanding of citizenship of a municipality is, I
base my analysis on municipal results of national referenda on aliens’
acts, immigration and facilitated naturalisation between 1982 and
2002.4 These referenda provide information on the attitudes of the re-
spective municipal Swiss population towards alien residents and on the
significance of their national identity. If in a municipality laws on facili-
tated naturalisation are rejected and laws limiting immigration are ap-
proved, this indicates that the majority of Swiss citizens have a restric-
tive understanding of citizenship. I carried out a factor analysis with
the percentages of yes votes. The second resulting factor matched fairly
well with my conceptualisation of an understanding of citizenship and
was therefore retained for the following regression analysis.
While ideological attitudes have a high impact on how foreigners are
naturalised, it is necessary to bring to the contentious and political nat-
ure of citizenship to light: the outcome of a specific naturalisation pol-
icy is the result of ongoing political struggles over the questions of
who we are and who belongs to us. Following Howard (2006), the ac-
tual politics of citizenship must be accounted for – we need to know
which political actors participate in citizenship politics and what their
ideas about the Swiss nation are. Joppke (2003) has argued that left-
wing parties favour a liberalisation and de-ethnicisation of citizenship
politics, whereas right-wing governments prefer a more restrictive pol-
icy and a re-ethnicisation of citizenship politics. I assume that citizen-
ship politics depends to a large extent on right-wing populists and their
influence in naturalisation politics (see also Howard 2006). Immigra-
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tion politics has become one of the main issues of these parties in sev-
eral European countries. In Switzerland the Swiss People’s Party – a
major right-wing populist party – is the most active political actor in
this policy field and defends very pronounced positions. Its representa-
tives fear mass-naturalisations, and incessantly warn of the deprecia-
tion in the Swiss culture that would take place if too many people are
granted Swiss citizenship.
Given the distinct political structures at the local level it is hardly as-
tonishing that municipalities can also be distinguished by their party
systems. Most municipalities have their own sections of cantonal and
national parties. Thus, local political parties constitute crucial actors in
municipal politics. I argue that local naturalisation politics depends to
a large extent on the position of the local Swiss People’s Party. In those
municipalities in which this party plays an important role in local poli-
tics, a higher rejection rate can be expected. For this analysis, I only
have data at hand that provide us with information on the power of the
local parties in municipal politics in general (and not for the domain of
naturalisations in particular).5 This is a rather crude indicator, since
the power structure within a municipality runs only partly along party
lines. However, it is the most valid indicator that at my disposal for a
large-N analysis. This indicator relies on the perception of the strength
of the respective parties. The municipal secretaries were asked to indi-
cate how important each political party is.6 Ladner (1991: 237-238) has
shown that the evaluations of the municipal secretaries are congruent
with the real power distribution. Such an operationalisation is better
than accounting for the seats of the different parties in the local parlia-
ment or the executive body insofar as the number of received votes
does not necessarily reflect the power of these parties. Particularly in
small towns and villages, the position of individual actors is often more
important than the size of the party.
A last relevant factor in naturalisation politics are the formal deci-
sion-making structures. They are of importance insofar as they provide
different opportunity structures facilitating or inhibiting mobilisations
against naturalisation or the activation of discriminatory attitudes (see
Helbling 2009). In the last years, the political and judicial debates in
the context of local naturalisation have mainly focused on those proce-
dures in which the population makes the final decision on naturalisa-
tion requests by ballot or during a municipal assembly. It is argued
that such procedures enable discriminatory decisions because people
do not have to render an account for their decisions. I think that direct
democratic institutions provide a particular opportunity for right-wing
populists to mobilise the people for their cause and argue that anon-
ymous decisions favour discriminatory decisions as social control and
external checks to inhibit selfish behaviour are absent. Guiraudon
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(1998: 287-297) puts forward a challenging argument concerning the
mobilisation hypothesis. According to her, it is the scope and locus of
political debate that is relevant for policy outcomes (see also Gamble
1997: 249). It makes a difference whether immigration and citizenship
policies are the object of intense political mobilisation and public de-
bates or whether the status of foreigners is discussed mainly within
the bureaucracy. Whether these issues are debated in open or closed
political arenas changes the actors and processes involved. In the case
of immigration and citizenship, public debates are very much influ-
enced by actors pursuing a restrictive immigration and citizenship pol-
icy. Marginal actors such as extreme-right parties who have otherwise
no channels of access to the restricted policy venues get the opportu-
nity to put forward their positions.
The most famous case of local naturalisation politics in Switzerland
provides an excellent example in this regard. In the town of Emmen,
on the outskirts of Lucerne, the municipal parliament decided about
naturalisation applications until 1999, when the majority of the popu-
lation voted in favour of a referendum, launched by the Swiss Demo-
crats – a minor right-wing party – which required that henceforth deci-
sions should be made by closed ballot. This change of procedure gener-
ated a lot of media attention and public debates in Switzerland as well
as a great deal of astonishment beyond the Swiss borders. After the
change, the population of this town regularly took discriminatory deci-
sions refusing most or all candidates from Muslim countries. The fact
that anonymous decisions can have an impact is also illustrated by one
of my case studies in which decisions are often but not always taken
by closed ballot (see Helbling 2008: ch.4). In this municipality, recent
years have witnessed individual citizens requesting decisions be made
by closed ballot. Each time the request was accepted, all applications of
citizens from Muslim countries that were up for decision were rejected.
During other assemblies, when the population voted by open ballot, al-
most no candidates were refused. A representative of the administra-
tion of this municipality told us that the persons who demanded a vote
by closed ballot were known as quite xenophobic and normally did not
attend the local assemblies. The exceptional appearance of such per-
sons at these two particular assemblies provided an opportunity for a
majority of the population to reject applicants from Muslim countries.
It seems that the absence of social control enhances discriminatory
decisions when decisions are taken anonymously. Of course, social con-
trol only has an impact if the person is motivated to comply with the
referents in question. Moreover, intentions are not only controlled, but
they can also be reinforced if other people share the same attitudes. In
municipalities with a traditionally rather restrictive naturalisation pol-
icy it is certainly much easier to publicly maintain discriminatory argu-
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ments against certain groups of foreigners. It might however be as-
sumed that the basic principles of liberal democracy such as equality of
treatment constitute important arguments in most local debates on
naturalisation. Such normative and moral standards are not only diffi-
cult to counteract, they also constitute in themselves social control me-
chanisms or external checks that avoid blind, selfish and short-sighted
behaviour and enhance reasonable and non-regrettable outcomes (Offe
& Preuss 1991).
As for the operationalisation of the decision-making structure, I have
transformed the nominal variable of the formal procedures into dum-
my variables. In the analysis, I will make a distinction between munici-
palities in which the entire population decides at closed ballot and
those in which decisions are taken during municipal assemblies. While
both systems constitute direct democratic institutions, let us see
whether it makes a difference when decisions are taken in complete
anonymity at closed ballot or when people have to show their hands
during municipal assemblies.
Besides these three explanatory factors – the local understanding of
citizenship, the influence of political parties and the formal decision-
making structures – I will control for a series of other variables. Var-
ious researchers have argued that the interrelationship between citi-
zens of a country and its immigrants can be explained by economic
and socio-structural factors. Olzak (1992) argues that economic compe-
tition between ethnic groups leads to conflict. Competition for its part
is the result of socio-structural changes undermining traditional local
identities and opening the opportunity for ethnic identities. She enu-
merates four processes that influence competition and ethnic conflicts:
a large number of immigrations, economic crisis, augmenting re-
sources of the ethnic groups and organisational structures (political
parties and social movements). Quillian (1995) argues that prejudice is
not necessarily linked to the individual interests of group members but
is rather the result of a feeling that their prerogatives are threatened by
the subordinate group. This feeling of threat is largely influenced, ac-
cording to Quillian (1995), by both the relative size of the subordinate
group and the economic circumstances of the dominant group.
To operationalise these arguments, I will resort to unemployment
rates, ratios of foreigners living in a municipality and the ratios of ap-
plicants from Muslim countries. This last factor is of particular impor-
tance, as nowadays those people constitute the largest immigration and
naturalisation group in Switzerland. As for the operationalisation of
the unemployment rate, the secretaries of the local administrations
were asked to what extent their municipalities have been affected.7
Contrary to the effective unemployment rate, this operationalisation al-
lows us to better measure the perception of the local economic situa-
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tion which might also be influenced by the situation at the regional le-
vel. For the share of foreigners, I simply resort to the percentage of the
population living in a municipality that is of foreign origin. To account
for the impact of the number of candidates from Muslim countries, I
use the ratio between applications from immigrants from the former
Yugoslavia and Turkey and all submitted applications.8
Finally, I will also test whether the location of the municipality has
an impact on naturalisation politics. It might be argued that large and
urban municipalities pursue a more liberal policy. Moreover, it is often
put forward that the population of the French-speaking part of Switzer-
land has a different relationship with its nation and with its foreigners
than the population of the German-speaking part, both being inspired
by the French and German understandings of nationhood, respectively.
The often-evoked gap between these two language regions, when it
comes to questions about political opening towards Europe, could also
be relevant in citizenship politics. Consequently, it may be expected
that municipalities in the French part of Switzerland are inspired by
the French republican citizenship model and thus pursue a more gen-
erous naturalisation policy than Swiss German municipalities being in-
fluenced by the German ius-sanguinis principle.
6 The impact of cultural and political factors
In the following paragraphs, I will test the various arguments pre-
sented in the foregoing part. Particularly, I would like to show whether
the local rejection rates can be explained by cultural and political or so-
cio-economic and socio-structural factors. Since data is lacking for the
relative power of political parties for a considerable number of cases, I
retained only the variable for the influence of the Swiss People’s Party
(Schweizerische Volkspartei, SVP) for the regression analysis in Table
1.1. More detailed analyses have shown that other political parties have
no significant influence on the rejection rate. As I disposed of informa-
tion of the strength of the SVP only for a restricted number of munici-
palities, I had to make sure that both the full and the restricted sam-
ples are part of the same population. Thus, the regression analysis for
both samples (see Models 1 and 2) was run. Since it might be assumed
that the power of the SVP has an influence on the local understanding
of citizenship and formal decision-making procedures, the respective
variable has been included separately in Model 3. The individual coeffi-
cients change only slightly between the three models. Therefore, it can
be presumed that both groups are from the same population and that
the indicator of the strength of the SVP has no significant impact on
other variables.
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So far, the results in Table 1.1 confirm the hypotheses and challenge
competing explanation models. It appears that the perception of the
unemployment rate, the ratio of foreigners living in a municipality, the
ratio of applicants from Muslim countries, the language region, the
size and the urbanity of municipality have no direct influence on the
naturalisation policy. Rather, political and cultural elements help pre-
dict the outcome of naturalisation policies: in municipalities with a re-
strictive understanding of citizenship among the population more ap-
plications are rejected. Moreover, it is demonstrated that the dominant
actors and their attitudes must be accounted for: municipalities in
which the SVP is an influential force in local politics refuse more per-
sons the Swiss citizenship.
The rejection rate increases immensely when the entire population
takes decisions by ballot, which confirms the commonly held opinion
that direct democratic decisions lead to a more restrictive naturalisation
policy. However, I observed no significant increase of rejected candi-
dates in municipalities in which the population decides in municipal
assemblies. This can be explained by the fact that in municipalities
with votes by ballot the individual decisions are taken in complete
anonymity, whereas in municipal assemblies one’s show of hands is ex-
posed to other citizens. But what about those assemblies at which deci-
sions are taken by closed ballot? With the data from this survey I was
unable, unfortunately, to distinguish such cases and to systematically
investigate this aspect. However, by means of a more detailed analysis
of fourteen case studies, I was able to distinguish such cases and to re-
Table 1.1 Rejection rates of all applications: non-standardised regression coefficients,
standard error in brackets
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Popular votes at ballot 22.7*** (4.3) 25.7*** (4.5) 28.3*** (4.4)
Municipal assembly 3.0 (2.4) 2.3 (2.8) 2.6 (2.6)
Understanding of citizenship 3.5** (1.2) 4.5*** (1.3) 4.7*** (1.2)
Influence of the SVP - - - - 5.9** (2.1)
Unemployment rate 0.0 (2.1) -0.1 (2.3) 0.3 (2.2)
Ratio of foreign residents 0.1 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1) 0.0 (0.1)
Ratio of Muslim candidates 2.4 (4.2) 1.2 (4.6) 0.2 (4.4)
Language region -2.9 (2.4) -2.8 (2.8) 1.1 (3.0)
Rural area 3.7 (2.5) 0.4 (2.7) 0.9 (2.9)
Number of inhabitants 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Constant 2.5 (4.7) 6.5 (5.0) -1.6 (5.6)
R2 (adj.) 0.43 0.48 0.53
N 95 75 75
Notes: Level of significance: ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; only municipalities have been
retained in which at least ten applications were submitted between 1990 and 2002. Some
cases in Model 1 were lost because data for one or several independent variables were
missing (listwise deletion).
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veal that municipalities with assemblies at which decisions are taken
by closed ballot also reject significantly more candidates (Helbling
2008: ch.5).
I have seen that many incidents and controversies in the context of
local naturalisations refer to a particular group of people, namely the
increasing number of immigrants from the countries of the former Yu-
goslavia and Turkey. A look at the data from my survey shows that 36
per cent of all applications in Swiss municipalities between 1990 and
2002 were submitted by people from those countries. When it comes
to the number of rejected dossiers, the ratio of these people rises to 56
per cent. This makes clear that the majority of rejections concern can-
didates from Muslim countries. Thus, it should be tested whether or
not the models in Table 1.1 mainly explain the rejection rates of appli-
cations of candidates from Muslim countries.
The results of this test are presented in Table 1.2. It immediately be-
comes clear that the explanatory model predicts the number of rejected
applications of candidates from Muslim countries even better than the
general rejection rate. The explained variance rises to 66 per cent in
Model 3. Looking at the individual coefficients it appears that the value
of the indicator for popular votes at ballot increases strongly, although
it is already relatively high in Table 1. The coefficients of the other ex-
planatory factors – the understanding of citizenship and the influence
of the SVP – do not change greatly. This reveals that candidates from
Muslim countries face a particularly hostile naturalisation procedure in
Table 1.2 Rejection rates of candidates from Muslim countries: non-standardised
regression coefficients, standard error in brackets
Independent variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Popular votes at ballot 44.2*** (5.9) 52.0*** (5.6) 54.5*** (5.6)
Municipal assembly 3.5 (3.3) 1.4 (3.4) 1.6 (3.3)
Understanding of citizenship 2.4 (1.7) 4.0* (1.6) 4.1* (1.6)
Influence of the SVP - - - - 5.5* (2.7)
Unemployment rate 0.2 (2.8) 1.0 (2.8) 1.3 (2.8)
Ratio of foreign residents 0.1 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2) 0.0 (0.2)
Ratio of Muslim candidates 7.8 (5.7) 6.8 (5.7) 5.8 (5.6)
Language region -1.6 (3.3) -0.3 (3.5) 3.4 (3.8)
Rural area 2.6 (3.4) -1.8 (3.4) -1.3 (3.3)
Number of inhabitants 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0) 0.0 (0.0)
Constant 0.0 (6.3) 4.7 (6.2) -2.9 (7.1)
R2 (adj.) 0.49 0.63 0.65
N 95 75 75
Notes: Level of significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001; only municipalities have
been retained in which at least ten applications were submitted between 1990 and 2002.
Some cases in Model 1 were lost because data for one or several independent variables
were missing (listwise deletion).
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municipalities where the entire population decides on such requests.
Popular votes not only entail a restrictive naturalisation policy, but are
also the cause of discriminatory decisions against candidates from the
former Yugoslavia and Turkey. It is of particular interest that the actual
number of Muslim candidates has no significant impact on the rejec-
tion rates of this group. This finding reveals that it is not the mere pre-
sence, but rather the perception the local population has of this group
of immigrants that explains the high rejections.
I have also tested the hypotheses for all rejected applications without
those of candidates from Muslim countries (results not shown here). As
expected, the individual coefficients and the explained variance are very
low. Concerning the level of significance of the coefficients, however, I
observed the same pattern as in Tables 1.1 and 1.2. It can be concluded
that the proposed explanatory model explains the rejection rates for dif-
ferent groups of naturalisation candidates and is a particularly good pre-
dictor for the number of rejected candidates from Muslim countries.
7 Conclusion
As my results revealed, to understand local citizenship politics several
factors must be accounted for: how people perceive their nation, how
they struggle over naturalisation criteria which have to be fulfilled to
become a member of one’s community and how decisions are taken.
Contrary to immigration policy, which is often led by economic con-
cerns and the questions of how much foreign workforce a country
needs and sustains, naturalisation is about the much more sensitive as-
pects of how we see ourselves and of who might become a member of
our national community. Accordingly, various studies on local and re-
gional citizenship and immigration politics in the different European
countries presented above have come to the conclusion that it is mainly
cultural and political factors that explain naturalisation politics. Those
works also make clear that the Swiss case is not as special as it first
might appear. Diverging understandings and politics of citizenship can
be observed in various countries.
Looking at a large group of municipalities, as has been done in this
chapter, does not enable us to study local citizenship politics in detail.
Rather, it permits us to sort out variables that have no explanatory
power and to specify what has to be explained. More generally, such a
survey helps set the stage for ensuing analyses and get a rough idea of
which direction to take in a next step in order to unveil the causal me-
chanisms with which to explain citizenship politics. Such a step has in
fact been made elsewhere by investigating naturalisation politics in
fourteen municipalities (Helbling 2008, 2010). These case studies en-
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abled the more adequate measurement of theoretical concepts and the
confirmation of my hypotheses with new data.
More generally, these case studies allowed a better conceptualisation
of what happens when a national group of political actors struggles
over the question of who belongs to their community. To analytically
grasp such struggles, citizenship politics by means of Bourdieu’s (1977,
1990) analytical instruments were studied. Bourdieu never specifically
wrote on nations and nationalism, but he studied neighbouring themes
such as regionalism and identity (Bourdieu 1980) and the genesis of
groups (Bourdieu 1984). The political sociology that he has elaborated
in these works and elsewhere provides challenging analytical tools to
bridge the rigid division between essentialists/culturalists/objectivists
and instrumentalists/cosmopolitanists/subjectivists. It has specifically
done so by accounting for how in ongoing processes dominant inter-
pretations emerge out of different representations of the social world.
Resorting to his analytical instruments enabled the conception of na-
tions as ‘political fields’ in which, according to Bourdieu, actors strug-
gle over the legitimate manipulation of the comprehensive view of the
social world. Observable in those fields are ‘power ideas’ between those
defending a prevailing perception of the world and those challenging
it. It is the political capital of the involved actors that helps us trace the
power structures and predict which ideas have more chances of becom-
ing dominant.
By generating an indicator for the individual understanding of citi-
zenship by local actors, it was possible to distinguish diverging ideas
on how cultural boundaries are drawn and how foreign residents who
apply for Swiss citizenship are perceived. To distinguish majority and
minority positions and to explain why a specific construction prevails, I
proposed including the local power structures in the study. Community
power studies and social network analysis were used to trace the ways
in which influence is exerted. As it turned out, accounting for both the
symbolic and material aspects of naturalisation politics enabled an ex-
planation of rejection rates and the distinguishing of various local citi-
zenship models.
Notes
1 This chapter presents results from a research project on local citizenship politics in
Switzerland that has been generously financed by the Swiss National Science Foun-
dation (NFP 40+) for three years between December 2003 and January 2007. This
chapter draws on an extended discussion of our findings that can be found in Hel-
bling (2008). See also Helbling (2004, 2009, 2010), Helbling and Kriesi (2004) and
Helbling, Egli and Matter (2005).
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2 To attain a high rate of return, I proceeded according to Dillman’s (1978: 160-199) to-
tal design method, which describes the step-by-step details of how to conduct suc-
cessful mail surveys.
3 As it turned out, however, no such difference exists.
4 References to such referenda are also made in other studies to measure locally pre-
vailing attitudes towards foreigners or citizenship politics (Ireland 1994: ch.6; Catta-
cin & Kaya 2005: 309-318; Piguet & Wanner 2000: 66-73; Bolliger 2004). The Swiss
Federal Statistical Office provided the data for this indicator. The following referenda
were considered for the measurement of the indicator: Aliens Act (1982), Federal Re-
solution on the Facilitation of Certain Naturalisations (1983), Federal Law on the Re-
sidence and Establishment of Foreigners (1987), Asylum Act (1987), Initiative on the
Limitation of Immigration (1988), Revision of the Federal Regulation of the Facili-
tated Naturalisation of Young Foreigners (1994), Federal Law on Sanctions against
Migrants (1994), Initiative against Illegal Immigration (1996), Asylum Act (1999)
and Initiative against the Misuse of Asylum Rights (2002).
5 The variables on the perceived strength of political parties and of the unemployment
rate have been taken from a dataset provided by Ladner and his collaborators at the
University of Berne. Together they carried out three national surveys in all Swiss mu-
nicipalities in 1988, 1994 and 1998 (see Ladner 1991).
6 The municipal secretaries were asked how important, in their opinion, party X is in
the political life of their municipality: ‘very important’, ‘important’, ‘rather unimpor-
tant’ or ‘unimportant’. For the regression analysis, the party variables have been di-
chotomised: ‘important’/’unimportant’.
7 The municipal secretaries were asked whether their municipalities have been affected
‘very much’, ‘partly’, or ‘not at all’ by increasing unemployment. This variable has
been dichotomized (not affected/partly or very much affected).
8 I am aware of the fact that not all candidates who emigrated from the countries of
the former Yugoslavia are Muslims, nor can it be certain whether all Muslim appli-
cants are religious. Unfortunately, there is data at our disposal providing information
about the religious affiliation of the individual candidates. However, it is a fact that
Muslims from Kosovo constitute by far the largest immigrant group from the former
Yugoslavia.
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2 Grassroots multiculturalism in Italy:
Milan, Bologna and Naples compared
Tiziana Caponio
1 Integration models at a crossroad: a defeat of
multiculturalism?
‘Multiculturalism’ is one of those polisemic terms whose use is likely
to raise a great deal of misunderstandings and incomprehension. It is
a notion that may be understood in very different ways (Martiniello
1997; Vertovec & Wassendorf 2004; Sciortino 2003; Vertovec 2007):
while in a mere descriptive manner it acknowledges the de facto multi-
cultural makeup of contemporary societies, in political philosophy and
public discourse, more prescriptive and value-loaded understandings
prevail. In this chapter, I will refer to multiculturalism as an analytical
concept, which in sociological and political science research is usually
linked to some notion of recognition. This may occur either on the part
of groups/collectivities calling for the recognition of their own distinc-
tiveness, or on the part of institutions through policies aimed at ad-
dressing groups’ differences. This study is concerned essentially with
policy and, even more narrowly, with local policy, to find which actors
at the local level are likely to mobilise and/or promote issues of recog-
nition and cultural difference.
The existing literature has focused especially on national-level state
policy, identifying different models or regimes for immigrants’ incor-
poration into the rights of citizenship (Brubaker 1992; Castles 1984;
Soysal 1994). Starting from the late 1990s, these models have under-
gone a phase of crisis and revision (Joppke 2006; Carrera 2006). A
convergence towards neo-assimilationist policies has been observed
(Joppke 2006), as indicated by the diffusion of so-called ‘introductory
courses’, i.e., language and civic education for candidate immigrants
and for those who aspire to long-term resident status.
Yet one might wonder if distinct, national models have ever existed.
The isolation of a few macro-institutional variables has often oversha-
dowed the complexity of processes of social integration usually taking
place at a local level, where policies have not necessarily complied with
principles stated at the national level (Favell 2001). Germany is a clas-
sic case in point: whereas conservative La¨nder in the South adhered to
the national guest workers model, left-wing progressive La¨nder in the
North were more likely to promote settlement policies and initiatives
aimed at improving integration (Thra¨nhardt 1992). In the case of Bel-
gium, on the other hand, instead of one unitary national system, two
regional models have been identified (Blommaert and Martiniello
1996, 51), the assimilationist one in the Walloon region and a multicul-
tural one in the Flanders region.
A further contribution to a reconsideration of the primacy of na-
tional integration models comes from the first systematic studies of
immigrant policies in new immigration countries such as Italy and
Spain (Zincone 1998; Baldwin-Edwards 1999, 2002). These countries
have traditionally been characterised by a high degree of territorial dif-
ferentiation, both in terms of cultural identity and socio-economic de-
velopment, as well as by considerable differences in the performance
of local/regional administrations and in the shape of welfare arrange-
ments. Moreover, comprehensive national legislation on immigration
has been approved in relatively recent times, while local/regional poli-
cies were in some cases already in place. As a consequence, especially
as far as social policies are concerned, access may vary considerably ac-
cording to the area where immigrants happen to live: for example, in
certain areas, such as southern regions in Italy or regions like Murcia
in Spain, delegation of services to third-sector organisations prevails; in
other regions, such as Emilia Romagna or Catalonia, local and regional
authorities have been promoting various integration programmes
throughout the 1990s.1
Thus, the study of national models of immigrants’ incorporation into
host countries has not taken into sufficient account the actual complex-
ity of immigrant policy, which often takes shape at a local or regional
level. Studies analysing multiculturalism at a local level, are still few
and far from systematic. In the emerging literature on local immigrant
policy, at least two research pathways can be identified: studies repro-
ducing the logic behind the models which attempt to reconstruct coher-
ent configurations of local immigrant policies (Alexander 2004, 2007);
and studies emphasising the specificity of the city context and of the
policymaking processes taking place at this level (see e.g. Vertovec
1996; Gaxie et al. 1999; Mahnig 2004).
In the first kind of studies, multiculturalism represents one policy
option among others. According to Alexander (2004, 2007), at least
five attitudes towards immigrants can be identified, each one being
the premise of different local policy responses: transient, guest worker,
assimilationist, pluralist and intercultural. Alexander finds that, whereas
transient attitudes are typical of initial labour migration, when immi-
grants make up a small and often undocumented population and the
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local authority is not aware of, or prefers to ignore, their presence,
guest worker attitudes imply the acknowledgement of this presence,
albeit on a temporary basis. Since such immigrants are assumed to
stay only a few years, policies will cater only to minimal basic needs.
The other three categories mark a shift in the social construct of la-
bour immigrants, and occur when local authorities finally realise that
labour migrant presence has become permanent (Alexander 2007:
35). The first two are particularly relevant since they express opposite
worldviews: while the assimilationist attitude assumes that migrants’
‘otherness’ will eventually disappear, the pluralist attitude looks at it as
permanent (Alexander 2007: 47). In terms of policies, local authori-
ties adopting the first kind of attitude will help individual immigrants
to integrate into the dominant host society while minimising the eth-
nic dimension; on the contrary pluralist policies are explicitly commu-
nity-based, i.e. looking at ethnic-based empowerment as a vehicle
rather than an obstacle in the integration process. Finally, the fifth at-
titude and policy response, the intercultural one, is represented essen-
tially as a reaction to pluralist policies and its perceived pitfalls in
terms of stigmatisation and segregation (Alexander 2007: 210): the in-
tercultural attitude stresses the need for more common ground in a
multiethnic society, in order to enable individual immigrants and
minority residents to choose among multiple identities, including
eventually their ethnic one.2
Policy attitudes are combined by Alexander with a second dimension
identifying four different local policy domains: legal-political, socio-
economic, cultural-religious and spatial. This enables him to point out
how cities may adopt different attitudes across the various policy do-
mains. Yet, what I think is more relevant to stress here is that findings
show how cities that more coherently implement a pluralist policy are
Amsterdam, Birmingham and Frankfurt while, by contrast, Paris and
Lille are prototypes of assimilationist attitudes and policies. Clearly, plur-
alist/multicultural3 cities are more likely to be found in national con-
texts traditionally characterised by a multicultural institutional struc-
ture, and the same holds true for the opposite case of assimilationist ci-
ties. Variation in local attitudes – and thus in local policies – towards
immigrants seems to be largely dependent on the national institutional
model into which cities are embedded.
On the other hand, studies emphasising the specificity of local pol-
icymaking contexts have yielded contradictory evidence on multicultur-
al policies. Whereas some scholars point to the more open and prag-
matic attitude of local governments in accommodating cultural differ-
ence (Joly 1992; Leggewie 1993; Rex & Samad 1996; Vertovec 1996,
1999), other accounts contradict such a positive view. Local policies on
immigrants are generally designed to address the fears and particular-
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istic demands of local electorates (Gaxie et al. 1999; De Barros 2004;
Mahnig 2004), who are by no means more enlightened or pragmatic
than national ones.
However, these studies addressing the problematic aspects of local
policy often implicitly take into account just one aspect of the policy
process, thus focusing on decisions pursued officially by municipal ad-
ministrations and on the conditions that lead to the adoption of those
decisions. To get a complete picture of how policies for immigrants ac-
tually take shape at a local level, implementation should also be consid-
ered. According to Penninx and Martiniello (2004: 156), ‘effective im-
plementation [of immigrant policies] will be impossible without enga-
ging the immigrant groups themselves in policy formulation and
implementation’. A comparative analysis of integration policies in such
different cities as Manchester, Toulouse and Marseille (Moore 2004) is
revealing. In the first case, immigrant organisations have, since the
very beginning, been called to take part in local policymaking. While,
in the two French cities, more informal ways of dealing with immi-
grant problems, such as recruiting community mediators, have been
put into place.
In more general terms, despite the convergence of national integra-
tion policies throughout Europe towards a kind of neo-assimilationist
strategy, Penninx and Martiniello (2004) suggest that at the implemen-
tation level an opposite process can be observed. They identify a pro-
cess leading to a convergence of strategies towards immigrants’ recog-
nition and participation, i.e. what might be called soft recognition.4 Two
different layers or spheres of local policymaking are noted: the sphere
of local government’s official policymaking, on the one hand, and that
of formal and informal practices of implementation, on the other. Dif-
ferent actors take part in these spheres, and different strategies are
likely to be pursued.
Official policy has to be formally sanctioned by political actors gov-
erning the city, and thus is likely to be subject to cycles of politicisa-
tion. In contrast, formal and informal practices of intervention and im-
plementation are carried out by complex networks of public institu-
tions and private, especially non-profit, organisations. It is at this less
official level that stakeholders’ collaboration is needed, even though dif-
ferent ways of pursuing this collaboration can be identified. Recogni-
tion and participation of immigrant groups, through the promotion of
multicultural practices, is just one possible strategy, since collective ac-
tors already mobilised on the issue are likely to define ‘the stakeholder’
according to their own vested interests and identities.
This chapter intends to contribute to the emerging debate on local-
level multiculturalism by comparing three Italian cities – Milan, Bolog-
na and Naples – which represent very different contexts in terms of the
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economic situation as well as cultural and political traditions.5 As a
first step, I shall focus on official policy priorities explicitly agreed
upon by political actors. At this level, an opposition emerges between
the assimilationist approach pursued by the administration of Milan
and the multicultural one promoted by that of Bologna, while Naples
lies in between. The reconstruction of implementation strategies,
which is the second step of the analysis, clearly points out a conver-
gence towards practices of formal and/or informal recognition of cul-
tural differences in making services accessible/available for immi-
grants. However, this does not coincide necessarily with a move to-
wards inclusion and participation of immigrant organisations in
policymaking. As a third and final step of the study, I shall look at the
interests and logic behind the actions of the different categories of local
policymakers in order to understand who is likely to endorse multicul-
tural policies/practices and for what reasons.
2 Policies for immigrants in Milan, Bologna and Naples:
a comparison of official priorities
Milan, Bologna and Naples represent very different contexts both in
economic and socio-political terms. Milan represents the post-indus-
trial north-west, now successfully converted to the service economy. Bo-
logna is characterised by the development of small and medium-sized
firms, often export-oriented. Naples is a service metropolis in the less
economically developed south. These cities necessarily offer immi-
grants different job opportunities (Ambrosini 2001), and are also char-
acterised by very different cultural and political traditions. Milan has
the legacy of its industrial past, with a division of responsibility be-
tween Catholic organisations providing social assistance to poor people,
and the unions, which have traditionally been more concerned with
issues of workers’ rights. Bologna has a strong left-wing tradition, as
evidenced by the over 40-year hegemony of the Communist party in
local government. Naples represents a traditional, Catholic, family-
based culture, where the church has always played a role of moral
guidance and material assistance.
In what follows I analyse official immigrant policy priorities from
1993 to 2001. During this period, the three cities were governed by dif-
ferent political majorities which assumed quite different positions on
immigration during the electoral campaign. In the case of Milan, two
right-wing majorities have been governing the city since 1993, the
Northern League (Lega Nord) and the Pole for the Freedoms (Polo delle
Liberta`). In both cases, mayoral candidates’ electoral campaigns took a
negative stance on immigration, emphasising the supposed link be-
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tween illegal entries, deviant behaviours such as prostitution and beg-
ging, and criminality. Integration could be achieved only through work
and acculturation into the receiving society lifestyle and culture.
By contrast, in the case of Bologna, an open, pro-immigrant attitude
can be found in the political programme of the centre-left coalition (i.e.
the Ds, Green Party and Popular Party) that won elections in 1995. Im-
migration was defined as a resource for the receiving society. The stated
goal of public policy was that of building a multicultural society where
cultural diversity should be not just tolerated, but positively integrated.
To this end, particular emphasis was placed on policies favouring inter-
cultural education, community mediation and immigrants’ participa-
tion in the running of social services. However, such a favourable poli-
tical climate changed suddenly in the 1999 electoral campaign, when
the centre-right-wing Pole for the Freedoms mayoral candidate Giorgio
Guazzaloca succeeded in promoting an alternative definition of immi-
gration as a problem of law and order.
As for Naples, in the period considered, immigration did not repre-
sent a relevant issue either in local electoral campaigns or in the politi-
cal programmes of the winning centre-left majority. Traditional
problems such as administrative corruption, unemployment and lack
of public housing dominated the debate. However, starting from 1995
a number of official city documents began to consider the necessity of
providing for immigrants’ participation and integration through speci-
fic policies aimed at supporting foreign groups and organisations.
Table 2.1 shows policy priorities in the period 1993-2001. These have
been identified through an analysis of the official documents approved
by the local executives and/or by the municipal councils (delibere di
giunta e di consiglio), establishing and/or financing services for immi-
grants.6 At least in part, these decisions appear to reflect the political
majorities’ different standpoints on immigration.
In the case of Milan, the Northern League majority focused from the
beginning on a few priorities aimed at supporting individual integra-
tion through housing facilities (shelters and initial-accommodation
centres) and access to jobs (vocational training). Attention was also
devoted to vulnerable categories of immigrants such as refugees, with
specific programmes aimed at assisting their insertion in the labour
market (vocational training and Italian language courses), and traf-
ficked women, with special protection and social integration
programmes. Cultural projects were almost nonexistent, with the
exception of the interpretation and translation service that hired profes-
sional interpreters on an ad hoc basis.
In Bologna, on the contrary, we find a far more diverse list of priori-
ties, combining policy measures directed at integrating both foreign in-
dividual workers and immigrant groups. Similar to Milan, the first
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priority is represented by initial-accommodation centres, in order to
cope with immigrants’ difficulties in finding decent housing at a rea-
sonable price in the private rent market. However, in Bologna this
policy was explicitly framed by the centre-left majority in terms of
‘community centres’, to be run by immigrant groups’ associations. Also
policies such as intercultural education for children, community med-
iation to facilitate access to services and support for immigrants’ asso-
ciations can be clearly characterised as group-oriented, recognising di-
versity in order to facilitate immigrants’ integration into the local
society. At the same time, individual integration is also pursued
through Italian language courses, vocational training schemes and
projects to combat racial and ethnic discrimination.
The electoral victory of a centre-right majority in 1999 led to a
partial revision of these priorities. The project of creating community
accommodation centres was definitively abandoned while, similar to
Milan, along with measures aimed at supporting processes of indivi-
dual integration (i.e. first-accommodation, Italian language courses and
vocational training), particular attention to vulnerable groups such as
asylum-seekers came to the fore. Specific housing and vocational
training schemes were developed, justified by the necessity of avoiding
the risk of deviant behaviours and social marginality because of the
uncertain legal status of this category of migrants. However, some
degree of cultural recognition in making services more accessible to
immigrants was maintained, as pointed out by the continuity of inter-
cultural education for children and community mediation.
Finally, in the case of Naples, a mix of different measures can be ob-
served. Similar to the Bologna centre-right administration, policy prio-
rities combined individual integration (first-information points and vo-
cational training), recognition of groups’ differences (intercultural edu-
cation for children and community mediation) and a programme for
trafficked women. As for this last priority, contrary to a similar project
initiated in Milan in 1997, in Naples the programme was a conse-
quence of the 1998 immigration law which introduced a special fund
for the financing of actions aimed at protecting foreign women forced
into prostitution and sustaining victims’ social insertion.
From the analysis of official policy on immigration, i.e. of the deci-
sions formally agreed upon by different local government majorities, at
least two models emerge: the multicultural model, emphasising immi-
grant organisations’ inclusion and group recognition, as in the case of
Bologna in the period 1995-1999; and the assimilationist model, that
favours individual integration and assistance to particularly disadvan-
taged categories, as in Milan. However, in the cases of Naples and of
the Bologna right-wing administration, mixed patterns of policies
emerge. As demonstrated by Figure 2.1, politics seems to have some
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impact on official policy outputs: centre-left majorities usually show a
preference for recognition policies, consistent with a definition of im-
migration as a resource for the local society; on the contrary, right-wing
governments tend to privilege measures aimed at favouring individual
integration and at preventing deviance among the most vulnerable
groups (refugees, asylum-seekers, trafficked women), according to a de-
finition of the issue as potential problem.
Thus, according to Figure 2.1, at the level of official policy, diver-
gence in the priorities pursued prevails. Yet, external contingent factors
can have an impact: as noted in the case of Naples, the social protec-
tion programme for trafficked women was essentially undertaken on
the basis of national funding. Also, the continuity of cultural policies
during the centre-right Guazzaloca administration in Bologna is at
least in part explained by the availability of regional funding for the
promotion of community mediation and intercultural education pro-
grammes. External funding represents the first factor to be taken into
account when looking for policy divergence/convergence at the local
level.
3 Policy networks and implementation: a reconstruction of
practices
If we look across the columns of Table 2.1, we see that, along with vo-
cational training, a minimum convergence on measures aimed at facili-
Figure 2.1 Political majorities and official policy models in Milan, Bologna and
Naples (1993-2003)
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tating linguistic communication can be identified. However, only in
the cases of the left-wing administrations in Bologna and Naples are
these part of a broader policy project aimed at recognising and includ-
ing immigrant groups. The following analysis of policy networks and
implementation practices is aimed at finding out if, and to what extent,
this project has translated into concrete actions. At the same time, I
shall attempt to identify mechanisms and processes of cultural recogni-
tion which are also at work in Milan, despite the clear preference of of-
ficial policies for individual integration.
In other words, the purpose of this section is to reconstruct practices
of implementation in the three Italian cities in order to find out if
there is any convergence towards soft recognition, i.e. some degree of –
formal or informal – immigrant groups’ inclusion and participation. To
this end, I look at the actors involved in the delivery of immigrant poli-
cies and at their definitions of ‘the stakeholder’, which are crucial in or-
der to identify who is in and who is out of the local policy networks.
3.1 Milan
Since the late 1970s, as the presence of foreign immigrants in Milan
became increasingly perceived, two networks mobilised on the issue
to propose quite different definitions of the phenomenon. There were
Catholic third-sector organisations, on the one hand, and the unions
supporting first-community associations, on the other.
Regarding the first network, two organisations emerged as being
crucial. In 1979, Caritas Ambrosiana opened the first office providing
assistance to foreign citizens in the city. In 1983, on the initiative of
the Cardinal of Milan, the Curia established the Foreigners’ Secretariat
(Segreteria degli Esteri), with the aim of coordinating and integrating
initial-help interventions (e.g. night shelters, canteens) provided by
parish churches and other Catholic agencies. Both organisations
shared a similar conception of immigrants, regarded as ‘new poor peo-
ple’ coming from less developed countries to look for better life
chances in Europe. Whereas the Curia, thanks to its network of infor-
mal voluntary services, copes with the most needy immigrants, includ-
ing illegal ones, Caritas is more concerned with running facilities for
legal immigrants and asylum-seekers, often in partnership with public
administrations.
The second network is composed of two different kinds of organisa-
tions: immigrant associations and the unions. On the one hand, immi-
grant associations began to organise in the 1970s, either as informal
networks or as homeland-oriented political movements. Nevertheless,
the process of settlement taking place in the 1980s caused a reorienta-
tion of these movements, which started to take an interest in the living
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conditions of fellow national workers. A case in point is represented by
the two Eritrean Liberation Fronts, which during this period merged
into the Eritrea Community, catering to the needs of Eritrean citizens
living in the city.7 A similar pattern was followed by student associa-
tions – first Iranian and then Egyptian – which in the same decade be-
came increasingly concerned with the living conditions of immigrants
in Italy, particularly those of their fellow nationals. Labour unions, for
their part, supported this new interest/orientation by promoting a dis-
course centred on the recognition of migrant workers’ rights, including
the right to associate. Community organisations were regarded as
immigrants’ legitimate representatives in the local policymaking
processes.
Thus, at the beginning of the 1980s, two alternative discourses on
immigration were confronting each other in Milan, each one mobilis-
ing different actors. The first one looked at immigrants as ‘new poor
people’ who needed material help and moral assistance, and was pro-
moted essentially by Catholic organisations. The second, in contrast,
centred on issues of citizenship rights and group recognition, and gath-
ered together immigrant associations and the unions with the explicit
purpose of influencing local policy.
Official policies promoted by the then centre-left majority favoured
the immigrant associations–unions coalition. In 1986, the Municipal
Consultative Committee was established, an appointed body providing
the local administration with advice and suggestions on immigration
issues. In 1989, thanks to an agreement between the Education and
the Social Services Department, the Foreigners’ Centre (Centro Stra-
nieri) opened, with the ambition of being a reference point for immi-
grants in the city. Social services were provided by the centre with the
informal collaboration of ethnic leaders, members of the Consultative
Committee who acted as interpreters and mediators. The centre also
provided rooms and facilities for community associations to organise
their activities8 and favoured the creation of immigrants’ cooperatives.
These were entrusted with the running of the municipal initial-accom-
modation centres – foreign-workers’ hostels established with the funds
provided by the 1990 immigration law.9
Yet such a multicultural project of social integration yielded contra-
dictory outcomes. The Consultative Committee progressively became
less influential as a result of a lack of representativeness among many
associations participating in it (Murer 2000: 19; Palidda 2000: 22).
The project of the Foreigners’ Centre also failed because of quarrels be-
tween the managers of the administrative departments: at the end just
a small Foreigners’ Office remained open to deliver first reception and
assistance services. As for the multi-ethnic cooperatives, most of these
organisations lacked experience in running accommodation services.
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Maximum-stay rules (six months) were often disregarded, as were the
monthly fees. Episodes of drug dealing and other illegal activities were
reported by newspapers, causing tensions in the neighbourhoods
concerned.
The situation was further exacerbated by the corruption scandals that
decimated the Milanese political elite in 1992 (the so-called ‘Tangento-
poli’). The Foreigners’ Office was left alone to face the degradation of
the living conditions in the accommodation centres. The electoral vic-
tory of the Northern League in November 1993 left no room for any
positive evaluation of previous multicultural policies. The first two
years of the Northern League’s administration were marked by an ef-
fort to close down the most disreputable accommodation centres and
get rid of the insolvent cooperatives.
Immigrant organisations and the unions mobilised against these
plans for dissolution, and provided support to the people living in the
centres. In order to face these tensions, in May 1995 a roundtable on
immigrants’ housing problems was established gathering together local
politicians, public officials, as well as representatives of the unions and
of Caritas. At the same time, the decision of the Mayor to appoint the
vice-president of a prominent Catholic organisation, the Italian Volun-
tary Movement (Movimento Italiano per il Volontariato, Mo.Vi), as
head of the Social Services Department opened a window of opportu-
nity for the institutionalisation of the Catholic policy network, sanction-
ing the definitive exclusion of immigrant associations (Caponio 2005).
Thus, the implementation of the Northern League policy priorities
was pursued through a strategy of redefinition of the legitimate stake-
holders. These were no longer identified with immigrant groups claim-
ing recognition and participation, but rather with foreign individuals
who needed to be assisted and/or integrated. As a consequence, Catho-
lic associations were regarded as crucial, given their greater profes-
sional experience in providing social services to people of disadvan-
taged social strata.
Issues of cultural difference became of secondary relevance for such
an implementation network. However, at the level of service delivery,
communication problems continued to be dealt with by the Foreigners’
Office through the Interpretation Service. This was a legacy of the pre-
vious implementation network: as mentioned above, in 1989 the For-
eigners’ Office began to collaborate informally with ethnic leaders in
order to address problems of linguistic and cultural communication. In
the following years, the number of foreign interpreters working for the
administration increased constantly, and some of them were employed
as community mediators to act as bridges with their own communities
and facilitating their access to services. However, community media-
tion projects were run on a short-term basis, and targeted essentially
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those groups which were regarded as the more problematic ones, i.e.
the North African workers living in the initial-accommodation centres.
In general, the prevailing approach has always been ad hoc, emergency
interpretation, consisting of the hiring of professional interpreters on
the basis of specific needs.
The service, which is still active, provides interpreters to other munici-
pal offices/services as well as, on demand, to primary schools and hospi-
tals.10 Tasks assigned to interpreters range from mere translation of
documents to supporting social workers. Demands are different accord-
ing to the services concerned. Whereas the Population Register usually
asks for just the translation of documents and certificates, the Family
Support Service (Servizio Sociale per le Famiglie) and the Minors Assis-
tance Service (Pronto Intervento Minori) have more elaborate needs,
such as supporting the establishment of communication with proble-
matic foreign families and abandoned minors (Favaro 2001).
Cultural recognition and mediation, while denied in official policy
and in the implementation network, based essentially on Italian Catho-
lic third-sector organisations, actually inform at least in part delivery
practices. However, this kind of intervention is generally regarded more
as a resource for facing particularly difficult and problematic situations,
rather than as a stable feature of social services for immigrants.
3.2 Bologna
First interventions in favour of immigrants were promoted by the mu-
nicipality of Bologna as early as 1986, when foreigners living in the
city were but a few hundred and, for the most part, students. The Or-
ientation Centre was opened, run by the unions with the purpose of
providing information and assistance to immigrant workers. In 1989,
when flows started to increase consistently, it was always the munici-
pality that took the lead: one billion lire were destined to the provision
of initial-accommodation services. Old schools where groups of immi-
grants squatted were restructured and converted into accommodation
centres managed by union-affiliated cooperatives.
Thus, at the beginning of the 1990s, the main actors dealing with
immigration in Bologna were the municipality and the trade unions.
They were replicating a model built up by the communist administra-
tions governing the city since the end of World War II, i.e. direct deliv-
ery of basic services and contracting out of more specialised ones to
highly professional, union-affiliated cooperatives. Significantly, one of
these cooperatives, called Metoikos, was founded in 1990 by a group of
first-generation immigrants – foreign students and political dissidents
who had already arrived in the 1970s.11 Here, the Catholic movement
was weaker than in Milan and highly fragmented. Parish churches and
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voluntary groups provided some initial help and material assistance,
but these were essentially spontaneous initiatives that never became a
consistent alternative network (Bernadotti 1995).
As is clear, Bologna represents a case of strong public intervention
and low third-sector autonomy. In fact, the local administration contin-
ued to develop ad hoc services for immigrants throughout the 1990s.
This is the case, for instance, of the Documentation Centre on Intercul-
tural Education (Cd-Lei): specialised in intercultural education, it was es-
tablished in 1992 on the initiative of the Education Department, signing
an agreement with the Province, the Provincial Education Authority
(Provveditorato Agli Studi) and the Department of Science of Education
at the University of Bologna. In this context, third-sector associations
have always experienced a low degree of autonomy: either they were di-
rectly involved in the administration policies, as in the case of the un-
ion-affiliated cooperatives, or they were completely marginalised. Immi-
grant organisations could hardly have access to this system unless there
were relational resources to affiliate them with the crucial actors, as in
the case of the Metoikos cooperative.
However, at the beginning of the decade, an internal crisis of the
communist party created pressure for the renewal of such a system
and for the finding of new solutions to manage social policy. In the
area of immigration, renewal meant essentially to shift attention from
initial accommodation towards integration. In the programmes of the
centre-left administration elected in 1995, this implied a recognition of
immigrants’ differences, i.e. of their cultures of origin as well as of
their associations.
To implement such an ambitious goal, a new autonomous agency
was established in 1996, the Institution for Immigrants’ Services (Isti-
tuzione dei Servizi per l’Immigrazione, ISI), directed by an indepen-
dent committee of experts in the field of immigration and social policy.
Its mandate was to implement the policies formulated by the political
executive and coordinate all the public and private actors working on
the issue in the Bologna metropolitan area (Bernadotti & Mottura
1999). Immigrant associations were to take part in this process
through the Metropolitan Forum of Extra-Communitarian Immigrant
Associations, which was officially established in 1997 on the basis of a
project co-financed by the European Commission. Compared to the Mi-
lan Consultative Committee, the forum was not an appointed institu-
tion; all the associations willing to take part were admitted. Over 40 or-
ganisations entered the forum and facilities were provided to support
their activities.12 In 1998, immigrant associations were also invited to
apply for municipal funding.13
This opening of the implementation policy network to immigrant as-
sociations went hand in hand with the building of a multicultural pro-
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gramme of integration. In the area of accommodation, for instance,
the administration pressured the Pakistani, Moroccan and other Magh-
rebi men living in the municipal centres on the outskirts of the city to
form community associations to be entrusted with the everyday run-
ning of the centres. Given a similar problem – providing initial-accom-
modation services for foreign male workers at reasonable costs for the
administration – the Northern League in Milan and the centre-left ma-
jority in Bologna adopted two opposed strategies. While in Milan initi-
al-accommodation services were curtailed, in Bologna the accommoda-
tion policy was framed as an opportunity to empower immigrants’
groups and organisations. Delegation allowed a lowering of the ex-
penses for contracts to third-sector cooperatives.
A multicultural approach was also pursued in the areas of education
and access to social services. As for education, the ISI coordinated the
Inter-Ethnic Pole (Polo Interetnico) project, based on a joint partner-
ship between various schools, seven city districts, the Cd-Lei and a
Catholic association affiliated to the local Caritas. Community media-
tors of different nationalities were made available in order to facilitate
foreign children and parents’ initial approach to schools, and to famil-
iarise Italian students with their cultures of origin. At the same time,
special courses of Italian as a second language were provided.
Access to social services was another key area of concern. In 1998
the first training course for cultural mediators in the social and health
area was organised, which led to the foundation of an association spe-
cialising in health care mediation and interpretation. Other courses fol-
lowed in 2000 and 2001, on the initiative of the Cd-Lei, and new asso-
ciations of foreign cultural mediators were founded.14 Moreover, cultur-
al mediators of various languages were directly employed by the ISI in
the front office service, to welcome foreign clients and to help them to
get access to the facilities offered by the municipality.
Despite the building of an essentially inclusive policy network aimed
at fostering immigrants’ participation in service delivery, some contra-
dictions have to be pointed out, particularly with the community ac-
commodation centres. First, community associations were perceived as
an imposition by the municipal administration, rather than an expres-
sion of genuine ethnic identities, as pointed out particularly in the case
of Maghrebi immigrants, comprised of very different nationalities such
as Moroccans, Tunisians and Algerians (Pero` 2002). Moreover, many
associations turned out to be unable to manage the accommodations,
with a rapid degeneration of living conditions in the centres.
Another contradictory point was represented by participation of im-
migrant associations, although this was a key factor in the multicultur-
al project implemented by the ISI. The Metropolitan Forum of Extra-
Communitarian Immigrant Association was just a first step. It should
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have been completed with immigrant residents over the age of eigh-
teen directly electing two foreign representatives to the city council, the
so-called ‘adjoined’ councillors.15 However, in 1999, the city council de-
feated the proposal elaborated by the ISI and the Forum, leading to the
resignation of the Forum executive.
The election in June 1999 of a centre-right Pole for the Freedoms ma-
jority put a definitive end to the development of the multicultural model
pursued by the ISI. The autonomous agency was closed, the experts di-
recting it dismissed, and responsibility for immigration reassigned to
the Social Services Department. In terms of policy priorities, the new
Immigration Service focused its attention on initial accommodation.
The implementation strategy they adopted was at least in part similar to
the one pursued by the Northern League in Milan: an in-depth revision
of the accommodation system was undertaken by redefining the stake-
holders and thus the actors to be involved in service delivery. The em-
phasis shifted more and more to foreign workers’ individual needs. The
implementation network was therefore opened to Catholic organisations
close to Caritas, which were involved in the running of so-called ‘social
centres’, smaller residential structures implementing specific projects
aimed at supporting the autonomy of the immigrants’ hosts.16 Immi-
grant organisations were marginalised, except for the strongly professio-
nalised union-affiliated cooperatives, which continued to be charged
with the running of initial-accommodation centres. Most of them had
been employing foreign cultural mediators since the mid-1990s.
However, the policy network did not change much as far as integra-
tion services were concerned. Many cultural activities initiated by the
previous administration, such as the Inter-ethnic Pole or the Zonarelli
Intercultural Centre,17 continued to receive financial support. Such con-
tinuity has been favoured by the Emilia-Romagna Region, by assigning
funds to the municipalities in order to carry out projects aimed at en-
hancing the recognition of differences in the delivery of services. To
avoid losing these funds, the Immigration Service continued to collabo-
rate with the implementation network that had been consolidated in the
previous years (Cd-Lei, associations of foreign cultural mediators, etc.),
and which could ensure a long-term experience in the area of intercul-
tural policy.
At the same time, the Immigration Service continued to employ cul-
tural mediators of different nationalities in order to ease immigrants’
access to social services. There were ten such mediators in 2003. In
2002, a Centralised Service of Community Mediation and Social Inter-
pretation was established by the Immigration Service providing quali-
fied foreign operators18 to other offices of the municipal administra-
tion, as well as to other public and private institutions in the territory
(hospitals, schools, training agencies, etc.). As is clear, during the cen-
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tre-right administration, the implementation network encompassing
the local administration, the unions, their affiliated cooperatives and
immigrant associations was not completely discarded. On the contrary,
it actually came to represent the backbone for the development of new
projects, as pointed out by the Centralised Service of Community Med-
iation and Social Interpretation.
3.3 Naples
Similar to Milan, in Naples the first organisations to deal with immi-
grants were also Catholic parish churches, coping with basic material
needs and providing services such as canteens, health centres, night
shelters, showers, counselling and help centres. In some cases, Catho-
lic institutions became a meeting point for informal groups, such as
the Cape Verdean women hosted at the Cappuccini Monks’ convent of
Mergellina and the Sri Lankan immigrants who attended the church of
S. Pasquale in the Chiaia district.
At the end of the 1980s, immigrants also started to organise, often
supported by the unions, which, during the two first amnesties for ille-
gal immigrants, in 1986 and 1990, actively mobilised in favour of re-
cognising immigrant workers’ rights, including the right to participate
in public life through their autonomous organisations. In 1991 the Im-
migrants Regional Coordination Group was set up by the trade union
CGIL (Confederazione Generale Italiana Lavoratori). Together with im-
migrant community associations (Senegalese, Somalis, Filipinos, Sri-
Lankans, Eritreans, among others), prominent religious associations –
Catholic ones, in particular – such as Caritas, the S. Egidio Community
and the Federation of Evangelical Churches also took part in the initia-
tive. A few years later, a new Coordination Group of Extra-Communi-
tarian Associations in Campania (CASEC) was founded by ten foreign-
ers’ associations. These also joined the anti-racism forum promoted by
Italian civil rights organisations.
Thus, in contrast to the other two cities analysed so far, in Naples we
do not find two networks supporting different views on the stake-
holders, but rather an enlarged network agreeing on the necessity of
involving immigrant groups in the development of local policy. This
enlarged network found an opportunity to enter the policymaking are-
na in 1995, when the centre-left majority, which had been governing
the city since 1993, started to get interested in the issue of immigra-
tion. An informal roundtable was established. Along with representa-
tives from all of the public institutions (the prefecture, the police head-
quarters, the regional government, the Chamber of Commerce, the
Provincial Education Authority, the Local Health Administration, muni-
cipal social services, and the Regional Employment Bureau), the un-
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ions, lay and Catholic voluntary associations, and immigrants’ organi-
sations (from Argentina, Somalia, Eritrea, Senegal, Nigeria, Cameroon,
Ivory Coast, Cape Verde and Sri-Lanka) also took part in it.
It is at this roundtable, led by a sociologist with expertise in the field
of immigration, that the official policy priorities (see Table 2.1) of the
centre-left majority were identified and agreed upon. The delivery of ser-
vices was usually contracted out to Italian Catholic and lay organisa-
tions, the only ones able to offer a stable structure and long-term experi-
ence in providing social services. Yet, the projects, especially those im-
plemented by lay cooperatives, were particularly keen to take into
account issues of cultural difference and recognition. This was indicated
by the initial-assistance and information points opened in 1996 in four
districts of the city (territorial front offices). Originally run by Caritas, the
service was contracted out in 1997 to third-sector lay organisations and
became more and more culturally oriented, employing a number of cul-
tural mediators of different national origins. Cultural mediators were
also employed in the implementation of vocational training projects. Ac-
tually, the main initiative carried out in this area by the Dedalus coopera-
tive was a professional course for foreign community mediators, which
resulted in the founding of a multiethnic cooperative called Casba.
Thus, in the implementation of the various projects, as well as in
everyday service delivery, a cultural approach prevails, even though sta-
keholders – immigrant associations – were not formally incorporated
into the system of service provision. One partial exception was the Isla-
mic community: in 1999 this association was awarded a public con-
tract for the running of a municipal information office for immigrants
thanks to the intermediary role played by an Italian association. Yet, in-
formal participation of immigrant associations seems to be the rule,
especially through cultural/community mediators hired on an indivi-
dual basis. This sort of informal participation also takes place in inter-
cultural education projects, which are run by Italian lay cooperatives
employing foreign immigrants as social educators and/or community
mediators.
4 Explaining grassroots multiculturalism: actors’ logic in
different contexts
In this section I analyse in greater depth the interests of and logic be-
hind the actions of the different actors taking part in the making of lo-
cal policies for immigrants, to find out who might endorse multicultur-
al policies and for what reasons. To this end, two different phases of lo-
cal policymaking processes must be distinguished: 1) the decision-
making phase, where official policy priorities and programmes are
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agreed upon, approved and financed; and 2) the implementation
phase, which consists of the translation of official priorities into service
delivery practices. While strictly intertwined, for analytical purposes I
keep these phases distinct.
4.1 Decision-making processes and the setting of official policy priorities
Despite images that tend to emphasise the role of politicians, a num-
ber of different actors actually take part in local decision-making pro-
cesses on immigration-related issues. As a consequence, official policy
priorities are the output of complex negotiations and bargaining, rather
than of a coherent and pre-established model or ideology looking at im-
migrants either as individuals or cultural groups.
Nevertheless, at the local level, elected politicians represent crucial ac-
tors since they have to agree at least on a set of official policy priorities,
even when these are somehow suggested or defined by someone else.
For this category of actors, the main interest is that of building and
maintaining a consensus. As a consequence, multiculturalism repre-
sents a viable solution insofar as it will be considered a ‘good’ policy
frame to gain stable consensus on controversial migratory issues. This
is the case of centre-left majorities in Bologna and Naples which present
immigration as a resource for the society, and thus multicultural policies
as a recipe for establishing positive relations with the foreign popula-
tions living in those cities. On the contrary, in the case of Milan, the pre-
vailing centre-right parties’ political discourse on immigration as a pro-
blem does not allow for any positive evaluation of cultural difference.
According to the cases analysed, once politicians have set the general
frame, either of a multicultural (Bologna and Naples) or an assimilation-
ist (Milan) kind, a strategy of blame avoidance is often pursued: the re-
sponsibility for defining concrete intervention is delegated to experts, i.
e. personalities who are well known for their competence in the field
and are not subject to electoral judgement. In other terms, by resorting
to experts, politicians attempt to minimise electoral risks.
In our analysis, this strategy is seen particularly in the case of Bo-
logna, where an independent agency led by a committee of specialists
was set up, and of Naples, where an expert was called upon to coordi-
nate the roundtable charged with the task of establishing the basis for
immigrant integration policies in the city. Also, in 1995 in Milan, the
Northern League, despite a programme aimed at curtailing immigrant
services appointed an expert as head of the Social Services Depart-
ment. In all of the cases considered, experts have pursued a problem-
solving-oriented logic, i.e. one aimed at providing sound solutions to
perceived problems. As a consequence, multiculturalism will repre-
sent a viable solution for those experts who define issues of immi-
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grants’ integration in terms of group recognition and the validation of
differences. This was the case in Bologna and in Naples, where ex-
perts made considerable – if not very successful – efforts to involve
immigrant associations in policymaking, but not in Milan, since the
appointed expert was far more closed to Catholic NGOs acting for im-
migrants rather than with immigrants.
Of course, politicians usually take care to appoint experts who are
not completely at odds with their own perceptions and definitions of
the problem. Yet, the problem-solving logic is very often likely to con-
tradict politicians’ search for consensus. Bologna is a case in point: the
ISI experts committee strongly supported foreign groups’ participation,
despite the indifference of the centre-left majority that actually defeated
the ISI and Metropolitan Forum of Extra-Communitarian Immigrant
Associations proposals in the Municipal Council.
However, politicians and experts do not act alone, but rather in a
context where other actors are mobilised and seek to pursue their views
on how immigrants should be integrated. This is the case of civil ser-
vants who might have been dealing with the issue well before politi-
cians and appointed experts, thus developing their own ideas on the
matter. They often take part in decision-making processes by providing
proposals and advice, as well as crucial data and information on the
feasibility of the policy interventions supported by politicians and ex-
perts. This a crucial veto power, which is likely to have a considerable
influence on policymaking as well as implementation.19
Usually, bureaucratic offices will endorse multicultural policies inso-
far as these provide an opportunity to gain legitimacy and control over
new financial and/or organisational resources. For example, since new
resources were opened in Bologna by the Emilia-Romagna Region,
public officials continued to carry out programmes such as community
mediation and intercultural education even under the not very cultu-
rally sensitive centre-right administration, relying upon their estab-
lished competence in these kinds of activities. Such expertise was
clearly lacking in Naples and Milan but for opposite reasons. If in Na-
ples it is a matter of administrative inefficiency, in Milan, the preva-
lence of Catholic NGOs in delivering services to immigrants, together
with a public discourse emphasising issues of law and order, did actu-
ally prevent the emerging of any programme explicitly dealing with im-
migrants diversity.
Finally, there is a fourth category of actors who have to be taken into
account when analysing local decision-making processes on immigrant
integration. These are civil society organisations, i.e. third-sector asso-
ciations and interest organisations such as the unions. They contribute
to the setting of official policy priorities through formal and informal
consultations, as well as through their close relationships with politi-
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cians, bureaucracies and/or experts. Their logic of action is centred
upon the recognition of their capacity to efficiently mobilise on the is-
sues, by proposing bottom-up solutions. However, these organisations
may be more or less open to cultural difference, and much depends on
the definition of the stakeholder which is at the core of their mode of
intervention. As pointed out, Catholic associations, which are central in
Milan, have developed their interventions as a consequence of their tra-
ditional activities of assistance to the poor, and usually look at immi-
grants first as needy persons to whom they deliver both material and
moral assistance. The unions and their affiliated NGOs, on the other
hand, that have played a pivotal role in Bologna and Naples have al-
ways been concerned with issues of foreign workers’ rights and, at least
in principle, have been more prone to recognise specific cultural
rights.
Official policy priorities are the output of this complex web of inter-
actions in a policy arena which is likely to take a different shape ac-
cording to the relative power of the actors involved. Consequently, mul-
ticulturalism represents a viable policy option only insofar as it proves
to be a solution coherent with the interests and logic of all the actors
concerned, or at least of those controlling the crucial resources for pol-
icymaking. If this was the case in Bologna, especially during the cen-
tre-left government, the situation seems to be much more fuzzy in Na-
ples (political agreement, in principle, and convergence with the un-
ions’ approach to immigration, but scarce resources and lack of
interest and efficiency on the part of the bureaucratic apparatus) and
decidedly unfavourable in Milan.
4.2 Implementation networks and practices of service delivery
This analysis questions the thesis of a convergence in implementation
processes towards some kind of immigrant group inclusion and parti-
cipation, and thus of soft recognition. On the contrary, different policy
networks are in place based on different definitions of the stakeholder
who is not necessarily identified with immigrant associations or group
representatives. This is especially the case of Milan, where the imple-
mentation network is centred on third-sector Catholic organisations,
carrying out initiatives with the explicit purpose of catering to the
needs of foreign individuals, such as initial and subsequent accommo-
dation, vocational training, assistance to asylum-seekers and refugees
and social protection for trafficked women.
This does not mean that immigrant associations in Milan are non-
existent. Yet, in the context described above, these associations did not
have many opportunities to develop and establish themselves. The
community associations, which were among the best established in the
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1980s, are now far less organised and significant. The majority of im-
migrant associations present in Milan today can be depicted as ‘com-
munity leisure time associations’. They meet on weekends, such as the
Philippine women in Catholic parish churches do (Lainati 2000: 56),
or occasionally get together for national celebrations, as can be ob-
served with the Albanian-Italian Cultural Association (Palidda 2000:
103). There are also a number of well-established multi-ethnic coopera-
tives specialising in cultural mediation services,20 but none was under
any contract with the local administration in the period considered, i.e.
1993-2001.
In the case of Bologna and Naples, on the other hand, immigrant as-
sociations have been considerably involved in implementation net-
works, especially at an informal level. Their relationship with the union
cooperatives and NGOs charged with implementing the municipality
programmes proved to be crucial. However, formal contracts awarded
have been few (Caponio 2005): one in Bologna in the period 1995-
1999 during the centre-left administration and one in Naples to the Is-
lamic Community in the period 1999-2001.
Despite differences in the three cities’ implementation networks, si-
milarities emerge with respect to the practices of actually delivering ser-
vices to immigrants. At the delivery level, some form of cultural recogni-
tion is pursued by street-level bureaucrats. The implicit assumption is
that in order to efficiently deliver services to immigrants, basic problems
of linguistic communication and cultural understanding have to be dealt
with. Even though different conventions are used – social interpreters in
Milan and community/cultural mediators in Bologna and Naples – for-
eign workers play similar functions: they facilitate immigrants’ first ap-
proach and relations with service providers, and they also support front
office operators and practitioners in relating to foreign clients.
However, different conventions may also prove to be relevant, since
these signal different conceptions of cultural differences on the part of
public administrators. In Milan, the emphasis on interpretation clearly
points to a conceptualisation in terms of a transitory problem, to be
tackled by employing professionals able to provide ad hoc translation
and to overcome obstacles in communication. Once these obstacles are
removed, service delivery is supposed to continue in a standard way.
On the other hand, the use of labels such as cultural/community
mediation point to the necessity of favouring a more long-term and on-
going process of reciprocal cultural adaptation. Usually the mediator is
required to master both cultures in order to understand the two con-
cerned parts: the stake here is mastering processes of social change.
Immigrants should be included in order to properly account for their
specific cultural point of view. In such a context, group participation
and inclusion cannot be avoided. Even if not yet fully realised, this
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seems a more favourable context for policies of soft recognition, link-
ing immigrant groups to policy formulation and implementation.
5 Conclusion
If we look at multiculturalism as a policy option – i.e. as a set of public
policies based on principles of (soft) cultural recognition – from the
analysis thus carried out, we see that there are considerable differences
between the cases, both at the level of official policy priorities and of
implementation networks. On the first point, multiculturalism, or poli-
cies recognising groups’ cultural diversity in access to services and so-
cial resources, is a policy option which requires the agreement of all
the actors taking place in local decision-making processes or at least of
those having control of relevant resources.
Elected political majorities are in this respect crucial, since they rely
upon the democratic source of legitimate decision-making: voting. The
analyses carried out in this chapter clearly demonstrate the influence
of other categories of actors. This is particularly the case of civil ser-
vants, who control vital resources for policy implementation. Moreover,
as emphasised in the cases of Bologna and Milan, immigration and
foreigners’ offices play a role in selecting, and thus including or exclud-
ing, civil society organisations which take part in policy implementa-
tion networks.
Consequently, as far as implementation networks are concerned, dif-
ferentiation rather than convergence prevails, in the sense that differ-
ent implementation networks are likely to be established and to conso-
lidate over time. Immigrant associations may or may not be included.
Inclusion depends on the definition of the stakeholder agreed upon by
all the concerned actors, i.e. politicians, civil servants and prominent ci-
vil society organisations working in the field. As we have seen, these
may either agree to favour immigrant groups, regarded as representing
different interests and identities, or individual foreigners. The latter is
usually the position of Catholic organisations, drawing upon their con-
solidated tradition of caring for the poor, regardless of any other speci-
fication. Thus, implementation networks do not necessarily imply the
linking or participation of immigrant groups, since alternative defini-
tions of the stakeholders may also prevail.
However, a certain convergence can be detected at the level of service
delivery, where it is difficult to completely avoid issues of cultural and
linguistic diversity. Here the key actor is the so-called ‘street-level bu-
reaucrat’ (Lipsky 1980), i.e., social workers, teachers, counter-clerks,
educators and others who may feel unable to provide adequate answers
to a culturally different clientele. Yet ways of defining and dealing with
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such issues are again different, suggesting that trends towards conver-
gence are only partial and do not necessarily entail recognition of
groups and their participation.
A sort of functional strategy prevails, in that accommodation of di-
versity is regarded first and foremost by practitioners as a way to over-
come obstacles in the delivery of existing services to foreign users. This
is especially the case in Milan. In Bologna and Naples, despite a public
discourse open to cultural recognition, accommodation is more a mat-
ter of informal relations than an institutionalised system providing for
groups’ inclusion and representation.
Rather than a convergence towards some sort of formal or informal
linking of groups and foreign associations in policy implementation
and formulation, our cases show a convergence towards functional re-
cognition or, in Vermeulen and Stotijn’s terms (in this volume), prag-
matic accommodation, driven by practitioners in order to address pro-
blems in everyday service delivery. Research studies on the level of de-
livery practices are still few and far from systematic – not only in Italy.
However, if we are to understand how multiculturalism concretely
takes place – and in spite of ideological opposition at the level of offi-
cial policy – a more in-depth analysis of practices and their diffusion
across similar institutions/organisations is of utmost relevance. In the
case of health care services, for instance, a certain convergence has
been noted across European hospitals towards practices of cultural re-
cognition in the delivery of child-care and maternity services, as well as
towards the incorporation of interpretation and/or cultural mediation
services (Caponio 2006b).
In order to look at multiculturalism at the local level, one must thus
overcome traditional political units of policymaking. This is in order to
find out how practitioners in different organisations deal with issues of
cultural diversity, as well as the conditions that, within organisations,
favour or discourage the adoption and diffusion of different practices
of recognition. To what extent these also entail groups’ inclusion and
participation is still an open question. In the Italian cities analysed
here, inclusion is not necessarily the case. After all, practices aimed at
accommodating immigrants’ cultural differences in access to services
might well co-exist in the absence of any – formal or informal – partici-
pation channel.
Notes
1 For a review of the literature on local policies for immigrants in Italy, see Zincone
and Caponio (2004) and Caponio (2006a). For the case of Spain, see More´n-Alegret
(2004).
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2 The intercultural attitude is just sketched by Alexander. Doubts are cast on the real oc-
currence of a policy change since, according to him, it is difficult to establish whether
the designation of ‘intercultural’ is just a rhetorical variant for pluralist attitudes
(2007: 214). However, the fact that this attitude applies not only to once pluralist ci-
ties such as Amsterdam, Birmingham and Stuttgart but also to new immigration
ones such as Turin, Rome and Barcelona, seems to point out a certain weakness in
conceptualising intercultural attitudes and policies as a mere reaction to the short-
comings of multiculturalism. According to Wood and Landry (2008), the intercultur-
al city is one that pursues intercultural exchange and cross-fertilisation in all policy
domains in order to get the most from its multifaceted diversity.
3 It must be pointed out that Alexander intends his prevalent use of the term ‘pluralist’
to be essentially interchangeable with ‘multicultural’.
4 Soft recognition should not be confused with soft multiculturalism (Martiniello 1997).
The latter indicates social practices, consumer and lifestyles that are oriented towards
an appreciation of cultural difference though not related to public policy. It is also dif-
ferent from weak multiculturalism (Grillo 2007) in which cultural diversity is recog-
nised in the private sphere, contrasted with the high degree of assimilation expected
in the public sphere, i.e. law, the market, education, employment, etc. According to
Entzinger (2000), this is the individual approach to cultural diversity, i.e. based on
ideas of liberal pluralism, which is in opposition to strong multiculturalism and its pro-
motion of the acknowledgement and institutionalised recognition of cultural differ-
ence. The category of soft recognition proposed here falls somewhere in between. It re-
fers to immigrant policies that somehow take into account the relevance of cultural
difference in access to social services and social resources overall, albeit without an
explicit acknowledgement or strong institutionalisation of group differences.
5 The chapter is based on research initially carried out in 2001-2002 for my PhD in
political science (obtained at the University of Florence), and enriched and completed
in 2003 during my contract as researcher at the University of Bologna. As will be
specified, my main sources were official documents approved by the three local ad-
ministrations considered. Over 50 in-depth interviews with policymakers and ethno-
graphic observations in the cities’ immigration offices were also carried out.
6 Priorities have been established according to three criteria: 1) the amount of financial
resources invested in the various policies; 2) the number of administrative records
concerning a certain policy; and 3) the source of the financial resources invested – if
coming from the local administration budget or from external funding. This third
point is a crucial dimension, since it distinguishes between priorities set directly by
the local government and sustained with internal resources from policies drawing
from regional and national laws and provisions that are thus based upon external re-
sources.
7 For a more detailed description of the development of immigrant associations in the
city of Milan, see Caponio (2005).
8 The longer-established associations, such as those in the Eritrean and Egyptian com-
munities, were able to set up a range of initiatives, such as native language courses
for children.
9 For details on immigration laws in Italy, see Zincone (1998, 2006).
10 However, must be pointed out that school and hospitals only marginally apply for
this service, since there are other organisations in Milan providing cultural mediators
specialised in the areas of education and health care.
11 These were primarily architects, mainly from Argentina and different African coun-
tries, who came to Italy and completed their studies (Bernadotti & Mottura 1999: 80).
12 A Metropolitan Forum of Extra-Communitarian Immigrant Associations office was
opened and provided with computers, a printer and a photocopier.
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13 However, only awarded were small grants, each around E 2,500-E 3,000.
14 In 2005, Bologna had at least four active associations of cultural mediators: one spe-
cifically catering to women, two specialising in children’s education and one to facili-
tate access to health services (Provincia di Bologna – Osservatorio per l’Immigrazione
2006).
15 ‘Adjoined’ councillors were voted on in the mid-1990s in Rome and Ancona. They
are not allowed to vote in the Council, and have a mere consultative function. Other
cities allowed for the direct election of consultative committees, the ‘consulte.’ This
was the case of Turin in 1995 (though only until 1999), of Modena (1999), Palermo
(2001) and Bergamo (1999).
16 This is the case, for instance, of a social centre run by the Arc-en-ciel association
hosting foreign male workers who wish to reunite with their families living abroad.
The centre assists them with finding a proper home in the private market and with
bureaucratic procedures involved in family reunion.
17 The centre provides facilities to ethnic communities and associations to enable them
to organise cultural activities (national celebrations, language courses, ethnic festi-
vals, etc.).
18 These are selected by the Immigration Office based on of a number of criteria. A list
of qualified foreign community mediators and social interpreters is available on de-
mand (Provincia di Bologna – Osservatorio per l’Immigrazione 2006: 11-13).
19 See, for instance, the role of bureaucracy in Bologna in impeding the consolidation
of the ISI (Caponio 2006a).
20 This is the case of, for instance, the Crinali and Kantare cooperatives. Founded in the
1990s by Italian and foreign trade union activists, these cooperatives work particu-
larly in partnership with city hospitals and health centres.
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3 Young immigrants’ low participation in the
German vocational training system:
how local actors in Munich and Frankfurt/Main
try to make a difference
Can M. Aybek
1 Introduction
The vast majority of migration to Western Europe since the 1950s has
been to cities (Messina 2007: 27; Van der Gaag, Van Wissen, Salt, Lynus
& Clark 2001: 5-16). Manufacturing sector companies were located in
these cities and provided the newcomers with a workplace, an income
and a perspective on the future. However, the post-industrial urban cen-
tres at present are characterised, by a general decline of their blue-collar
workforce and a small job market for low-skilled workers. In combina-
tion with cutbacks in social budgets in most European countries, these
developments initiated stratification processes within the urban com-
munities that created a new underclass characterised by, among other
features, ethnic origin and/or migratory background. Persistent differ-
ences in educational outcomes between young natives and immigrants1
have led to a duplication of this stratification. This chapter focuses on
one of the important thresholds where this achievement gap occurs in
Germany: the transition from school to vocational training.
In the first part, I will illustrate the overall situation in the German vo-
cational education and training system (known as VET), and will discuss
the problems young immigrants face. My aim is to outline a broader fra-
mework as a prerequisite to understanding the general circumstances
under which local policies are developed and implemented. As a second
step, I will discuss – based on case studies of Munich and Frankfurt/
Main – how, within the framework of local policymaking, policies on the
integration and vocational training of immigrants relate to each other.
And in the last part of my chapter, I will present two examples of practi-
cal approaches from the cases that, while not representing mainstream
programmes, have had some success in bringing young immigrants
into VET. Based on these examples, I will develop hypotheses on how
and why certain characteristics seem to be more important than others
in bringing about a policy shift that might offer more favourable condi-
tions to disadvantaged young immigrants in search of vocational
training.
2 The situation of young immigrants in the German vocational
education system
Seen from a comparative perspective, the German secondary school as
well as VET system appears to be both highly stratified and strongly se-
lective (see Allmendinger & Leibfried 2003; Deutsches PISA-Konsor-
tium, Baumert & Neubrand 2001; Walther, Stauber, Pohl, & Seifert
2004). Education policy is, in principle, a regional matter and may
therefore vary to a certain extent between the regions (La¨nder). Never-
theless, there are some common characteristics valid for most of the
country. After only four years of elementary schooling, in most regions
pupils are regrouped onto different school tracks. This selection proce-
dure is based on the recommendation given by the elementary schools,
but the final decision is taken by the children’s parents. They apply to
one of the three school tracks they want their child to attend: the basic
secondary school track, the Hauptschule; an intermediate secondary
school, the Realschule; or the more academic Gymnasium. Following
the four years of elementary education, the Hauptschule leads to a certi-
ficate of compulsory education after five years; the Realschule provides
a certificate of a higher status after six years, which nowadays in most
professions is considered to be the educational minimum in order to
be accepted as an apprentice; and the Gymnasium provides a qualifica-
tion (Abitur) giving access to higher education after nine years.
According to empirical research, the transition to the Gymnasium
track is determined not only by the individual achievement of the stu-
dent, but also by the social background of the family (Konsortium Bil-
dungsberichterstattung 2006: 49-50). The chances of a child attending
the Gymnasium are fourfold if the parents belong to the highest occu-
pational status group compared to a child coming from a working class
family. Although there are some regional differences, the probability of
attending the Hauptschule is also connected to family background: chil-
dren with parents of higher social status are more often successful in
avoiding lower school types compared to their peers, even if their
achievement at school is equally weak.
According to a Report by Germany’s Commissioner for Integration,
Maria Bo¨hmer, in the school year 2004-2005 only 15 per cent of Ger-
man children attended the Hauptschule, compared to over 40 per cent
of children with a foreign citizenship. Furthermore, almost half
(45 per cent) of the Germans attended the Gymnasium, but only a fifth
(21 per cent) of the foreign-citizen students did so (Migrationsbeauf-
tragte 2007: 57–58). This ‘ethnic divide’ with respect to school types
also has consequences for the chances of these young people when
they look for job training. Before sketching out the situation during the
last years on the VETmarket, I will describe the system itself.
86 CAN M. AYBEK
The German VET system can be roughly subdivided into three areas:
– company-based job training, better known as the ‘dual system’
(duales Berufsbildungssystem);
– school-based vocational training (Schulberufssystem), the typical pre-
paration for certain professions such as nursing, and fully compar-
able to the dual system with respect to the qualification obtained;
and
– the intermediate system (U¨bergangssystem), which consists of mea-
sures and programmes of different types and does not provide a vo-
cational certificate.
The backbone of this VET system – at least in the public discourse – is
still considered to be company-based training, the dual system. This is
an institutionalised structure, in which the apprentice, after having
been accepted by a company, is trained for a period of two to four years.
She/he attends school one or two times a week and is trained the rest
of the week within the company. This system is strongly regulated and
the qualifications obtained are highly standardised. Every person finish-
ing vocational education is supposed to have similar levels of knowledge
and all the necessary skills to work in the profession in which he or she
was trained.
Young people in Germany generally put much effort into obtaining
training in one of over 340 acknowledged professions. However, the
share of young immigrants with no vocational qualifications is much
higher than that of youths of German origin (BMBF 2007: 123-126).
Even the fact that – as the former Federal Government Commissioner
for Foreigners and Integration, Marieluise Beck, once put it – young
migrants show a great interest in obtaining a vocational qualification
and ‘can – to the highest degree – be sure that their parents will encou-
rage them in their ambitions’ (Beauftragte fu¨r Ausla¨nderfragen 2002:
216), does not alter this negative outcome.
Based on data gathered for the Federal Report on Vocational Train-
ing in 2006, Burkert and Seibert illustrate that the percentage of
young foreigners who participated in vocational training dropped in
the previous ten years by nearly 10 per cent. In 1994 this share was
still 34 per cent, whereas in the year 2004 only 25 per cent of school-
leavers with non-German citizenship participated in vocational training
(BMBF 2006: 31). In addition to the general decline in the participa-
tion rate, there are some gender-specific observations: young females
of foreign citizenship – despite the unfavourable conditions – have
been able to keep their participation rate almost constant (although at
a very low level). A phenomenon which is coming more and more into
the focus of political debate and scientific interest is the performance
of male immigrants: their participation rate decreased sharply, by 14
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percentage points from 42 per cent in 1994 to 28 per cent in 2004
(BMBF 2006: 3).
The trend shown in Figure 3.1 seems to be continuing, as the VET
Report for 2008 with updated information shows: the participation rate
of young foreigners dropped in 2006 even further to 23.7 per cent
(BMBF 2008: 97). This is less than half of the share that could be ob-
served for young people of German citizenship (56.9 per cent).
The classic strongholds of youth employment for those with lower
educational levels, many of whom had a migratory background, were
the small- and medium-sized companies in the German manufacturing
sector. The blue-collar professions of the manufacturing sector have for
years been a ‘safe haven’ for young people with lower educational qualifi-
cations, because in this training segment they did not have to compete
for an apprenticeship with graduates of higher school tracks. In recent
years, however, the economic conditions for these companies have been
especially harsh so they have been forced to reduce their employment
and VET capacities. Furthermore, economic restructuring processes and
the shift towards more knowledge-based work have changed the face of
the remaining training opportunities in the manufacturing sector. The
actual content of the work became more similar to the tertiary, service
sector, interpreted as the ‘internal tertiarisation’ of manufacturing
(Baethge, Solga & Wieck 2007: 27-28). In many parts of the manufactur-
ing sector, expectations of the profile of apprentices have risen, so that –
besides the already limited capacities it can offer – the sector can no
Figure 3.1 Participation rates in VET of youths with German and foreign citizenship
by gender, 1993–2004
Source: Burkert and Seibert (2007: 9)
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longer be viewed as the area offering VET opportunities to young people
with lower educational credentials.
Although the service sector has more to offer in terms of job train-
ing, in many branches the competition for training is fierce. Students
from the Gymnasium potentially apply for the same training slots as
those with Hauptschule certificates. In some cases, where certain ‘soft
skills’, such as social abilities and communication skills are required,
acceptance can be especially difficult for young people with a working
class and/or non-native background.
In recent years changes have occurred on the supply as well as the
demand side of the VET market (see Beicht, Friedrich & Ulrich 2007;
Ulrich, Eberhard & Krewerth 2006b). On one hand, the total number
of school-leavers has increased for demographic reasons; on the other
hand, there has been a general decrease in training locations due to
structural changes in the economy. These factors have made it more
difficult for young people with Hauptschule certificates to gain access
to training opportunities.
A political reaction to these changes has been the expansion of the ‘in-
termediary’ system. The intermediary system channels certain groups of
young people who are considered to be disadvantaged into further quali-
fication programmes and schemes (Baethge et al. 2007). The biggest
share of these programmes are called ‘vocational orientation’ (Berufsor-
ientierung) or ‘vocational elementary education’ (Berufsgrundbildung) and
give young people the chance to complete their compulsory schooling
years, but do not provide them with a recognised vocational certificate.
The second biggest and fastest-growing part of this system between
1995 and 2004 was the Labour Office programme for ‘vocational pre-
paration’ (Berufsvorbereitung). In addition, there was a growing number
of participants in school- or project-based programmes organised by the
state (La¨nder) or local governments.2
Figure 3.2 illustrates the general participation structure of young
people with foreign citizenship in the VET system, and points to the re-
gional differences between the two La¨nder, Hesse and Bavaria. Partici-
pation in the intermediary system plays a more important role in
Hesse – with Frankfurt/Main being one of the Hessian cities – than in
Bavaria, where Munich is located. However, looking at the overall pic-
ture the trend is very similar: young foreigners are overrepresented in
the programmes of the ‘intermediary system’ while the proportion of
the share of foreigners in the whole student body in each Land to their
overall share of 2004 school graduates is comparable.
The official statistics on developments in Germany’s VET system un-
fortunately do not deliver important information such as the socio-eco-
nomic characteristics of the participants in the intermediary system.
Nor do they describe what happens to participants after they leave the
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programmes. Therefore a study has been initiated by the German La-
bour Office and the Federal Institute for Vocational Education (Bewer-
berbefragung, BA/BIB) in order to better understand certain develop-
ments in the VET system. Since 1997, this study has analysed annually
the transition patterns of young people who applied to the Labour Of-
fices in order to be channelled into job training.3 One of the main re-
sults is that young people with Hauptschule qualifications have a much
higher probability of entering the intermediary system than those who
have Realschule or Gymnasium certificates. This is especially true for
the measures aimed at improving vocational orientation (Krewerth &
Ulrich 2006: 77). At the same time, participation in any of the
schemes does seem to have neither a positive nor a negative effect on
the chances of entering job training in the dual system (Ulrich & Kre-
werth 2006: 169).
To assess the overall chances of young immigrants and natives of
getting into the dual system (see Figure 3.3), we again refer to the
aforementioned BA/BIBB Survey 2004 data (Ulrich, Eberhard, Granato
& Krewerth 2006a: 202-206).
In 2004 the overall probability of getting an apprenticeship for na-
tive Germans was about 40 per cent. If these native-born young people
had acquired a Realschule or Gymnasium certificate, their chances rose
to 47 per cent. If, in addition to their better school certificate, their
maths grade had been ‘good’ or ‘very good’, their transition rate to VET
became 64 per cent. Finally, if the employment rate in their home re-
Figure 3.2 Young foreigners in sectors of the VET system in 2004
(in % of total student population)
Source: Baethge, Solga and Wieck (2007)
90 CAN M. AYBEK
gion was below 9 per cent, 71 per cent of them were able to take part
in vocational training within the dual system.
For all the applicants who, in one way or another, had a migratory
background4 the overall probability of finding a training location was
29 per cent. With a Realschule or Gymnasium certificate their chances
improved by 5 per cent to 34 per cent. Having a ‘good’ or ‘very good’
maths score added another seven percentage points, so that the prob-
ability rose to 41 per cent. A favourable labour market situation in addi-
tion to all of this led to a transition probability of 44 per cent.
Some observations seem to be valid for both immigrants and natives:
a better school certificate, a better maths score and a place of residence
with favourable employment conditions raise the chances of entering
the dual system. But these effects (if all three conditions are fulfilled) –
as illustrated by the log-odds in Figure 3.3 – are much stronger for the
native-born population than for immigrants.
There is also the possibility that certain unfavourable conditions may
cumulate. If the immigrant applicant had ‘only’ a Hauptschule certifi-
cate, the probability of being accepted for vocational training was
25 per cent. If their maths score was no better than ‘sufficient’, their
chances diminished by ten percentage points to 15 per cent. And if they
happened to live in a region with an unemployment rate higher than 9
per cent, only eight in 100 were able to find a place as an apprentice.
To sum up, the traditional trajectory of leaving school and being im-
mediately admitted to professional training seems to be more difficult
for young immigrants than it is for their native-born peers. Generally
favourable individual characteristics and contextual conditions have a
Figure 3.3 Probability of successful transition into the dual system in 2004
Source: Ulrich, Eberhard, Granato and Krewerth (2006a)
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less positive effect on them than on young Germans and the impact of
negative factors is stronger. Furthermore, a within-group variation for
young immigrants is also observed: among immigrants born in Ger-
many the transition rate to vocational training was on average 33
per cent and among ethnic German immigrants (from Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet republics) it even reached 35 per cent. However,
of young people born abroad only 18 per cent were able to make a suc-
cessful transition. The most difficult situation was observed for young
people born in Turkey or with Turkish citizenship: only 16 per cent of
them managed to find a vocational training place (Ulrich et al. 2006a:
205-206).
Instead of obtaining a proper vocational qualification, young mi-
grants tend to pursue further schooling or participate in the schemes
of the intermediary system. This might improve their chances, but they
may also be ‘cooled out’, lose their interest, or put on ‘waiting loops’
without actually entering proper VET (see Lex 1997), and eventually be
excluded from vocational training. Solga (2002) argues that a lower
educational background in combination with the label ‘participated in
programmes’ has a quite strong stigmatising effect on the VET market
for all disadvantaged young people in Germany.
Having examined the situation of young immigrants on the indivi-
dual level, we now turn our attention to institutional structures and ap-
proaches within integration policymaking on the local level.
3 Integration policy and local governance of vocational
training
For a long time, immigration- and integration-related issues in Ger-
many were not at the heart of federal politics. Since the Citizenship
Act (1999) and Immigration Act (2004) were passed, however, this
trend seems to have been reversed. The Federal Commissioner for For-
eigners, Refugees and Integration, Maria Bo¨hmer, and even Chancellor
Angela Merkel regularly address integration-related issues. Concerning
young immigrants’ transition problems Bo¨hmer stated:
The difficult situation of young immigrants must represent a
main issue in the political debate on vocational training. ... Within
the context of the National Integration Plan the Federal Govern-
ment will put all necessary effort into easing the transition of
young foreigners into vocational training – for only those who
have a vocational qualification have a fair chance of integrating
and taking part in our country’s social life on an equal footing.5
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Official documents issued by local governments contain similar state-
ments. In a document formulating a Leitbild (or ‘vision’) for the city of
Munich, for instance, the following passage can be found:
It is the aim of local policies to enable all foreigners who live here
permanently or over a long time-period to benefit from work-re-
lated, social, cultural and educational opportunities on an equal
footing. This means that their integration has to be supported with
measures, while their cultural identity has to be preserved to avoid
an uprooting of these immigrants. (LH München – Planungsrefer-
at 1999: 20)
Rather than concentrating on declarations or policy goals, in the follow-
ing part of this chapter I shall focus on the local institutional structures
in integration and VET policymaking. The latter type of institutions, in
a most manifest sense, determine the general conditions, in terms of
available slots for job training, programmes and schemes of the inter-
mediary system, etc. They design the opportunity structure the young
people are confronted with during their transition processes into VET
(Heinz, Weymann & Alheit 1996).
3.1 Institutional structures and strategies in integration policymaking
In order to better understand how the transition processes are influ-
enced by local institutional structures we will refer to the cases of
Frankfurt/Main and Munich. Rather than evaluating specific policies
and their outcomes, institutional developments in the area of integra-
tion policymaking will be outlined. The objective of this comparison is
to identify trajectories that have led to quite different institutional set-
tings for integration policymaking on the local level.
The case selection is based on a ‘most similar systems design’ ap-
proach (Dogan 2002: 73-74; Landman 2008: 70-75; Przeworski &
Teune 1970). The aim of such an approach is, on one hand, to reduce
the number of variables that might have an effect on the question of
‘policymaking in the area of vocational education’ in order to support a
higher transition rate of disadvantaged immigrant youth into VET. On
the other hand, differences should be accounted for in a variable as-
sumed to play a key role, the institutional structure of integration
policymaking.
The selected cases share characteristics in the following realms:
– scale of the city
– economic structure and labour market situation
– composition of population and
– institutions concerned with immigrant integration.
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Both Frankfurt and Munich are metropolitan cities. Their economic
impact on the region in which they are located is strong. In terms of
population, Frankfurt (660,000 people) is half the size of Munich (1.3
million) but, in economic terms, Frankfurt represents the centre of a
region where 4.9 million people live (see Magistrat Frankfurt a. M.
2007; Scho¨nwa¨lder & So¨hn 2007). The economic performance of the
metropolitan areas of Munich and Frankfurt is similarly high. This is
relevant for the argument made in this chapter, because it means that
both cases represent full-fledged VET markets with the advantages as
well as the downsides typical of urban service economies. The unem-
ployment rates in recent years have been relatively low in both cities,
and the ratios between the number of available apprenticeships and
the number of young people searching for such a position have been
advantageous.
Another commonality is that both cities have a high share of immi-
grants among their resident population. The German National Statisti-
cal Office recently published demographic data which, for the first
time, count people not according to their citizenship but differentiating
on the basis of migratory background. According to these tables from
the 2005 census, in Frankfurt persons with a migratory background
make up 39.5 per cent of the total population, whereas in Munich this
share is 34.2 per cent (see Statistisches Bundesamt 2007). Together
with cities like Stuttgart, Augsburg, Nuremberg or Wuppertal, they
have the highest share of immigrants in urban areas. The composition
of the immigrant groups in Frankfurt and Munich is also quite similar,
although Frankfurt has a slightly more diverse composition, probably
because the international airport there is used as an entry gate by im-
migrants of different ethnic backgrounds.
An important aspect within this analysis is that in current scientific
debates both cities are treated as municipalities with advanced local
integration or multicultural policies (see Filsinger 1998; Pro¨hl 1998;
Schader-Stiftung, Deutscher Sta¨dtetag, GdW Bundesverband deutscher
Wohnungs- und Immobilienunternehmen et al. 2007). A variety of
immigration-related public policy and civil society organisations have
developed in the last two decades. Issues related to immigration and
integration processes have been continually put on the agenda of the
local political institutions through public debates and the engagement
of immigrants and their grassroots organisations. A number of politi-
cians themselves have an immigrant background and are members of
the city council. Furthermore, in both cities immigration-specific
bodies have been established, although the strategies followed were
quite different.
In 1989, the city of Frankfurt put a concept into practice that was ab-
solutely unique at that time in Germany. The idea was to introduce an
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administrative unit designed to play the role of a mastermind or pio-
neer for the whole city administration with respect to integration poli-
cies and give impulses to other departments. The initiative for an Of-
fice for Multicultural Affairs (Amt fu¨r multikulturelle Angelegenheiten,
AMKA) came from the Green Party – at that time part of the governing
coalition – and its prominent council member Daniel Cohn-Bendit.
The Office started off with a multicultural team and a small budget.
Formally it had the same rights as other units in the administrative
hierarchy of the city, but it had no authority to give directives to other
parts of the administration on any issues. It was therefore dependent
on the willingness of the other departments and units to cooperate
(Noormann 1994: 75-76). Even though this willingness to cooperate
was not always present and in some cases even the contrary was true,
the Office managed to set examples of good integration programmes
and give impetus through projects it realised either in cooperation with
immigrant organisations or alone. The projects were conducted in var-
ious policy fields, for example, in the area of youth policies (see AMKA
2000). The main approach in Frankfurt was thus to establish the
AMKA as a central unit for coordinating and pioneering local integra-
tion policy.
A similar approach could be observed in Munich, at least until the
end of the 1990s. In the mid-1990s the position of a Commissioner
for Foreigners’ Affairs was established, which was later changed to an
Ombudsman Office. Local integration policy was an important issue
and therefore required institutional support and a sound knowledge
of the related tasks. In 1997 the city collected data and published a
detailed report called the ‘Life Situation of Foreign Citizens’ (LH
Mu¨nchen – Planungsreferat 1997b). Within the context of developing
and formulating an urban Leitbild, the issue of foreigners was expli-
citly addressed (LH Mu¨nchen – Planungsreferat 1997a; Reiß-Schmidt
& Tress 2000).
At the end of the 1990s, however, the institutional framework of in-
tegration policymaking in Munich shifted towards a mainstreaming
approach, trying to involve all relevant departments in local adminis-
tration, and away from an integration policy where a single adminis-
trative unit was centrally responsible. The institutional bodies estab-
lished before were either dissolved or their role and powers were di-
minished. The positions of the Councillor of Foreigners’ Affairs and
the Ombudsman were abolished and instead a ‘Unit for Intercultural
Work’ was created, which, as a subunit of the Housing Section within
the Social Affairs Department, represents a lower position within the
administrative hierarchy.
Despite these developments signalling, to a certain degree, the
downsizing importance of migration and integration issues, the local
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Office for Youth Welfare has been extremely active. For example, in the
field of youth policies they have issued publications such as a ‘Concept
of Doing Social Work with Immigrant Children and Youth’ and, later,
‘Guidelines for an Intercultural Children and Youth Welfare Policy’
(LH Mu¨nchen – Sozialreferat/Stadtjugendamt 2000).
In academic as well as policymaking discourses, the approach fol-
lowed in Munich in the field of youth welfare policies is regarded as
highly innovative with its emphasis on the ‘intercultural orientation’ of
publicly provided social services (Filsinger 2002: 44; Handschuck &
Schro¨er 2003). ‘Intercultural orientation’ or ‘cultural mainstreaming’ as
a policy approach aims to develop standards for every relevant policy
field in order to ensure that the services provided within the respective
fields take the needs and specificities of immigrant clientele into ac-
count. Once developed, the standards have to be generally acknowl-
edged and put into practice by the relevant institutions. This policy
goal is also termed the ‘intercultural opening’ of institutions for immi-
grants and migration-specific issues (Filsinger 2002; Friedrich-Ebert-
Stiftung, Bundeszentrale fu¨r politische Bildung & Modellprojekt
‘Transfer interkultureller Kompetenz’ der iaf-Berlin 2002; Handschuck
& Schro¨er 2000).
The approaches to integration policymaking in Frankfurt/Main as
well as in Munich are both advanced, but at the same time very differ-
ent. The Office for Multicultural Affairs in Frankfurt plays the role of a
principal coordinator in migration and integration-related issues,
whereas the strategy followed by the actors in Munich relies more on a
mainstreaming approach. The question that arises here is: to what ex-
tent do these differences influence the policymaking in the area of vo-
cational education and training?
3.2 Institutional structures of VET policy in Munich and Frankfurt6
In both Munich and Frankfurt, networks were established during the
1990s to tackle problems related to the vocational education and train-
ing of young people. The network in Munich is named Working Group
Youth, Vocation and Education, whereas in Frankfurt it is entitled Net-
work for Youth and Labour. They constitute an important, if not the
most important, institutional setting for local approaches to vocational
training. As previously mentioned, most young people in Germany
complete vocational training in the so-called ‘dual system’. The actors
involved in delivering the training within this system must broadly co-
ordinate their actions. The new networks were initially established to
do exactly this in a more efficient way.
The network structure is similar in both cities (see Figure 3.4). Mem-
bers of these networks include the local Labour Office and at least
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three departments of the local government, namely the Department of
Labour and/or Finance, Department of Education and the Department
of Social Affairs (or Youth). In addition, the Chamber of Trade and
Commerce (representing mainly the service sector) and the Chamber
of Artisans (for the manufacturing sector) send representatives. Some
other public or private organisations offering programmes to young
people who are still in need of a VET placement also take part. In
Frankfurt, this includes, for example, a semi-public organisation: the
Local Association for Youth Employment, partly owned by the city it-
self; whereas in Munich there are several organisations involved. More-
over, there are always representatives of the La¨nder government from
the Ministry of Education or other relevant parts of the administration
at the La¨nder level. Along with other minor actors, local politicians oc-
casionally take part as well. In Munich, for instance, this happens quite
regularly. Munich’s vice-mayor has even chaired the network for a long
time herself – a deliberate action by the city government to stress the
political importance of this network at the local level.
It is important to mention that the networks have a closed member-
ship structure. Indeed there are institutions wishing to participate
which are not admitted. For example, the administrative units dealing
directly with intercultural and integration-related issues are not neces-
sarily members of the network: as of the year 2006 in Munich the
Unit for Intercultural Work had only recently been admitted and in
Frankfurt the AMKA was still not member of the network. This exclu-
Figure 3.4 Local VET networks
Source: Author’s illustration
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sion may be explained by the attitude of the established members,
although it may also be the result of a lack of personnel or the fact that
potentially interested actors from the field of integration policy do not
have the necessary technical know-how on VET related issues. There is
also the possibility that certain actors do not get involved because they
are already engaged in other types of local youth policy networks.
The permanent members making up the core of these networks are
mainly higher ranking decision makers in their respective organisa-
tions. Only a few are from middle management with implementation
responsibilities. The latter generally act as intermediaries and commu-
nicate the necessary information and instructions to the operational
levels.
The high-ranking members meet only two to four times a year.
These meetings are prepared well in advance by the lower-ranking
staff, who come together on a regular basis in subgroups. Representa-
tives of outside institutions join these meetings whenever the core
members think it is necessary.
The roles played by the representatives of each institution are differ-
ent. They differ according to their institution’s interests as well as
their prominence, financial resources and political power. They also
differ considerably according to the level of engagement of the person
in charge.
In both networks in Munich and Frankfurt, the mode of cooperation
is based on similar principles. There is no fixed statute describing the
procedures or defining the rights and duties of the members. The net-
works thus have, in principle, an informal and voluntary character. No
press releases are published after meetings, nor are any documents dis-
seminated unless there is a specific reason for doing so and all mem-
bers explicitly agree on the content. This is in accordance with the gen-
eral principle that all decisions have to be taken consensually. There is,
therefore, at least in theory, always the risk of a veto-player, but the
agenda is prepared well in advance so the chances of parties not coop-
erating are low.
According to the actors themselves, the goals pursued by these net-
works can be summarised as follows:
– to exchange information and monitor developments in VET and
youth policy in the city
– to track existing measures and programmes
– to identify actual or potential bottlenecks in the vocational training
market and
– to confer on possible solutions.
It is it important to look at the institutional structures of vocational
training in more detail in order to assess the immigrant youths’
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chances to participate in the VET market. Freeman (2004: 946-958)
points out that immigrants’ integration processes are highly fragmen-
ted, i.e. are taking place in different realms of society and are influ-
enced to different degrees by already existing institutions. Therefore the
analysis of integration has to be disentangled and the conditions in each
societal domain have to be analysed separately.
In the social science literature on German political economy, the
skill provision structure is deemed to be a consensus-based regulation
system, representing a ‘non-liberal’ or ‘socially embedded’ model of ca-
pitalism (see Crouch, Finegold & Sako 2001; Estevez-Abe, Iversen &
Soskice 2001; Streeck, Hilbert, Kevelaer, Maier & Weber 1987; Streeck
1989, 1997). In essence, these VET networks represent exactly this cor-
porate regulation system of the German labour market. A closer exami-
nation of the membership structure of the VET-related networks and
their function reveals that the main objective of these networks is to
provide a local structure for skill provision for the labour market. They
do not follow an integration-related or immigrant-specific agenda, but
rather maintain the traditional system and its regular tools.7 One of
the central claims of this paper is that – regardless in which locality
young immigrants in Germany reside – the vast majority of them who
could not yet enter proper job training, participate in regular pro-
grammes – and not immigrant-specific programmes. These pro-
grammes are offered by the major actors in the field, such as the Ger-
man Agency for Labour (Arbeitsagentur), which are part of the net-
works described above and have a big influence on what the
opportunity structures look like on the local level.
The problem is that most of the programmes offered within the reg-
ular system address the group of ‘disadvantaged young people’ as a
whole. Those with lower educational certificates are – in most of the
cases – considered to be part of this youth. They are described as a
group with great deficits and therefore are assumed to be in need of
compensatory programmes. Even though no thorough direct evaluation
of these programmes of the intermediary system has been conducted,
the empirical data cited suggest that the schemes adopted so far have
been inefficient or insufficient to reverse the prevailing negative trend
in VET participation of young immigrants (see Granato & Meissner
1994; Granato 2003; Granato & Schittenhelm 2003; Uhly & Granato
2006; Ulrich & Granato 2006).
4 Introducing and establishing new approaches in VET
Under such circumstances, any potential improvement lies in the de-
velopment of new approaches rather than continuing with the existing
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programmes. But even though new approaches might be successful,
they could also face some difficulties, such as finding the acceptance of
established actors in the field. To discuss these issues, I will refer to
some examples from my case studies.
4.1 Munich
My first example concerns the approach that a civil society organisation
in Munich, the Iniativgruppe (IG), has developed. The IG has been en-
gaged since the early 1970s in social work with immigrants and inte-
gration work, of which youth programmes are just one part.8 Because
of its successful work, the organisation has managed to grow from a
tiny non-governmental organisation to a medium-sized provider of var-
ious social services, always with an emphasis on programmes related
to extracurricular support in schools and the successful management
of the transition from school to vocational training. As part of a reflec-
tive manner of conducting its work the IG developed intercultural qual-
ity standards. These standards are continuously monitored and docu-
mented.9 Moreover, a large number of its employees have migratory
background themselves.
The IG’s activities are grouped into and described as ‘work modules’.
I will refer here only to the most important ones. Within the context of
supporting the transition of young immigrants, cooperation with
schools in the neighbourhoods plays an important role. Besides main-
taining contacts with school administrations and teachers, specialists
from the IG visit school classes from the seventh to ninth grades to in-
form the students about different vocations and train them in writing
applications and preparing for interviews. After contacting the young
people in their schools, the students are invited to come to one of the
IG youth centres, where different programmes and projects are offered.
These programmes have multiple primary and secondary goals: trips
and sports tournaments are organised, and some of the activities in-
volve teamwork or coaching in conflict management. Others aim to de-
velop communication and social skills. As part of these projects, for in-
stance, the young people may edit and publish a newspaper or manage
a cafe´ and thus acquire specific skills. An important feature is that all
types of participation are certified in detail and can later be used in ap-
plications for apprenticeships.
Furthermore, the IG actively approaches parents and tries to involve
them in the process of deciding on the right vocational track and find-
ing an apprenticeship.
Finally, the IG maintains close relationships with companies in the
neighbourhood. These firms potentially take apprentices or offer trai-
neeships. If young people are successful in finding a training opportu-
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nity, the IG provides, if necessary, extra training for the theoretical part
of the VET to prevent a dropout.
Although public actors generally confirm that the work of the IG is
of high quality, the group does not enjoy reliable financing. The pro-
jects are funded by a range of institutions, including the Land of Bavar-
ia, the European Union and the municipality. At the end of every fi-
nancing period of one to two years, the IG faces the risk of having to
give up parts of the work or release some of its personnel. For these
reasons, the management and employees have to raise the level of
transparency of their work by carrying out time-consuming public rela-
tions activities. They are also active in various political organisations
and professional circles. The IG regularly organises debates on current
migration-related topics and maintains contacts with representatives of
political parties.
The work of the IG serves as a model for other actors and institu-
tions in this field.
4.2 Frankfurt/Main
My second example regards a project which aims to convince entrepre-
neurs with migratory backgrounds to offer young people apprentice-
ships. Frankfurt’s AMKA launched this project in the early 1990s.
As mentioned, the dual system is highly regulated. Companies that
intend to offer vocational training have to fulfil certain preconditions
in order to offer an apprentice all the required support (e.g. skilled trai-
ners or the necessary variety of activities related to the profession con-
cerned). These preconditions may represent a handicap to small or
medium-sized firms, even if they want to offer training.
The AMKA had the idea of approaching immigrant entrepreneurs,
mobilising them, and offering to help them if they wanted to organise
themselves as collaborative training providers. The advantage of colla-
borative VET provision is that no single company has to fulfil all the
obligations, but rather each member can provide a part. For instance,
it is sufficient that one in four companies has a skilled and certified
vocational trainer among its employees.
At the beginning of the project, the AMKA started with a small
study to assess which economic sector or part of the city would be
most promising for such an endeavour. Through contacts with many
entrepreneurs, they soon realised that the wholesale market for fruit
and vegetables in Frankfurt was a good target and so the project
started there. Soon the Chamber of Trade and Commerce took notice
of the project and wanted to participate. After several successful years,
the chamber fully incorporated the project into its own structures. At
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the moment, it has two employees working full-time to coordinate the
extended version of this project.
Meanwhile, this project and others have gained prominence and
have been adopted in most of the big German cities with a high share
of immigrant entrepreneurs. Even the Hessian Ministry for Trade and
Commerce is convinced, and offers financial support to new projects of
the type.
As in the first example from Munich, the approach serves as a
model for other cities and institutions: first the ideas are developed;
specific concepts are tested in practice and further elaborated; even-
tually, the established actors in the field notice the new approach and
incorporate it.
5 Conclusion
In the context of this comparison between two cities it seems reason-
able to argue that the established networks in the field of VET repre-
sent the typical mode of skill provision within the German corporate
economy. Despite global processes of modernisation, certain institu-
tional structures which have emerged historically within nation states
prevail. Once these institutions gain a role within the socio-political
system of a society and are commonly accepted, it is difficult to abolish
them. This persistence in turn leads to ‘path dependencies’: even
though countries may face similar pressures and problems, the way
they deal with these external and internal influences will be different
(Lehmbruch 1996, for a VET-specific discussion see Thelen 2004).
The VET networks are characterised by a fairly exclusive member-
ship structure, and the main actors are still the traditional ‘social part-
ners’ in this policy field. In other words, there is little overlap between
the group of actors engaged in VET and those explicitly involved in im-
migrants’ integration policies. Moreover, the VET actors do not seem
eager to overemphasise immigrant youth, but rather focus on the coor-
dination of their main task: the provision of skilled labour to the regio-
nal economy. The ‘integration experts’, however, mostly do not have
the necessary VET-related technical know-how to become fully en-
gaged. The chances of making changes in the overall structure there-
fore seem to be rather low.
One decisive factor for new and innovative approaches to VET, how-
ever, seems to be the existence of institutions that could play the role
of pioneers and serve as models for others. They are capable of doing
so because of their accumulated knowledge in practical work and the
information gathered during their contacts with the people and institu-
tions involved. This is a necessary, but not sufficient condition to en-
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courage the established actors to change their mindsets and reconsider
their routines.
For an actor embedded in the administrative hierarchy, such as the
Office for Multicultural Affairs in Frankfurt, it will generally be easier
to enter new areas of engagement. Having a defined role and compe-
tencies within the local government structure will probably help in lo-
cal agenda-setting as well as attracting the attention and gaining the
support of potential partners. However, an administrative unit is also
subject to political and bureaucratic sensitivities, whereas an organisa-
tion like the IG in Munich – not being a member of the administration
– does not have to concern itself with these issues to the same degree.
There may be situations in which such institutions can act in a more
innovative ways on the implementation level.
Another lesson that can be drawn from the examples is that institu-
tions with an innovating role obviously not only have to be flexible and
eager to experiment, but should also have extensive local knowledge.
The dissemination of their ideas is, however, only facilitated through
the networks they are part of. Local governance structures therefore
have to be permeable enough to provide these actors with opportunities
to share and discuss their views. Of course, this is not only a question
of opportunity structures, but also of the direct engagement of the re-
spective institution in public relations activities. The chances of trans-
ferring innovative projects into the regular system will be higher if
there is the will and openness on the side of the established actors to
cultivate a dialogue with the initiators of new approaches.
Notes
1 I use ‘young migrants/immigrants’ and ‘young people with migratory background/of
immigrant origin’ in this chapter as interchangeable terms that refer to the same
group: young people who have immigrated themselves or whose parents have immi-
gration. However, from this I distinguish terms such as ‘young foreigners’ and
‘young people of foreign citizenship’ etc., which refer to persons with a non-host-
country citizenship.
2 The typical classification presented here, however, is by no means clear-cut, as the
contents of different programmes may be quite similar on a (local) implementation
level.
3 The survey was conducted by the Federal Labour Office (BA) and the Federal Insti-
tute for Vocational Training (BIBB) among young persons who applied to the Labour
Office for a VET apprenticeship. Here, however, I refer mainly to the results of ana-
lyses of the dataset of the survey conducted in 2004. This survey, like the preceding
ones, aimed to develop a better understanding of young people’s application beha-
viour and their further trajectories after a period of training applications. The data
were assembled from all the labour offices in the country, and the probability of
being selected into the sample – except for the condition of being acknowledged by
the Labour Office as an applicant – is unbiased. Within the sampling framework con-
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structed, 9,688 individuals were randomly chosen from the Labour Office registries
and invited to participate in the survey through a questionnaire sent by post. A total
of 5,100 (53 per cent) of these young people replied. According to the administrators
of the survey, this sample is suitable for making inferences about the population
parameters as a whole (740,200 applicants in 2004) as the relevant results were cal-
culated after applying various weighting procedures (Krewerth, Eberhard & Ulrich
2006).
4 To determine if a respondent has a migratory background, information from three
different realms is combined in the survey: citizenship, first-acquired language and
place of birth. A respondent is considered native-born if he or she has German citi-
zenship, was born in Germany and speaks only German as native language. All other
respondents are regarded persons of migratory background: they may have been born
abroad, be ethnic German immigrants (young people who mostly have German citi-
zenship but grew up in the former Soviet Union, Poland or Romania, or whose par-
ents did so) or be young people who were born in Germany though are without Ger-
man citizenship (cf. Ulrich et al. 2006a).
5 See www.bundesregierung.de/nn_56546/Content/DE/Pressemitteilungen/BPA/2007/
04/2007-04-18-boehmer-ausbildungssituation.html.
6 The information provided in this and the subsequent sections is based on field re-
search and interviews with local actors conducted by the author in 2006 and re-
ported in full detail in Aybek (forthcoming).
7 For a related discussion on the role of targeted (immigrant-specific) vs. general poli-
cies, see Vermeulen and Stotijn (in this volume).
8 See www.initiativgruppe.de/ueberuns/IGselbstdarst/english.htm.
9 See www.initiativgruppe.de/intern/leitbild/qm_leitbild4.htm.
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4 Local policies concerning unemployment
among immigrant youth in Amsterdam
and in Berlin: towards strategic replacement
and pragmatic accommodation
Floris Vermeulen and Rosanne Stotijn
1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the manner in which Amsterdam and Berlin
policymakers and policy practitioners deal with youth unemployment
among immigrant groups. Unemployment among immigrant youth is
an important policy topic in both cities (as it is in most other European
cities), and the issue is closely linked to debates about local integration
policies. We will argue that local policymakers dealing with immigrant
youth unemployment are often confronted with what Frank de Zwart
(2005) calls ‘the dilemma of recognition’. This dilemma refers to
whether local governments should pursue general or targeted policies
to combat group inequality. On the one hand, general policies do not
recognise groups as being relevant to the policymaking process, which
also means that the policies are seldom effective in combating group
inequalities. Targeted policies, on the other hand, recognise groups as
beneficiaries for specific policies, yet face the danger of perpetuating
group inequalities. In this chapter we hope to explain how, on the local
level, policy practitioners working with unemployed immigrant youth
have responded to the dilemma of recognition with their own prag-
matic solutions, which are considerably independent of the official pol-
icy integration framework. Because this independence allows for the
possibility of mixing general policymaking on a national level and tar-
geted policy implementation on the local level, we will argue that it is
precisely this quality that should be seen as a valuable example for pol-
icymakers and practitioners to learn from.
In both Amsterdam and Berlin we conducted interviews with policy
practitioners. In the interviews we focused on how policy practitioners
deal with the dilemma of recognition when interacting with unem-
ployed immigrant youth. We spoke both to practitioners who work for
general job centres as well as to practitioners who work for non-profit
organisations, immigrant or otherwise. This gave us the opportunity to
see to what extent the practitioners in different organisations have dif-
ferent solutions for the dilemma of recognition. The comparison be-
tween Amsterdam and Berlin also provides an opportunity to analyse
the influence of a different local integration policy framework, as each
city has formulated different policies, which have uniquely evolved over
the course of time. We have found that neither the different policy fra-
mework nor the different organisational setting is reflected in the way
in which projects are implemented for unemployed immigrant youth.
2 The policy paradox: the dilemma of recognition
Many local governments around Europe endeavour to combat inequal-
ity by promoting a group-specific redistribution policy. Upon consider-
ing options that exist for a redistribution that benefits groups, however,
some governments find themselves in a double bind. Unlike pensions
or health and insurance plans, targeted redistribution policies require
definition, recognition and, moreover, mobilisation of the groups con-
cerned. However productive this targeting process may be for adminis-
trative purposes, it works to accentuate ethnic and racial distinctions –
some governments fear precisely this side effect. Although deemed ne-
cessary to reduce group inequality, targeted redistributive policies may
also encourage ethnic conflict, create vested interests in group distinc-
tions and diminish public support for redistribution. In so doing, such
policies work to defeat the very purpose they were intended for. De
Zwart (2005) labels this paradox ‘the dilemma of recognition’. Govern-
ments usually try to resolve this dilemma by adjusting the category sys-
tem that is used to target redistribution. According to De Zwart, three
types of adjustment may be applied to policy: accommodation (the
multicultural approach), denial (the ideal-typical liberal solution) and
replacement (a compromise alternative).
Accommodation, which is also known by the names ‘multicultural-
ism’ or ‘the politics of recognition’, is meant to designate the benefici-
aries of redistributive policies according to people’s membership in
groups that state and society have come to take for granted. Policy-
makers treat these social categories as ‘self-evident’ groups, and repre-
sentatives of immigrant groups who seek accommodation do so as
well. An example of accommodation: the backwards socio-economic po-
sition of immigrant groups can be targeted by using specific social po-
licies for specific immigrant groups. In order to implement these poli-
cies policymakers make use of ethnic policy categorisations. In the
Netherlands it has been common to formulate specific measurements
for Turkish or Moroccan immigrants. On the other hand, incentives to
exclude immigrants from society can also be a reason for politicians
and policymakers to use policy categorisation of immigrants. Geddes
(2003) points to the example of asylum-seekers in the 1990s. As their
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numbers grew in the Netherlands and Germany there was pressure to
place these persons outside the welfare state using specific policy cate-
gories. However, such ethnic or group categories are not actually self-
evident; they are constructed for a specific policy purpose. Categories
can allow policymakers to better organise the ambiguous reality that
they are confronted with. Nevertheless, once these categories have been
created by the state there can be far-reaching consequences. As Yanow
(2003: 7) states, ‘There is a power in naming groups. The name evokes
a common identity, and in so doing, it presumes a common interest’.
Brubaker (2003: 166) adds that by ‘invoking groups, they [policy-
makers] seek to evoke them, summon them, call them into being.
Their categories are for doing – designed to stir, summon, justify, mo-
bilize, kindle and energize’. As such, many governments and critics of
multiculturalism fear further segregation that could come as the result
of mobilising groups and reiterating ethnic boundaries.
In view of this concern, we will show how these problematic aspects
of accommodation pertain mainly to policymaking, and have a far less
profound effect on implementation. The concreticisation of categories
for the sake of official policy and budget purposes is simply not the
same as a practitioner’s dependence on group categories to inform de-
cisions and make judgements. We propose use of the term ‘pragmatic
accommodation’ to designate the significance of group-specific differ-
ences in the daily practice of policy implementation and to differentiate
it from the idea – if not the ideal – of accommodating groups and their
perceived group differences de jure. To exemplify accommodation’s
complex nature: is a social worker consulting an imam about a Muslim
youth accommodating group-specific differences by seeking out a reli-
giously ‘relevant’ consultant? Or is the social worker using the group-
specific position of the imam to most effectively get her counselling
job done?
Another policy approach is denial or the insistence that, despite in-
equality between socially or culturally defined groups, redistribution
policies do not benefit any particular demographic. Denial is consistent
with the ideal-typical liberal state that stresses individual rights and
does not recognise any pre-existing, organic or transcendent structure
in society. A textbook example of denial is the philosophy of republican
citizenship that officially informs policy in France. Although denial fits
in an ideal-typical ethos, in reality, in France, as in most other liberal
states, group inequalities are a major problem and tend to increase
over time. In other words, denying the existence of group inequality
does not seem to be an effective solution for the dilemma of recogni-
tion, either.
De Zwart’s third proposed policy approach combines accommoda-
tion and denial. Replacement constructs the targets of redistributive
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policies in such a way as to avoid the accentuation – or the mere recog-
nition – of ‘inconvenient’ distinctions, while still allowing for beneficial
redistribution among the groups. More and more, replacement policies
are being favoured around the world, as the possible disadvantages of
multiculturalism become apparent and denial is hard to sustain in the
face of group inequality.
When a government pursues redistribution to benefit ethnic groups,
it constructs its own social categories. These categories are different in
name and usually more inclusive than the ethnic classifications they re-
place. This strategy is a purposeful attempt to avoid official recognition
of the social divisions thought to cause the problem, while still permit-
ting redistribution to benefit disadvantaged groups. According to De
Zwart, however, replacement policies pose three problems. First, they
create new inequalities and therefore become self-perpetuating: groups
with the best mobilisation capacity are first in line for the benefits. Sec-
ond, the social categories that emerge are exactly those that replacement
aims to suppress: as De Zwart argues, the categories do not come despite
the use of replacement strategies, but because of them. To provide an ex-
ample, because unemployment rates among immigrants are relatively
high, using ‘the unemployed’ as a constructed category for policymaking
will, at least in some neighbourhoods, manifest itself in the same immi-
grant group categorisation that the policy tried to overcome. Finally, re-
placement categories rely on vague definitions to function and thus can
only aim at ambiguous administrative concepts. As a result, control over
the implementation of policies is impeded and there remains ample op-
portunity for political entrepreneurs to mobilise ethnic collectivities and
pressure the government to recognise their claims.
Still, it should be noted, replacement’s actual effects are under-inves-
tigated and remain less understood than other policy adjustments. Our
research found that vague definitions did not hinder policy practi-
tioners in their attempts to deal with immigrant youth unemployment.
Practitioners showed how they could deliver locally adequate services
by pragmatically accommodating group-specific differences that only
reveal themselves in the local context. Moreover, we witnessed how a
sense of adequacy can be achieved with relative independence of the
political context in which policy is implemented. We found that repla-
cement does not necessarily lead to the effects De Zwart connects to it.
Instead, replacement can be strategic, provided policymakers are aware
that it may be accompanied by pragmatic accommodation at the level
of implementation. As the Dutch Scientific Council for Government
Policy (WRR 2001) notes, general measures combating inequality often
come to ultimately benefit the immigrants anyway.
De Zwart’s dilemma of recognition deals primarily with the extent to
which policymakers distinguish among specific groups in their integra-
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tion policies in order to combat group inequality. Here, Amsterdam
and Berlin provide an interesting case study. The cities are mirror
images of one other in the extent to which social or cultural groups are
recognised as beneficiaries of the last three decades of targeted policies.
Amsterdam’s policy has developed from a multicultural, accommoda-
tive approach (with targeted policies for clearly defined ethnic groups)
to a more generalised approach without any target groups whatsoever.
Berlin officially did not have targeted policies throughout the 1980s
and 1990s, though the city recently changed its approach to an accom-
modative one in which specific problems of immigrant groups would
get more attention. This method has involved councils of immigrant
organisations who advise local authorities on integration policies, an of-
ficial integration policy framework and an appointed Senator for Inte-
gration Affairs (to some extent, this picture is very similar to that of
multicultural policies in Amsterdam of the 1980s). It is compelling to
ask why Amsterdam and Berlin are, in many ways, mirror images of
one another and what this, in general, may tell us about the effective-
ness of the cities’ integration policy frameworks. However, we will not
deal specifically with these questions, so much as focus on current pol-
icymakers and policy practitioners who deal with immigrant youth un-
employment. We seek to determine how they cope with the dilemma
of recognition. To enable us to place the work of these policymakers in
their policy context, we will first give an overview of how the local inte-
gration framework developed in each city.
3 Local integration policies in Amsterdam
Until the end of the 1970s, the settlement of immigrant groups in Am-
sterdam did not lead to the formulation of a specific local integration
policy. Authorities of course dealt with social issues related to the grow-
ing immigrant communities in their city, but they saw the presence of
these populations as temporary. It was therefore unnecessary to formu-
late any structural policy for them. By the end of the 1970s, this strat-
egy of ignoring immigration was no longer feasible. Amsterdam autho-
rities had to change their view on immigration for two reasons. First,
increased immigration on such a large scale made it impossible for po-
liticians to ignore the fact that immigrants had become a structural ele-
ment of Dutch society. In addition, social problems related to immigra-
tion (segregation, discrimination, violence against immigrants, unem-
ployment, criminal behaviour, etc.) swept the city and people expected
politicians to come up with solutions. Second, in accordance with the
policy shift that was taking place on the national level, Amsterdam
authorities began to formulate specific policies to improve the position
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of immigrants in the Amsterdam society. A multicultural policy was to
be implemented that could be characterised as an accommodative ap-
proach. It officially classified the main immigrant categories as ‘minor-
ity target groups’ whose socio-economic position needed bettering. The
minority policy had two principal objectives: first, the social and eco-
nomic conditions of immigrant groups in Dutch society were to be im-
proved. To ensure equal access for all, this would require active public
interventions in the labour market and the education system. And sec-
ond, the Netherlands was to become a tolerant, multicultural society
where every immigrant culture would be accepted, respected and va-
lued (Lucassen & Penninx 1994: 148). All the main political parties
backed this policy shift. On the national level, issues related to minori-
ties and integration were not politically contentious during the 1980s;
in fact, the issues were highly depoliticised (De Beus 1998).
To illustrate, the new multicultural policy meant that, from 1981 on-
wards, different minority target groups became eligible for direct subsi-
dies to establish and develop their own ethnic organisations. The city
council envisaged three primary tasks for such organisations: to pro-
mote and preserve cultural identities, to emancipate their constituen-
cies and to represent community interests (Vermeulen 2006). While in
principle, political or religious organisations were not entitled to subsi-
dy funding, Amsterdam authorities insisted that all segments of the
guest worker community be included so as not to isolate certain groups
or associations. To this end, authorities invited religious organisations
to found additional social-cultural organisations so that the city would
be able to financially support these groups.
In 1985, the government decided to establish five1 minority advisory
councils consisting of members of ethnic immigrant organisations.
Their task was to advise local authorities on new policies and to evalu-
ate existing ones. However, the political influence of these councils was
often questioned in local policy reports and the organisations never
really cooperated harmoniously (Vermeulen 2005). Nevertheless, re-
search on the development of Amsterdam’s minority policy throughout
the 1990s indicates that these advisory councils did play a role in the
formulation of minority policy; their role was at least as large as that of
any individual immigrant organisation (Berveling 1994: 279).
As the 1980s drew to an end, Amsterdam followed the national lead,
slowly beginning to embrace a more general policy approach without
specific ethnic target groups, a structural integration policy framework
or minority advisory councils. After much delay and political pressure,
the city government published a 1989 report elaborately outlining its
anticipated minority policy for the coming decade. The report stated
that the policy effects of ten years of multiculturalism were disappoint-
ing; now more attention was to be given to the poor socio-economic po-
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sition in which most of the city’s immigrant groups found themselves.
After 1994, the multicultural policy with specific minority target
groups was abandoned and, to a large extent, immigrant organisations
lost their role in the policy system (Musterd, Ostendorf & Breebaart
1998: 41-42; Kraal 2001). By 1999, local authorities officially changed
their intentions towards immigrants from a minority policy to a diver-
sity policy. Within this diversity policy framework, focus fell on social
problems across the entire Amsterdam population, not just those of
the target groups. The central aim of this diversity policy for all inhabi-
tants to feel ‘at home’ in their city and to ensure that everyone had
equal opportunity to participate in society (Kraal 2001: 23-24).
The new diversity policy was intended to better serve the diverse Am-
sterdam population by focusing on differences between individuals in-
stead of between groups. Within this framework, all citizens were en-
couraged to be more open to change and to increase their participation
in society (Maussen 2006). Policymakers’ starting point should not be
the population’s problems, but rather the ‘strength of the people’ (City
of Amsterdam 1999). Amsterdam’s present-day diversity policy is best
characterised as a combination of denial and replacement. It may be li-
kened to denial because it refuses to acknowledge the relevance of
groups in the policymaking process; yet, it resonates with replacement
in attempts to ‘replace’ pre-existing ethnic groups with a broader, if not
blurrier, definition of diversity. Research has already identified some of
the negative side effects that were anticipated in Amsterdam’s replace-
ment strategy. Uitermark and Van Steenbergen (2006) conclude in
their study on the transformation of Amsterdam’s integration policy
that the reforms have disadvantaged the already most deprived immi-
grant groups because they lack the resources to organise themselves
within the new policy framework. Whereas the old multicultural policy
provided them with instruments for political participation, a lack of tar-
geted policies prevents these groups from mobilising. By contrast,
groups that already have a well-established organisational structure
profit from the policy reforms by exploiting the replacement categories
for their own advancement.
Accommodative elements in Amsterdam’s integration policies have
not completely vanished. For instance, current mayor Job Cohen has
expressed his belief that immigrant religious organisations can play an
important role in keeping the people of Amsterdam together. Cohen
therefore promotes close collaboration between the government and
some of these organisations (many of which are organised according to
ethnic religious identities). Furthermore, because diversity policy may
not always be executed by design at the local level, ‘street-level’ bureau-
crats need to collaborate with ethnic organisations in order to stay in
touch with residents of immigrant neighbourhoods (Maussen 2006).
LOCAL POLICIES CONCERNING UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG IMMIGRANT YOUTH 115
It would thus be appropriate to say that present-day Amsterdam’s inte-
gration policy draws on denial, accommodation and replacement, pro-
ducing a combination in which replacement is most visible (this con-
trasts with the accommodation dominant during the 1980s). We have
found that a similar process is at work among policy practitioners deal-
ing with unemployed immigrant youth. The policy targeted at unem-
ployed youth may also be characterised as a replacement strategy,
though in its method of providing assistance, it still gives attention to
cultural ethnic differences. These accommodative elements suggest
that the replacement strategy’s negative side effects, as De Zwart refer-
ences, do not occur in the policy field of our present research. Before
elaborating on this, let us look at Berlin’s integration.
4 Local integration policy in Berlin
Local integration policy in Berlin has been ambiguous from the begin-
ning, largely because it is a mixed bag of both conservative and multi-
cultural elements. On the one hand, Berlin is known throughout Ger-
many for its uniquely progressive stance on immigrants and its conse-
quently inclusive attitude towards immigrant organisations. On the
other hand, local politicians have used very restrictive measures to con-
trol the growth and integration of the immigrant population in their
city. It is also fair to say that immigration has been a highly politicised
topic in Berlin, especially during the 1980s. This alone makes the Ber-
lin case very different from Amsterdam’s (Hunger & Thra¨nhardt 2001:
111; Vermeulen 2006).
By the end of the 1970s, increased immigration to Berlin, as a conse-
quence of both family reunification among migrants and a high num-
ber of asylum-seekers, caused serious social problems just as in Am-
sterdam. The city was forced to deal with segregation, racial violence,
unemployment and housing problems, and the political significance of
immigration and integration issues grew commensurately. Berlin faced
in these years an immigration and integration crisis (Schwarz 2001:
129-130). The Christian Democrats (CDU) won the 1981 local elections,
proposing strongly restrictive and sometimes xenophobic measures for
the growing immigrant population in Berlin (Hunger & Thra¨nhardt
2001: 109). After the election, a new directive by the new local govern-
ment was introduced that was supposed to prevent a further rise in the
immigrant population and simultaneously further the integration of
those immigrants already living in Berlin. The policy programme’s
motto was ‘integration or departure’ (Schwarz 2001: 131). This ultima-
tum in the form of a slogan well illustrates the two sides that charac-
terised integration policy during the 1980s. On the one hand, the gov-
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ernment emphasised restrictive measures to ensure the reduction of
the number of immigrants in the city, such as increasing efforts to find
illegal immigrants and expel them from the city, but also opposing
dual nationality and stressing the need for immigrants to adapt to Ger-
man norms and values. Several conservative CDU senators, of whom
Heinrich Lummer (1981-1986) was the most renowned (Gesemann
2001: 16), were behind these measures. On the other hand, there was
a focus on a more integrative regime, which aimed to incorporate new-
comers into the host society, not to leave them behind. This aspect of
the policy was to be implemented by the new Commissioner for For-
eigners (Ausla¨nderbeauftragte), a bureaucratic institution established
in 1981 by the new local government.
The Ausla¨nderbeauftragte’s founder was Barbara John, a moderate
CDU politician who served in her position for more than twenty years.
She was Berlin’s main actor in the field of integration throughout the
1980s and the 1990s. There were several similarities in the policies
promoted by John herself and her institution and those being imple-
mented in Amsterdam. In terms of policy, the Ausla¨nderbeauftragte
emphasised naturalisation, something that was very different from
Germany’s national policy. In 1981, a successful campaign was
launched around naturalisation that focused especially on second- and
third-generation Turks (Bo¨cker & Thra¨nhardt 2003: 123). To this day,
naturalisation rates in Berlin are much higher than in other German
states. A second key element in the Ausla¨nderbeauftragte policy was ex-
plicit financial support for immigrant organisations. These subsidies
were not, however, part of a larger integration framework; they were a
more practical strategy to sustain the position of the Ausla¨nderbeauf-
tragte within the local political field. Since the political pressure that
the more conservative wing of the CDU exerted on the Ausla¨nderbeauf-
tragte was strong, and the issue of integration was unpopular among
the CDU, John sought groups outside her party to secure the institu-
tion’s political position. Funding organisations would improve relations
with the immigrant communities which would, in turn, ensure the
Ausla¨nderbeauftragte’s political legitimacy over a longer period
(Schwarz 2001: 133). In addition, because the Ausla¨nderbeauftragte
could only advise in the policymaking process, it did not (up until
2005) formulate integration policies for the Berlin Senate.
After 2000, city authorities followed the national level’s footsteps to
formulate a new integration framework. This resulted in the Berlin
Senate’s first official integration policy and appointment of the first Se-
nator for Integration Affairs. Berlin’s new integration policy is largely a
replacement strategy, as in the case of Amsterdam, though it has
strong accommodative elements. This is especially visible in the extent
to which immigrant organisations and their advisory councils are given
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a more influential role in the policymaking process. The policy itself is
characterised by the Berlin Senate’s Commissioner for Integration and
Migration (2005: 8) as follows:
Integration requires participation. Hence, the integration policy in
Berlin is primarily targeted both at the migrants and the majority
society. The integration of minorities is promoted by many speci-
fic measures, which aim at facilitating their full legal and social
equality; and simultaneously, integration also requires the majority
society to open up its institutions and procedures to intercultural
plurality. New forms of direct participation, like the State Advisory
Board for Integration and Migration Issues, incorporate represen-
tatives from the immigrant population into the advisory bodies.
Integration is a bilateral process, in which migrant organisations
perform the hinge function between the minorities and the major-
ity society.
This newly assigned role for immigrant organisations in Berlin is
meant to allow underprivileged groups opportunities for participating
in the policymaking process. The ultimate goal of Berlin’s integration
policy, however, is not to outfit immigrants with their own ethnic-speci-
fic institutions that enable participation. As described by the Commis-
sioner of Integration Affairs (2005: 9):
Successful integration policy leads to a new customer orientation
in Berlin’s administration and social services. Long-term integra-
tion also signifies that those immigrants residing in Berlin should
be sufficiently covered by the social welfare and support systems,
which enable them to gain equal chances of development. Primar-
ily, this should be achieved by an opening of public services and
institutions. They need to be accessible to all citizens in the same
way. This entails improvement in their customer orientation and
attainment of courteousness towards citizens. Specifically, this ap-
plies to migrant-specific administrations (e.g. Foreigners’ Office),
the common healthcare system, offers for elderly citizens, as well
as social and labour matters. Only in complex cases, where the
standard services do not suffice in terms of time and resources,
should exceptional offers for immigrants be carried out.
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5 Immigrant youth unemployment in Amsterdam and in
Berlin
In both Amsterdam and in Berlin, youth unemployment among immi-
grant groups is a serious problem. In Amsterdam, the level of youth
unemployment among immigrants (ages twenty to 24) has decreased
from 11 per cent in 2001 to 7 per cent in 2005 (compared to the 5 to 6
per cent among non-immigrant groups). In some immigrant neigh-
bourhoods, however, the level of unemployment is much higher, at
about 22 per cent, and the majority of the unemployed are under age
26 (O + S 2005). These neighbourhoods are among the poorest areas
in the city and a high percentage of the inhabitants there have a low
education, which does not put them in a good position to succeed at
the labour market. The labour market situation is generally much
worse in Berlin, where the unemployment level was 18 per cent in
2005. In the same year, unemployment among Turks, by far the largest
immigrant group in Berlin, was approximately 40 per cent; it was
nearly 50 per cent among Turkish youth (Der Spiegel 2005). These per-
centages suggest that Amsterdam has a few thousand unemployed im-
migrant youngsters, whereas Berlin’s numbers are in the tens of thou-
sands. The cities’ individual discrepancies notwithstanding, youth un-
employment among immigrants is significantly, persistently higher
than it is among non-immigrant groups. As such, policymakers seek-
ing to diminish group inequality have to contend with the ‘dilemma of
recognition’.
5.1 The implementation of policies in Amsterdam
Amsterdam’s current policy towards unemployed immigrant youth was
established in 2000, just after the new diversity policy was implemen-
ted. Two factors were important in creating the policy. First, there was
a high rate of youth unemployment during the late 1990s despite the
fact that Amsterdam’s economy was doing very well at the time. There
was no specific policy for immigrant youth leading to a crisis in the ci-
ty’s social security agency, which experienced a period wherein Amster-
dam’s entire labour market office was heavily criticised (Van Genus
2004). Second, politicians found the high percentage of unemployed
immigrant youth worrisome, believing that the situation was causing
more and more problems in the city. Moroccan youth, in particular,
were seen as the root of future social conflict. The riots of 1998 in Am-
sterdam-West that took place between the police and Moroccans young-
sters had put the status of immigrant youth high on the political agen-
da. Youth unemployment and high school-dropout rates were seen as
two of the main sources for problems within this group.
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Politicians and policymakers decided to change their approach to-
wards immigrant youth around 2000. Specific policies for ethnic
groups were no longer possible, as multicultural policy had just been
officially abandoned by the local government. Policies for unemployed
immigrant youth were therefore more in-synch with the new diversity
policy’s basic assumptions. Amsterdam tried to tackle its youth unem-
ployment problem with what the city characterised as a stringent, yet
humane, personal approach. This involved keeping track of unem-
ployed youngsters via youth offices, and through their administration,
assigning personal coaches to the youths. These coaches would have
several intensive consultations with the youngsters, allowing them to
evaluate their goals, skills and challenges. With the main problem
being attributed to their lack of education, the policy’s main goal was
to get youngsters back to school to improve their employable skills and
thus enable themselves to find decent work. The youth offices found,
however, that the proverbial right path – one that would take them
back to school – was often blocked by various obstacles. If this were
the case, a youngster was expected to enrol in an internship project
where he or she could acquire employable skills. Amsterdam offers
many such internship projects for unemployed youth.
A caveat to Amsterdam’s policy is that individuals under age 23 are
not entitled to any form of social security. Instead, these youth must be
enrolled in school, be engaged in a trainee programme or an intern-
ship or be holding a job. The individual attention offered by a personal
coach, along with the policy’s positive approach that still maintains
strict boundaries between the coach and the youth, have so far been
seen as a successful formula. As one personal coach relayed in an
interview:
They [unemployed youth] can get some money, but they have to
work for it. If they do not want to work: there is the door! […] The
money that they can get is at the same level as unemployment
benefits – it is very low. It is explicitly not called ‘a benefit’, but
rather, ‘an income’. It is the same amount as a benefit, but you
have to work for it. (Interview with employer youth employment
office)
If no work is available for a youngster, he or she must be engaged in a
full-time trainee programme, whereby work and social skills are im-
proved to ensure better job market prospects. Thus, Amsterdam opts
for an integrated approach that allows different institutions and agen-
cies to cooperate. The basic principle of this policy approach is fulfill-
ing a right to work rather than a right to benefits. In practice, this
means that unemployed youth should actively participate in work pro-
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jects as well as receive benefits (at a level comparable to regular social
security). If they refuse to participate in any of the prescribed projects,
however, they may experience cutbacks to their benefits – or no bene-
fits at all.
Despite, or perhaps because of, these drastic policy measures, it can
be extremely difficult to reach out to unemployed youth, not least be-
cause many have severe social problems and show little interest in edu-
cational and employment programmes. Many unemployed youth suffer
from personal issues such as psychiatric and drug-related problems
(Zandvliet 2005). Moreover, their immigrant background is frequently
implicated as the source of language barriers, a different cultural atti-
tude towards work and education or labour-market discrimination.
Amsterdam authorities have deliberately chosen to follow a general
policy free of ethnic categories and specific target groups. This strictly
structured yet integrative programme is extended to all of Amsterdam’s
unemployed youth and appears to be more effective than targeted poli-
cies. What has proven remarkably helpful for immigrant youth is the
policy’s provision of intensive personal guidance. This observation has
not explicitly been stated by policymakers and practitioners, them-
selves, though this is the suggestion made in a handbook administered
to youth office personal coaches. The book describes the specific pro-
blems of the target group as follows (Zandvliet 2005: 8):
The demands of the Western culture in terms of self-knowledge,
formation of opinions and negotiating skills are often at odds with
the norms and values of the families in which [unemployed immi-
grant youth] grew up. In these traditional families there is no
room for negotiating. Individual departure from collective family
rules will not be accepted. [...] There is a strong discrepancy be-
tween the Western I-culture and the we-culture of which they ori-
ginate.
The intensive personal approach applied in the work projects and the
educational methods administered by the youth office courses are all
focused on trying to resolve the specific problem of unemployment.
The consensus is that this can be accomplished through the social en-
richment of immigrant youth. As demonstrated in the fragment above,
insufficient social skills are viewed as a kind of culturally defined dis-
crepancy. Concepts that may sound abstract at the policymaking level,
such as ‘personal approach’ and ‘lack of social skills’, become concreti-
cised upon implementation in culturally ‘hands-on’ contexts. What is
more, the importance of such a specification is overtly recognised by
coaches. Coaches often distinguish work skills from social skills, sug-
gesting that most unemployed immigrant youth possess good pro-
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spects for employability, but lack appropriate social skills. Amsterdam’s
main policy objective is for youths themselves to realise how crucial
finding a good job is for the sake of their future. While policy projects
and programmes provide some levels of support, the youngsters must
invest in their own futures. Enhancing, if not altogether instilling, such
awareness means teaching youth how to conduct themselves on the la-
bour market and in the workforce. The individual-based personal
coaching style of Amsterdam’s policy promotes making contact with
this group of youth and communicating with them in ways conducive
to increasing their aptitudes and heightening their levels of conscious-
ness. In the fragment below, one of the coaches explains how this
method is part of a general policy that has no targeted ethnic groups,
but nevertheless manages to respond to the specific needs of unem-
ployed immigrant youth:
I am not an advocate of specific policies that focus on specific eth-
nicities and cultures. However, I do think that you [as a coach]
should be able to put yourself in the position of the youngster. On
the other hand, you should also be able to demand something
from them: that they be willing to take all kinds of jobs [no matter
the status], that they do everything to improve their language
skills. But you [as a coach] should also be prepared to assist the
youngsters if they experience specific obstacles. (Interview with
employer youth employment office)
Being a practitioner of the policy himself, the coach recommends an
accommodative implementation strategy while, at the same time, also
contextualising this strategy within the greater scheme of the pro-
gramme. Incorporating an accommodative practice within general de-
mands is thus viewed as part of an effective way of working.2 In prac-
tice, this means that the cultural background of a client may indeed
play a role in selecting the best tactic for acquiring additional social
skills. A coach contends that a personal coach’s approach is partly
decided upon by the client’s ethnic background:
Yes, it might be the case that our approach is influenced by the cli-
ent’s ethnic background. For instance, I have said that we should
visit mosques [to reach out to Islamic youth who are unemployed]
and that we should establish specific programmes for them. You
need to train them [Islamic immigrant youth] to be more proac-
tive, because they often say ‘yes’ out of politeness, because it is ex-
pected from them culturally. […] For these things [culturally speci-
fic customs] you need to set up specific programmes. (Interview
with employer youth employment office)
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Therefore, not only do policy approaches differ, but so do methods of
reaching out to specific groups. The coach continues:
I believe that we, as youth workers live too much in a castle. We
should go out more often to the city districts and neighbourhoods.
Go to mosques, schools and ethnic restaurants, it does not matter.
We should be talking to youngsters there and put up our posters.
Do not forget the schools, all youngsters go there and it is the
place where they drop out. (Interview with employer youth em-
ployment office)
Another personal coach explains how the youth office promotes colla-
boration with many different parties, including immigrant
organisations:
So, I do go to a mosque. […] That is something that we do, but we
should not completely focus on that. I do think that [immigrant]
interest organisations can be relevant for our job, but these organi-
sations also need to collaborate with each other. […] You should al-
ways work in a network of organisations. (Interview with employer
youth employment office)
Again, accommodation is said to be an effective part of implementation,
but only in a pragmatic sense. That is, accommodation proves to be a ne-
cessary means to an end for realising general goals. In principle, there
is not much room for accommodative elements in Amsterdam’s ap-
proach towards unemployed youth (or other social policy topics, for that
matter). The city has no target groups, the policy is the same for every-
one and the individual-based approach allows policymakers to avoid
group-based thinking. By contrast, our interviews show how, in practice,
a strong individual-based approach does leave room for cultural and eth-
nic differences. Such group delineations, however, are more closely re-
lated to the specific way in which cultural and ethnic background are al-
ready embedded in the life of unemployed immigrant youth. In addi-
tion, policymakers will take some specific cultural circumstances into
account if such consideration enhances eligibility for work prospects.
Amsterdam’s room for difference, so to speak, indicates that the replace-
ment strategy’s negative side effects are less severe; in fact, group differ-
ences remain significant for the policy approach at the practical level. As
we have observed, this policy adjustment does not require overpowering
framework that perpetuates group inequality. Amsterdam has shown
how replacement can work to combat it.
To conclude, in Amsterdam there is no clear one-to-one correlation
between policymaking and implementation and, thus, no coherent
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shift towards replacement. Instead, we see a delicate combination of re-
placement on one level, and pragmatic accommodation on another.
Furthermore, it is apparent that pragmatic accommodation can be en-
abled by replacement, as opposed to being hindered by it. Replacement
provides general criteria that can be set to work in a wide variety of dif-
ferent circumstances, precisely because they are broad.
5.2 The implementation of policies in Berlin
Berlin’s official government institutions dealing with employment is-
sues, such as the Jobcenter, give special attention to unemployed
youth, whether immigrant or not. These institutions use a replacement
strategy: although they work with target groups (unemployed youth,
for example), they do not make delineations according to social divi-
sions such as ethnicity. There are some similarities between Berlin’s
and Amsterdam’s policy approaches. Within the Jobcenter, there are
special divisions for youngsters and each unemployed person under
age 25 is entitled to a case manager equivalent to the personal coaches
we found in Amsterdam. One main difference between the two cities’
policies is that unemployed youth in Berlin are consistently entitled to
receive unemployment benefits. Although there are repercussions if
regulations outlined by the case manager are not followed, youth never
lose all their benefits; they simply face sanctions. Another difference is
the fact that there are very few case manager of immigrant back-
ground, whereas it has been part of Amsterdam’s policy to increase its
number of coaches of non-native origin. Apart from these differences,
the methods used by the Jobcenter in assisting unemployed youth are
similar to Amsterdam’s techniques. Below, two case managers we inter-
viewed explain the protocol they follow when an unemployed immi-
grant youth is assigned to the Jobcenter:
First we start by talking to the youngsters. […] Then we can estab-
lish what the problems are. The language skills are especially im-
portant, because this seems to be the biggest handicap – not so
much verbal, but mainly writing language skills. […] We also have
a division for the difficult cases. This is for those [clients] who
have more than one handicap. This approach is more intensive
and we work together with other networks [organisations] to teach
them everything that we are not able to do ourselves. We try to
give them a positive perspective on their future. (Interview with
case manager, Jobcenter)
Compared to Amsterdam’s youth offices, at the Jobcenter there seems
to be less interest in, and subsequent attention given to, the specific
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backgrounds of immigrant youth. In order to reach out and assist un-
employed youngsters, case managers do not need explicit policy mea-
sures. Our interviewees referenced conversations a case manager had
with the Tu¨rkische Bund Berlin (TBB), one of the city’s largest Turkish-
interest organisations which also provides specialised projects for un-
employed youth. As the fragment below suggests, Berlin’s approach is
relatively all-encompassing.
It was an interesting case. […] The TBB had the idea that there
were many [Turkish] youngsters who were not reached and no-
body knew about them. However, this was not the case. These
youngsters were all known, either by the Jobcenters or by one of
the partners. […] We do think a lot about this [special policy mea-
surements for Turkish youth]. (Interview with case manager Job-
center)
Case managers, furthermore, are highly positive about their coopera-
tion with other immigrant organisations, such as the TBB. Speaking
about Turkish youngsters, another case manager pointed to the unique
position immigrant organisation representatives have when it comes to
improving the skills of unemployed youth with little education:
I think it is very important [to give immigrant organisations a role
in the policymaking process], because the representatives [of the
organisation] come from the same culture. They can teach them
[immigrant groups] that Germany is their society, one in which
they have to make it and that they will not go back to their country
of origin. […] They [organisation representatives] can get more out
of collaborating with these youngsters because they know the
structures [of the immigrant families] better. (Interview with case
manager)
The Berlin Senate’s integration report encourages the assistance and
support of unemployed immigrant youth by various organisations, in-
cluding those that are immigrant organisations. It states (2005: 24):
In close collaboration with […] many non-profit organisations, the
Senate supports the transition [of unemployed immigrant youth]
into job training.
Case managers acknowledge the new opportunities for organisations
that are afforded by the new local integration policy report. As they
state in the interview:
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We also work together with the Commissioner for Integration and
Migration of the Senate of Berlin. The integration report is
adopted and this has made the topic [unemployed immigrant
youth] relevant again. Other organisations have also devoted them-
selves to this topic. At the moment, we are involved in a bi-na-
tional project with Kreuzberg Educational Works. The project lea-
der is of Turkish origin. What we do not like to do is to design
completely Turkish measures, because then the Turks are left
among themselves again, and that will not work. Although they
might feel very comfortable in a [Turkish-only] environment, they
would not even have to speak German there. (Interview with case
manager)
Looking at the other organisations providing activities and projects for
unemployed immigrant youth, we can distinguish between non-immi-
grant organisations and immigrant organisations. To this end, we will
focus on two examples, Arbeit und Bildung (AUB) and the TBB. What
is interesting here is that, compared to the attitude of Berlin’s Jobcen-
ters, both these organisations display a more responsive attitude to-
wards the specific needs of unemployed youngsters , and in this way,
their methods are very similar to Amsterdam’s.
AUB is an independent organisation with a focus on integration
through education and labour-market participation. Founded in 1986,
AUB targets unemployed immigrants, both youngsters and adults.
Through individual consultancies, AUB endeavours to guide unem-
ployed immigrants to the labour market, whether for their first time
or as returning employees. The organisation uses a database to locate
available jobs, internship positions or opportunities for continued edu-
cation. AUB works on a project basis and receives subsidies from the
local government to execute such projects. In keeping with AUB mis-
sion’s, their projects aims to help the unemployed find work or proper
education. The programme cooperates with several consultants, many
of whom are social workers and some of whom come from immi-
grant backgrounds themselves. To better communicate with the
youngsters, consultants speak various languages, including Turkish,
Arabic, Polish, English, French and Russian. The idea, moreover, is
that consultants with personal immigration experience have inside
knowledge of the networks of specific ethnic groups, thus facilitating
the reaching of target groups.
Despite AUB’s choice to work specifically with immigrant youth, we
find it difficult to refer to their actual policy as ‘targeted’. The following
interview fragment with an AUB manager illustrates this seemingly
contradictory point:
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I don’t particularly support targeted policies. I personally believe
that mixing Germans with other groups in projects is more suc-
cessful. Of course, there is some disagreement on this point. […]
You have to be attentive to personal backgrounds. Those also tend
to differ in significant ways within groups. Some [immigrant]
youngsters have successfully gone through high school and have
many German friends. They’ve been completely socialised in Ber-
lin. It is for this group that a mixed approach is extremely impor-
tant. For youngsters who have great language difficulties or have
just recently arrived here a targeted approach is crucial. (Interview
with manager of AUB)
Although Berlin’s political context is very different from Amsterdam’s,
as evidenced by AUB’s approach, the two cities similarly – and success-
fully – combine an adherence to general programme demands with
pragmatically accommodative approaches. The AUB policy is targeted
insofar as it serves practical ends. In other words, in order to tackle
youth unemployment (of which a substantial part happens to be immi-
grant), practitioners should pursue those specific measures that will
help them reach the targeted group. In AUB’s case, this does not mean
that group background or ethnic characteristics (other than language)
significantly affect their approach. It does mean, however, that AUB
tries to build a network that enables them to reach their target group.
They therefore enjoy a large network of partners for cooperation. Many
of these partners are immigrant organisations such as TBB and Re-
spekt (comprising Russian immigrants).
TBB is another organisation that has had a key role in rehabilitating
unemployed immigrant youth in Berlin. In 2005, TBB undertook a
project primarily targeted at unemployed Turkish youngsters with low
educational skills. Known as MOVE – Motivieren und Vermitteln (‘mo-
tivate and mediate’) – this project oversees 50 youngsters at a time who
follow Jobcenter-assigned courses that are intended to better their abil-
ities. MOVE is the only official immigrant organisation–founded youth
project that is supported by the Jobcenters and Berlin’s Senate. Each
MOVE project lasts for a period of six months, during which time
youngsters get help with improving their social skills and must enrol
themselves in an educational course, a work project, an internship at a
business or a shop or, in some instances, a regular job. The manager
of the programme explains MOVE’s method as follows:
In this phase [the programme’s introduction period] we examine
what the young people can do. What are their strong and weak
points, what do they actually want to do? After that, we teach them
the following topics: German, math, general knowledge, basic
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computer skills, job orientation, writing a letter of application and
extended job orientation. They need to do one or two internships
to really test whether it [the job they aspire to] is what they ima-
gined it to be. (Interview with manager of MOVE programme)
During the internships, the youngsters are supervised by MOVE tea-
chers who are also mainly of Turkish descent. Parents of enrolees also
get involved in the programme via MOVE’s habit of making house
calls and holding information meetings. TBB sees such practices as an
effective way to encourage participation and motivate youngsters to
succeed. According to MOVE’s manager, a main advantage the pro-
gramme has over Jobcenter-assigned projects is that MOVE speaks the
language of the youngsters. In the words of MOVE’s manager:
The teenagers do not understand the language of the administra-
tive bodies. They start a project and after two to three weeks they
already quit. Or they stay until the end, but with so many interrup-
tions, that afterwards they can hardly tell you where they were,
what they did and most important why they did it. […] Another
problem is the matter of time. We have here daily six to eight
hours for 40 to 50 youngsters. The administrative bodies maybe
have half an hour for them. That is too little and too short. And
this job orientation is also not taught at school. […] We cannot ex-
pect much of a young person, who is not aware of what he wants
to do, who does not have the needed conditions and maybe also
experiences language problems – and who the people from the ad-
ministrative bodies hardly have time for. (Interview with manager
of MOVE programme)
Kenan Kolat, a former TBB board member and the current president
of the Tu¨rkische Gemeinde Deutschland (TGD) explains to what extent
MOVE better assists unemployed Turkish youngsters than some of Ber-
lin’s administrative bodies can. In an interview he gave with a newspa-
per (Berliner Zeitung 2006), Kolat was quoted as saying:
We will not solve all problems with our campaign. To integrate
problematic young people we run projects like MOVE. These pro-
jects are divided into small sections; it is difficult, but very suc-
cessful. Our colleagues there speak the language of the young-
sters. They are, on the one hand, their team-mate, but they can
also be inflexible. If needed, they will get them out of bed in the
morning and bring them to the internship. Otherwise they will
get a reduction of their unemployment benefit. […] Many have
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their strong points and we have to positively develop that. We want
education to get mainstream in the Turkish community.
According to one MOVE teacher we interviewed, Berlin’s authorities
should do more to promote targeted projects that have already proven
so successful. The teacher states:
It is not only the 50 youngsters we look after, who are unem-
ployed, dropped out of school and have no opportunity to find in-
ternship. There are, in Berlin alone, thousands of youngsters of
Arabic, Kurdish or Turkish origin who stand around without any
prospects. This cannot go ignored. Targeted projects should be
promoted. We can assist a maximum of 50 people, but more
youngsters come and go, so that per year a few hundred can be
supported. But it is thousands that need help. Projects like MOVE
should be financed – ten, twenty or a hundred times more. (Inter-
view with teacher of MOVE programme)
Ultimately, however, TBB does not seem to endorse the assignment of
all projects for unemployed immigrant youth to immigrant organisa-
tions. In fact, the MOVE programme highlights the fact that these
youngsters sometimes need even more intensive assistance than immi-
grant organisations can provide. As such, one TBB board member we
interviewed suggested that it is not always requisite, nor even an ad-
vantage, for the MOVE teacher to speak Turkish:
It can be [an advantage that MOVE’s teachers speak also Turkish]
but not always. Most [Turkish] youngsters have grown up here [in
Berlin] and speak German pretty well. Many have more difficulty
with the Turkish language. It can be an advantage for many
youngsters that most teachers have a Turkish background, but not
for everyone; it depends on the person. (Interview with board
member of TBB)
To summarise, as in Amsterdam, Berlin’s official policy towards young
unemployed immigrants is one of replacement. The policy neither tar-
gets unemployed youth nor does it accommodate further group specifi-
cations. When it comes to implementation, however, Berlin’s policy of-
fers considerable room for the accommodation of immigrant groups
and immigrant organisations. This is remarkable, seeing as Berlin has
no tradition of integration policy, let alone of the accommodative form
that characterised Amsterdam’s policy during the 1980s. By contrast,
the networks, knowledge and initiatives fostered by immigrant organi-
sations are no longer of practical utility in Amsterdam.
LOCAL POLICIES CONCERNING UNEMPLOYMENT AMONG IMMIGRANT YOUTH 129
The differences between the cities, however, are subtle. Even though
immigrant youth are, in practice, a targeted group in Berlin, group-spe-
cific approaches are delimited. For example, AUB works with some
consultants who have immigration backgrounds themselves and can
thus offer insights into clients based on personal experience. For simi-
lar reasons, AUB also works with immigrant organisations that exploit
wide networks and first-hand knowledge of immigrant languages. This
enables an organisation like AUB to more effectively reach the target
group, even without being informed by the belief that specific groups
require ethnic- or culture-specific policies. Even the TBB, which does
give special attention to the possible existence of culturally defined
boundaries in its dealings with immigrant youth, prefers to be less ex-
plicit about culturally or ethnically specific policy. It thus seems that in
Berlin, where the official policy is characterised by replacement, there
is some room for the specification of target groups when it comes to
actual practice. This does not lead, however, to targeted policy. In other
words, Berlin’s policy implementation involves target groups, but not
targeted policy.
6 Conclusion
This chapter has looked at the local policies in Amsterdam and in Ber-
lin meant to reduce youth unemployment and assist immigrant young-
sters in steadily acquiring positions in the labour market. In general,
the cities’ policies are somewhat similar. Both cities have established
an infrastructure of youth offices, personal coaches and an individual-
based approach intended to improve youngsters’ social skills. In gener-
al, the main difference we observed in our comparisons is the stricter
policy that Amsterdam tends towards. For example, in Amsterdam
youth under age 23 do not receive unemployment benefits, and are ob-
ligated to work, be enrolled in work projects or go back to school.
In this chapter we also examined how the dilemma of recognition,
as described by De Zwart, is manifested in both cities. Amsterdam and
Berlin provide an interesting case for comparison because they are al-
most mirror images when it comes to local integration policy develop-
ments. Amsterdam has moved from a multicultural policy with official
target groups to an approach that is primarily characterised by replace-
ment, in which diversity is encouraged, though only on an individual
basis. Berlin’s rather ambiguous integration policy of the 1980s and
1990s, which actually offered no official integration framework, devel-
oped into a replacement strategy with many accommodative elements,
mainly as opportunities afforded to ethnic organisations and ethnic ad-
visory councils.
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Amsterdam and Berlin are also mirror images of one another in
terms of how policy strategies for unemployed youth function. In Am-
sterdam, there are few accommodative elements in the policy frame-
work: immigrant organisations have no major role and there are no
group-specific programmes for immigrants. But in practice, we see that
Amsterdam’s individual-based approach does leave room for cultural
and ethnic differences. We witnessed how youth office-assigned perso-
nal coaches acknowledge that they cannot apply the same strategy across
the board for all their clients. Our interviews revealed the need for prac-
titioners to be aware of a number of specific cultural factors as they at-
tempt to uniquely empower youngsters to improve their labour-market
prospects. In Berlin, it is the reverse. The policy framework does leave
room for cultural difference, mainly by assigning specific roles to immi-
grant and other organisations as they execute projects for unemployed
youngsters. However, in practice, there seems to be less enthusiasm for
giving attention to specific cultural backgrounds. TBB’s MOVE under-
taking is one of the few programmes we found to illustrate a high sensi-
tivity for the effect of specific cultural traits when it comes to increasing
immigrant youngsters’ opportunities for decent work, but even in this
project the approach for unemployed immigrant youth displays many si-
milarities with the Amsterdam approach. The MOVE project uses a si-
milar intensive personal approach towards the youngsters.
The situations in both cities are thus once again more similar than
would, on first glance, be expected. Both Amsterdam and Berlin’s policy
strategy is replacement, as evidenced by the very existence of the ‘unem-
ployed youth’ category that policymakers and practitioners work with.
Nevertheless, the policy still makes room for cultural and ethnic differ-
ences, if and when needed. While Amsterdam executes a top-down ap-
proach in this respect through the institutionalised administration of
youth offices and personal coaches, Berlin’s approach is bottom-up, as
seen in the opportunities immigrant organisations have to be included
in the policymaking process. Because of the room made available for
cultural and ethnic differences in the policy framework, we did not find
negative side effects of the replacement strategy, as De Zwart described:
in precise terms, that replacement would enable new social categories to
emerge which are exactly those replacement aims to suppress (see also
Stotijn 2006). Policy practitioners in Amsterdam and in Berlin seem
sufficiently capable of targeting relevant groups and addressing their in-
equalities. Admittedly though, the definitions they use to delineate cate-
gories can be rather vague at times so as to avoid naming and perpetuat-
ing group differences.
We also conclude that the dilemma of recognition is a useful con-
cept, as are the three policy approaches De Zwart outlined for dealing
with the dilemma. But to adequately evaluate the effects of denial, ac-
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commodation and replacement as strategies to cope with the dilemma
of recognition, it is crucial to differentiate between the domains of
policymaking and implementation. As Duyvendak and Uitermark
(2006: 65) have noted:
[Policy] is based on a variety of motives and justifications as well
as principles, and cannot be reduced simply to the implementa-
tion of an ideal. An idea that commonly crops up in the public
and political debates is that the ideal of a multicultural society
permeates all phases of policymaking, including the results, but
the literature reveals serious doubts about whether there is a direct
relationship between ideals and the actual results of policies.
Once the implementation of policies in Amsterdam and Berlin is scruti-
nised, it becomes clear that De Zwart’s categories should be refined. We
have shown that replacement can be accompanied by what we have re-
ferred to as pragmatic accommodation. Moreover, practitioners are able
to implement these replacement strategies because they make room for
pragmatic accommodation. The relationship between policy and practice
is dynamic and multivalent; it is not the so-often idealised one-to-one,
unidirectional translation of policy into practice. In effect, a dynamic re-
lationship prevents the solidification and consequent reaffirmation of so-
cial categories. By becoming aware of actual ‘street-level’ practice and the
divergent logic of practitioners, policymaking may be able to evade the
problems De Zwart identifies. In view of the policies discussed here, we
would characterise Amsterdam and Berlin’s policymaking as strategic re-
placement, for replacement in policymaking does not necessarily entail
replacement in implementation. Together with forms of pragmatic ac-
commodation, such strategic replacement may be much better suited for
dealing with the rich and complex relationships involved in social policy.
Notes
1 There were councils for Turkish immigrants, Moroccans immigrants, Surinamese/
Antillean and Moluccan immigrants, Chinese, Pakistani and refugee immigrants
and, finally, for immigrants from Southern Europe. Every council had about thirteen
members, all of them immigrant organisations. Members were chosen by the local
government and they were supposed to represent the main ideologies/movements/
groups that exist within the different immigrant communities. The task of these
councils was to provide policy advice on issues concerning integration (Go¨ttgens
2004).
2 We would go even further, arguing that to encourage effective participation in the la-
bour market and, for that matter, in society, policy must recognise and validate differ-
ences among groups while still holding individuals responsible for fulfilling general
workforce demands.
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5 Managing religious pluralism in Canadian cities:
mosques in Montreal and Laval
Aude-Claire Fourot1
1 Introduction: cities and the current challenges of religious
pluralism
The duty to accommodate, which has had legal force since 1985 follow-
ing a decision of the Supreme Court,2 plays a key role in the area of re-
ligious pluralism in Quebec and Canada. It
requires governmental bodies and private persons or companies
to change their rules and policies in order to accommodate the
needs of those whose right to equality has been infringed, unless
the needed accommodation would impose undue hardship.
(Woehrling 1998: 325)
The duty affects Quebec municipal institutions and confronts them
with issues in sharp contrast to the role traditionally assigned to the
municipal government, namely, ‘dealing with such prosaic things as
garbage-removal and sewers’ (Rowat 1969: 1). However, it is now
widely accepted that ethno-cultural and ethno-religious differences are
experienced on a daily basis in urban settings, and that not only do ci-
ties have a de facto responsibility for the management of religious plur-
alism, they also have the skills and tools to shape it. This is particularly
true of municipalities that have the power to authorise or refuse the
creation of places of worship.
That said, how does one account for the different processes of insti-
tutionalisation of places of worship in different cities? To answer this
question, this chapter analyses cases in two large Canadian cities, Mon-
treal and Laval, both located in the Province of Quebec. While previous
studies have already addressed some issues underlying the creation of
Muslim places of worship, my goal here is to identify processes of in-
stitutionalisation using a neo-institutional approach (Thelen & Steinmo
1992). This analytical framework reveals the institutional configura-
tions (Katznelson 1997) specific to each city and characterised by the
following: the state of inter-governmental relations; the discourses sur-
rounding the accommodation of ethno-cultural and ethno-religious de-
mands; the relations among local actors, especially elected officials and
municipal public servants; and forms of mediation between municipa-
lities and ethno-religious groups. I then demonstrate the impact these
configurations have on the processes of institutionalisation, and thus
the degree of personalisation of mediation channels. In this way differ-
ences across cases can be explained. My principal hypothesis is that
personalisation of mediation channels leads to a political process of in-
stitutionalisation whereas non-personalisation of these channels leads
to an administrative one.
2 Issues and approaches associated with creating Muslim
places of worship
Compared to the large corpus of European research on religious plural-
ism (inter alia Cesari, Bargach & Moore 2002; De Galembert 2006;
Eckardt 2006; Fre´gosi 2006; Gale 2004; Garbaye 2006; Manco & Kan-
maz 2002; Maussen 2005, 2007; Sunier 2005; Torrekens 2006), Cana-
dian studies have not given much consideration to it. One possible ex-
planation of this difference is that large-scale Muslim immigration to
Canada and Quebec is a recent phenomenon, especially compared to
the experience of former European colonial powers, such as France or
the United Kingdom. However, with the increase in Canada of persons
of Muslim, Hindu, Sikh or Buddhist faiths, there is new interest in the
revival of religious pluralism and the building of places of worship.
2.1 Data on the Muslim population in Canada and Quebec
This chapter concentrates on Muslim places of worship because Islam
has experienced the greatest growth rate among all religions (+129 per
cent) in Canada.3 In Quebec, the increase has been even larger: from
1991 to 2001, the number of persons stating they were Muslim in-
creased by 142 per cent. While Muslim immigration predates the
1990s, 4 it was during this decade that there were significant increases
in immigration flows. Thus, the immigration to Quebec of Muslims is
overwhelmingly a recent immigration, 78 per cent of which is made
up of first-generation immigrants.
While Muslims do not constitute a unified group, one of the distinc-
tive features of Muslims in Quebec, in contrast to their co-religionists
in the rest of Canada, is that most come from Africa and essentially
from the Maghreb (Eid 2007: 49-50). Ever since the Canada-Quebec
Accord on Immigration was signed in 1991, Quebec has had authority
over immigrant selection. As the province favours French-speaking im-
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migrants, the number of Muslim immigrants from North Africa has
increased. In 2006, for example, Morocco and Algeria were two of the
top four countries of birth of recent immigrants to Quebec (Quebec
2006; Quebec 2007).
These trends shape the situation in Montreal and Laval. More than
97 per cent of Muslims in Canada were settled in a census metropoli-
tan area5 (CMA) in 2001 (Janhevich & Ibrahim 2004: 47). In Montreal,
whose population in 2006 was 31 per cent immigrant (Canada 2007),
the proportion of immigrants of Muslim confession increased.6 The
same year, 20 percent of residents of the city of Laval were immi-
grants7 (Canada 2007), making it a particularly interesting case of the
suburbanisation of immigration (Charbonneau & Germain 2002).
Concomitant with the increase in the Muslim immigrant population,
there was an increase in the number of Muslim places of worship. For
example, in the early 1990s, there were nine mosques in Montreal
(McDonough 1994: 318). In 2002, over 45 mosques and prayer halls
were counted on the Island of Montreal (Gagnon & Germain 2002),
where today there are about 60 mosques and prayer halls on the Is-
land. Whereas in the mid-1990s there were no mosques in Laval, today
there are five Muslim places of worship.8
Given that they are much frequented by immigrants, mosques’ roles
differ from those in Muslim countries (Maussen 2005: 8). In addition
to providing for religious observance, they are playing other important
roles (McDonough 1994: 319; Germain, Gagnon & Polo 2003). Aside
from the hall reserved for prayer, mosques may reserve some rooms as
libraries or for social or educational activities, such as learning Arabic.9
Their socio-economic role has been acknowledged by local authorities.
For example, both the City of Montreal and the Socie´te´ de Transports
de Montre´al use them as sites for information sessions for job-see-
kers.10 In addition to their socio-economic role, they also play an iden-
tity-related and community-structuring role for the Islamic community
(Etienne 1989: 96; Isin & Siemiatycki 1999). In Western countries
‘the mosque is the central element in the urban visibility of Islam and
is affirmed as the vital location for the religious minority to organise it-
self’ (T, Cesari et al. 2002: 24).11 Thus, places of worship have a special
status among the religious claims of Muslims.
While recent studies of the creation of mosques in Canada and Eur-
ope have emphasised situations involving less conflict than those of
the past (De Galembert 2006; Fre´gosi 2006; Hoernig 2006), Canadian
research, for the most part, still focuses on such conflicts, and in this
respect dovetails with earlier studies of European cities (e.g. Beck
2002; Ce´sari 2005; Naylor & Ryan 2002; Moreras 2002).
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2.2 Literature analysing conflicts around the creation of mosques
There are several bodies of Canadian literature which have analysed
the creation of mosques, and three will be briefly presented here. A
first focuses on urban planning, because the creation of mosques in
Canada involves planning authority by-laws. Several studies contend
that the selection criteria used by planners may contain cultural bias.
According to Sandercock (2000: 14), for example:
such a universalistic framework has always been regarded as neu-
tral, that is unbiased with respect to culture, gender, religion, age
and so on. But this allegedly neutral framework is in fact driven
by a norm-focussed planning process which makes all sorts of im-
plicit assumptions.
In their study of mosques in Toronto, Qadeer and Chaudhry show that
the principal criteria employed by planning authorities are the compat-
ibility of the place of worship with land usage, parking spaces and road
traffic as well as architectural issues (especially as concerns their visibi-
lity and whether or not there is a minaret). In addition, the exemption
from property taxes for places of worship emerges as an issue for mu-
nicipalities, which perceive them in terms of lost revenue (Qadeer &
Chaudhry 2000: 18).12 Based on the cases observed, Qadeer and
Chaudhry conclude ‘planning standards (…) are subject to divergent
and contentious interpretations, resulting in widely recognised uncer-
tainties and delays in the planning process’13 (Qadeer & Chaudhry
2000: 20). For Isin and Siemiatycki, municipal authorities also justify
their reticence concerning the creation of mosques by using ‘“techni-
cal” concern over site location, size or parking’ (Isin & Siemiatycki
1999: 14). Such findings are not unique to Canada since ‘research on
how planning infrastructure mediates contestation over Muslim places
of worship has been conducted in a variety of other national contexts’
(Gale 2007: 1026).
The second body of literature puts the accent on the challenges of in-
tercultural cohabitation.14 In these analyses, space emerges as a central
factor in the disputes between immigrants and local governments, and
certainly is at the root of most of them (Isin & Siemiatycki 1999: 11).
According to Gagnon and Germain, for example, ‘the question of pub-
lic space is (…) sensitive’ particularly because several controversies have
been created ‘around a perceived violation of its presumed neutrality’
(T, Gagnon & Germain 2002: 159).15 Studying how Brossard – a muni-
cipality adjoining Montreal – rejected a plan to create an Ismaili mos-
que, Helly interprets ‘the hostility of non-Muslim actors to the pre-
sence of Muslims in what the former seem to consider their space’ as
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‘opposition to a Muslim presence in the public sphere’ (T, Helly 2007:
1-2). These analyses make clear that disputes over places of worship go
well beyond a mere clash about whether there is ‘room’ for them.
Rather
space (…) is a discursive contentious field that is linked up with a
particular problem definition, the construction of identities, em-
bedded in specific power and political relations. (Sunier 2005:
329)16
Another manifestation of the challenges following from intercultural
cohabitation is the increase, especially since 9/11, in acts of Islamopho-
bia.17 The literature has begun to keep track of such incidents (Helly
2004). Thus, like several Western European countries, where mosques
are often described ‘as parallel societies or as obscure spaces where
Muslim extremists can be heard defending anti-Western discourses’
(Maussen 2005: 3), Muslim places of prayer in Quebec are increasingly
feared as a breeding ground for terrorism (Gagnon 2006a, 2006b; De
Pierrebourg 2007). As a result, there is some hostility to the creation
of new mosques.18
The third approach briefly described is that evoking the concept of
urban citizenship. One version of such analyses focuses on the conse-
quences for Muslim groups themselves of such controversies. Employ-
ing an urban citizenship approach, Isin and Siemiatycki analyse ‘con-
flicts arising from requests by Muslim groups to build mosques across
the Toronto region and symbolic and material resistances they have
had to overcome’ (1999: 6). In this approach, Isin and Siemiatycki
maintain, efforts made by Muslim groups to overcome the confronta-
tions between municipalities and residents about mosques are in fact
struggles for a more inclusive citizenship.
Thus, the literature on the creation of mosques in Canada is struc-
tured around three main currents: the role of norms in the land-use
planning process, the challenges of intercultural cohabitation, and ur-
ban citizenship. However, notwithstanding the fact that the studies
forming this varied literature all focus on creating mosques and their
research provides solid results, they share a deficiency: they lack an in-
stitutional perspective. There is a need, I contend, for an approach in
which institutional configurations are central to the analysis. This
chapter provides such an analysis.
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3 Muslim places of worship: a configurational analysis of
institutionalisation processes
3.1 Institutions, mechanisms and process tracing
For neo-institutionalists, the definition of institutions ‘includes both
formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure
conduct’ (Thelen & Steinmo 1999: 2). Institutions provide both oppor-
tunities and constraints in defining the interests and, consequently, the
strategies that actors develop (Hall & Taylor 1996; Thelen & Stein-
mo 1999). My approach identifies four specific factors that explain
how institutions shape the behaviour of actors and decisions involving
the creation of places of worship: inter-governmental relations; relation-
ships among local actors, especially elected officials and municipal em-
ployees, the discourses about managing and accommodating ethno-re-
ligious claims-making; and, lastly, the type of relations between muni-
cipalities and ethno-religious groups. I will demonstrate that the links
among these various factors create institutional configurations (Katz-
nelson 1997) that shape the behaviour of the municipal and religious
actors involved.
A distinctive characteristic of the configurational approach is that it
focuses ‘less on the causal importance of this or that variable con-
trasted with others but more on how variables are joined together’
(Katznelson 1997: 99). As such, it differs from
the logic of conventional variable-oriented social science [which] is
explicitly organized around isolating the effect of each causal vari-
able – estimating its effects on some outcome, net of the effects of
competing variables. (Ragin 2000: 64)
Thus, it is only after establishing the relationship among the four vari-
ables identified above that we will be able to understand the decision-
making processes involved in approving the creation or expansion of
Muslim places of worship.
Following Chandra’s (2006: 2) recommendation to generalise about
mechanisms rather than outcomes, I will show that the dependent
variable (the process of decision-making regarding the establishment
of places of worship) is linked to the independent variable (a specific
institutional configuration) by a mechanism, namely the degree of per-
sonalisation of mediation channels between the religious authorities
and municipal authorities. The main finding of this analysis is that
where there is personalisation of mediation channels between religious
and municipal authorities, the institutionalisation process is political,
whereas the absence of personalised mediation leads to an administra-
tive process.
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Given that I am adopting a neo-institutional theoretical framework
favouring the analysis of mechanisms, I use the methodological ap-
proach of process tracing (Bennett & George 1997; George & Bennett
2005; Hall 2003; Mahoney 2003). Specifically
the general method of process tracing is to generate and analyse
data on the causal mechanisms, or processes, events, actions, ex-
pectations, and other intervening variables, that link putative
causes to observed effects. (Bennett & George 1997: 5)
Process tracing as a method of analysis can be either qualitative or
quantitative (Gerring & Thomas 2005: 13); this study is qualitative. I
conducted more than fifteen interviews using open-ended questions. I
interviewed elected officials, municipal employees and religious leaders
in the two cities. I also searched the archives of the two municipalities
and was able to collect data on the cases analysed and other informa-
tion as well, including summaries of decisions and minutes of public
consultation meetings.
The way I conducted the interviews was influenced by the topicality
and sensitivity of the subject. On the one hand, I had to overcome the
reluctance of political and administrative officials to deal with the issue
of religion, and especially Islam, since they feared being accused of dis-
crimination.19 On the other hand, interviewing subjects who are simul-
taneously stigmatised and proselytisers could present numerous diffi-
culties (Boumaza & Campana 2007: 11). During my research, then, I
had to conform to the behaviours preferred by my interviewees. During
the interviews conducted in one mosque, I was asked to wear a veil
and in others I was never alone with the man I was interviewing. In
addition, I was several times invited – on one occasion, persistently –
to convert to Islam.
3.2 The four elements in the configuration
The first element of the configuration follows from the fact that Cana-
dian municipalities are in charge of approving the creation of places of
worship. This is a legacy of past inter-governmental relations, even
though these relations have changed greatly over time. Under article
92(8) of the Canadian Constitution, municipal affairs fall within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the provinces, and city administrations thus
have no constitutionally guaranteed existence. In addition, one of the
distinctive features of inter-governmental relations in Canada as a
whole, and Quebec in particular, is the asymmetry of municipal legisla-
tion (Bherer 2003). The City of Montreal is governed by a special char-
ter that establishes a regime of exception and, among other things,
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since the early 1960s and until recently, it has been prohibited from or-
ganising any referenda (Bherer 2003: 133). Laval, in contrast, faces no
such prohibition. Also, before the 2002 municipal restructuring,20 the
City of Montreal was not subject to the sections of the Act respecting
land-use planning and development, but the City of Laval was. Such
differences in status have an impact on the participatory framework of
the municipalities (Bherer 2003: 91) and on relations among local
actors.
Beginning with the creation of the municipalities in mid-nineteenth-
century Canada, their role has essentially been oriented towards ser-
vices, especially those provided to property owners. The management
of land and buildings including places of worship became the responsi-
bility of the municipalities because it primarily involved control over
ownership and use of property (Tindal & Tindal 1990). Canadian mu-
nicipalities, whose responsibilities are still rather limited, vary from
one province to the next.
Public protection (such as police, fire and public safety), transport
(public roads, public transport) and environmental health (drink-
ing water, sewage and waste) have always been at the heart of the
municipal activity and have counted among the heaviest budget
items. (T, Collin & Léveillée 2003: 10)
However, municipalities also have other important responsibilities
such as urban planning, sports, leisure, and culture.
In later years, Canadian municipalities saw an increase in their re-
sponsibilities as provincial governments engaged in decentralising stra-
tegies in the mid-1970s (Graham, Phillips & Maslove 1998: 72). They
were handed fields that a priori were not municipal concerns. Pro-
grammes involving immigrants and ethnic minorities provide a good
illustration of this expansion. Another manifestation is an increase in
agreements among the three levels of government (municipal-provin-
cial-federal). The increasing complexity of inter-governmental relations
was also accompanied by greater interdependence among actors, sug-
gesting that vertical as well as horizontal forms of public policy coordi-
nation are important (Andrew, Graham & Phillips 2002; Le Gale`s
1995: 60).
The second element in the configuration involves the relationships
between municipal employees and elected local officials. These rela-
tionships are characterised in particular by the power that each actor
wields in decision-making and by the coordination between the politi-
cal leadership and the administrative sphere (Jouve 2006; Sancton
2004). Indeed, given that
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[l]ocal governments often have substantial service delivery respon-
sibilities, [t]his generates professional bureaucracies which are also
both a constraint and a resource for elected officials. (...) This im-
plies that a powerful bureaucracy limits the power of elected offi-
cials. On the other hand, control over a professional bureaucracy
and the instruments of service delivery provides important re-
sources to elected local governments. (Keating 1991: 7)
Recognising this dynamic implies that we need to adapt the Weberian
perspective according to which government employees faithfully imple-
ment the decisions of elected officials, since in reality municipal em-
ployees often straddle the political and administrative spheres. In parti-
cular, due to
their presence, expertise and experience in certain fields – that is,
due to their professionalism – they directly intervene at various
stages of the decision-making and implementation processes. (T,
Hoffman-Martinot 2007: 157)
In Montreal, analysts have shown that the Executive Committee has
played a major role in the municipal decision-making system since the
1960s (Lustiger-Thaler 1993). In Laval, the emphasis is on the role of
the mayor, whose first mandate goes back to 1989 and who since 2001
has faced no elected opposition. Leading a disciplined caucus, he has a
lot of room to manœuvre,21 especially since he also chairs the Laval
Confe´rence Re´gionale des E´lus (Regional Conference of Elected Repre-
sentatives, CRE´). In both cities elected officials have significant power
providing examples of the ‘municipal presidentialism’ associated with
Canadian mayors (Hoffman-Martinot 2007: 121). Nonetheless, this
domination is never complete, mainly because of the lack of any strong
ideological divisions between municipal political parties (Bherer 2003:
121-122). Therefore, the relationship among these key actors merits
analytic attention.
Third, the discourses framing the accommodation of cultural and reli-
gious claims are important, since they reflect the general approach of
the cities to diversity (Graham & Phillips 2007; Poirier 2005). Since
1987, the City of Montreal has advanced the principle of intercultural-
ism in its relations with ethno-cultural communities. It emphasises re-
spect for the French character of Montreal as well as French as the com-
mon language of public communication. It highlights also the notion of
contract, i.e. a mutual recognition between host society and immigrants.
The host society should be engaged in providing services adjusted to eth-
no-cultural diversity as should immigrants integrate themselves in the
Quebec society and should respect its fundamental values.
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In the last decade the city began to broach themes dealing with eth-
no-religious diversity, and this especially since ‘reasonable accommoda-
tion’ has become a major public issue. In 2001 the city published a
guide for managers and organised training sessions on reasonable ac-
commodation designed to increase public employee awareness around
these issues. Nevertheless, the city’s discourse is not fixed, and recently,
more universalistic references have modified it (Germain & Alain
2006; Poirier 2005: 209).
The City of Laval proposes an alternative which stresses near-univer-
salistic criteria, thereby adopting a quite different stance than that of
Montreal. Based on the Ensemble a` Laval (‘together in Laval’) pro-
gramme adopted in 1995, the position is described by its promoters as
inclusive and based on a ‘sense of belonging to the same community
of citizens’, implying that ‘all members of the civil community should
be concerned about the greater welfare of their community, to the
point of occasionally setting aside their personal motives or those of
their interest group with a view to working towards the ‘general inter-
est’ (T, Ville de Laval 1997: 3). Not surprisingly, therefore, many saw as
paradoxical Laval’s refusal to consider that a prayer 22 recited at the be-
ginning of the city council meetings might be discriminatory.23
The fourth element of the configuration is the form of relations be-
tween the municipalities and the ethno-cultural and ethno-religious
minorities specific to each city. An example of such relations is the pre-
sence of an advisory council that includes members of ethno-cultural
minorities. In Montreal, an advisory council on ethno-cultural diversity
was created to advise the Executive Committee and City Council. Cur-
rently known as the Conseil Interculturel de Montreal (CIM), the coun-
cil gives its opinion on various matters, including minority places of
worship. However, as in Toronto, no advisory council deals with reli-
gious questions specifically (Lefebvre 2005: 98). The CIM launched a
research project in 2007 about municipalities’ management of places
of worship for minority groups in Montreal.
In Laval, the forms of mediation between the city and its ethno-cul-
tural and ethno-religious communities are different. Although a multi-
cultural advisory council for the City of Laval was set up in 1990, it
was abolished following the adoption of the Ensemble a` Laval pro-
gramme. In accordance with this concept, the city implemented a pol-
icy in 1995 for recognising community organisations based on ‘univer-
salistic’ criteria. Associations considered to be providing services on the
basis of their religion or cultural origins cannot be recognized by the
city. This policy has important implications since without recognition
associations are denied the forms of institutional mediation needed to
advance their claims.
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4 Examples of institutionalisation processes
In this section the analytical framework is applied to two cases of insti-
tutionalisation. The first is that of Montreal in which a request for a
permit was made first in 2000, that is before the municipal mergers
that changed certain legal circumstances of the city. In Laval the case
began with a zoning change request in 2000. The examples reflect two
different institutionalisation processes, one administrative and the
other political. Process tracing focuses on three moments: the initial
demand24 made by the religious authorities, the treatment of the appli-
cation by municipal authorities and the results.
4.1 An administrative process of institionalisation in Montreal
In 2000, recently arrived imam Saı¨d Jaziri set out to establish a new
place of worship in the east end of Montreal. This case provides an in-
teresting and useful one for understanding the configurations and me-
chanisms involved in such situations of religious pluralism and parti-
cularly that of Montreal.
In order to understand this case, it is important to locate it with re-
spect to an already complex set of legal and political relationships. This
configuration involved all three levels of government. In the mid-
1990s, in general, places of worship were considered primarily in rela-
tion to issues of cultural heritage and its protection. The goal was to
protect religious sites threatened by demolition or commercial conver-
sion. A multi-denominational religious heritage foundation25 worked
with the federal and provincial governments to restore and preserve
Montreal’s heritage of religious architecture. In 1994 and 1995, agree-
ments were concluded between the two levels of government and pro-
jects valued at 7.5 million dollars were planned within the framework
of the Canada-Quebec Infrastructure Works Program to restore about
50 churches and synagogues (Myles 1994).
For its part, the City of Montreal also planned to recognise and pro-
tect traditional places of worship, and to this end adopted a by-law on
land-use planning that created a specific class of use (religious build-
ing) to cover existing places of worship. While the question of new
buildings was not initially on the agenda, it was raised later, because
the effect of the by-law was to limit the sectors available for ‘new places
of worship inserted into other zoning sectors (housing, commerce, in-
dustry and other public and institutional facilities)’. Any such building
had ‘to be authorised through special exemption from the by-law on
land-use planning’ (T, Arteau 2000).
In accordance with the asymmetry of Quebec’s municipal-provincial
relations, the City of Montreal received its unique charter. This meant
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that, at the time, Montreal was exempt from the provincial act respect-
ing land-use planning and development. Instead, Article 524.2 (d) of
the Charter of the City of Montreal stated that the city council could,
notwithstanding any zoning by-laws and subject to the conditions it
prescribed in each case, give individual and non-transferable authorisa-
tion for the use of land or construction, alteration and occupancy of
buildings for religious purposes.
In 1998, faced with an increase in requests for special authorisation
of non-traditional places of worship, the City Council amended the by-
law on land-use planning. Its aim was to allow as a matter of right the
creation of places of worship in moderate- and high-intensity commer-
cial sectors (Ville de Montre´al 2000). In 1999, the Executive Commit-
tee of Montreal asked the Department of Urban and Economic Devel-
opment (Service de De´veloppement E´conomique et Urbain, SDE´U) to
analyse ‘the issue of the creation and concentration of places of wor-
ship in Montreal’ and prescribed a moratorium on new places of wor-
ship until that time. In 2000, the SDE´U presented its results and then
was charged with preparing ‘a normative framework’ in order to better
manage the establishment of new places of worship’ (T, Ville de Mon-
tre´al 2000). The Executive Committee first agreed with the SDE´U: it
decided to refuse special authorisations in residential sectors and to
maintain a moratorium in specific cases (Ville de Montre´al 2000).
After that, however, the policy document and its proposals were pre-
sented, creating deep divisions in the Executive Committee and city
council.26 The policy document proposed by the SDE´U threatened to
deprive elected officials of their discretion and the Executive Commit-
tee feared provoking a negative reaction on the part of ethno-religious
communities. In the end, the Executive Committee Chairman came
down in favour of the status quo and special authorisations, fearing
that new zoning restrictions could go against the rights and freedoms
of ethno-religious communities and be viewed as a refusal to accom-
modate.27 Some municipal employees viewed this decision as a chal-
lenge to their expertise, to give preference to short-term interests.28
Therefore, knowing that the question of places of worship was a
very sensitive issue at this juncture in Montreal and aware that he
had no special relationship with an elected politician who might aid
him, Jaziri adopted a circuitous strategy. After a city’s inspector re-
ported that a socio-cultural activity was held without authorisation in
2000, the imam immediately asked for a permit. When he made his
application, he did not mention specifically that it would involve a
place of worship because he feared ‘being refused or held up’.29
Therefore, he told the public official his intention was to create a cul-
tural association, named the Koranic Association of Montreal (Associa-
tion Coranique de Montre´al), allowing some ambiguity to remain
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about the mission of the institution. As he reported to me, he told
the municipal employee: ‘We are engaged in cultural matters, a little
Arabic, from time to time we pray… ’.
In principle, no activity is supposed to be held until the city permit
is officially granted. However, on 14 September 2001,30 a citizen made
a complaint, which especially considering the timing appears to have
been a reaction to 9/11. For their part, the municipal authorities re-
acted rapidly. A few days later, the complaint was dismissed and the
City of Montreal granted a permit31 to the Koranic Association for so-
cio-cultural activities, a daycare centre32 and a place of worship. It is
likely that the imam formulated the permit application the same day it
was granted.33 Indeed, the religious leader explained to me, that having
acquired a clearer understanding of the property tax exemption for
places of worship and having checked that his application conformed
to the zoning by-law, he acknowledged that the building was essentially
a place of worship. ‘At that point’, the imam told me, ‘I publicised it
widely!’ He went on to say that: ‘in the media, they know us as a mos-
que; it’s rare that people are familiar with the fact that we are also an
association’.
Later, however, the same imam returned to the municipal authorities
with other demands, framed in the language of reasonable accommo-
dation. Indeed, by this time, the city had published its guide on reason-
able accommodation and had already dealt with claims from religious
congregations for exemption from parking regulations during religious
high days and holidays. Following this example, Jaziri reports that he
claimed flexibility for parking regulations around the mosque, but the
demand was unsuccessful. No doubt, as well, elected politicians feared
opening up an issue – that of parking – which was frequently in dis-
pute elsewhere (Qadeer & Chaudhry 2000).
Up to that point, the mediation mechanisms between the imam and
the municipality remained highly administrative, mimicking the neu-
trality and rationality of ‘heroic planning’ (Sandercock 2003). However,
once the mosque was recognised by the City, the imam tried to aban-
don these impersonal forms of mediation. He sought, instead, to estab-
lish mediation channels of a more personal nature with elected muni-
cipal officials. In his view, it was a question of ‘establishing contact
with those who represent the community; in that way, when I have a
problem, it can be dealt with… ’.
In other words, this imam had come to understand the institutional
configuration in which the processes of establishing new mosques in
Montreal occurred. When he set out to create a grand mosque in
Montreal,34 the imam sought to develop personal relationships with
elected officials, especially the mayor of Montreal. He argued that the
number of believers and increasing recognition of the Islamic form of
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worship merited such an institution and he proposed his plan for a
mosque in the city centre with Arabic architecture and on a plot of
land to be provided for free by the city. If there had been political
agreement among the three levels of government in Canada, the pro-
ject would have been financed by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates. The imam tried to unite Muslim groups around his propo-
sal, and sought to represent himself to the municipal authorities as
having a privileged relationship with the (supposed) Islamic commu-
nity. However, he was criticised by several other religious leaders, in-
cluding the head of the Muslim Council of Montreal, who found it
‘unacceptable to request public land and taxpayers’ money to finance
a mosque’ (T, in Cauchy 2005).
In the end, then, apart from providing support for a mayoral candi-
date during an electoral campaign, the plan came to naught. Moreover,
problems with the immigration services undermined the imam’s legiti-
macy,35 not only with government authorities, but also with other Isla-
mic organisations. Thus, in spite of his efforts to use the resources of
the institutional configuration, the imam failed to establish a persona-
lised mediation mechanism with the city. Rather, the process of institu-
tionalisation remained an administrative one.
Lacking the personalised relationship that he hoped for, Jaziri turned
to the media which he had used, and threatened to use, before. Even
before the municipality had stated its position, the imam said, ‘if the
city turns us down (…) their decision will be based, unfortunately, on
prejudice’ (T, in Cauchy 2005). He reported, however, that with respect
to the Grand Mosque he was disappointed that this media-based strat-
egy had so little effect. This lack of effect stood in contrast to his ex-
perience following a flood in the original mosque (a problem linked to
Montreal drains) and for which the imam sought financial compensa-
tion and a visit by a municipal leader to demonstrate the city’s concern.
He reported his efforts at exercising pressure via the media: ‘I told
them, I’m going to contact the media. … So they [a city councillor]
came… ’. Sometimes the media were also used as a threat ‘if Radio Ca-
nada gets wind of this, there will be a scandal!’
And, by way of summation he said: ‘If you don’t ask, you don’t get!’
In the end, the imam’s unsuccessful attempt to personalise media-
tion channels and his strategy of publicisation led to a lack of institu-
tionalisation of his position as leader of Muslims in Montreal. Asses-
sing this failure, the imam said, ‘In any case, in Montreal and Laval
things are going nowhere: we’re moving to Saint-Eustache!’ Indeed,
the imam hoped to have more success with a different municipal con-
figuration, and this time, in addition to the mosque, he planned to set
up a ritual slaughtering area. While his assessment of the situation in
Montreal is easily understandable, since it derived directly from his ex-
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perience, what should we make of his reference to Laval? This is what
I intend to explore through the example of the establishment of a Mus-
lim centre that amended a City of Laval zoning by-law.
4.2 A political process of institutionalisation in Laval
As noted, unlike the City of Montreal before the municipal restructur-
ing of 2002, the City of Laval is subject to the Government of Quebec’s
Land Use Planning and Development Act and its Act Respecting Elec-
tions and Referendums in Municipalities. Consequently, every zoning
amendment in Laval is potentially subject to a referendum, which is
part of the provincial procedures for public consultation. These require-
ments make the institutional configuration of Laval different from that
of Montreal.
In comparison with those until recently in Montreal, Laval’s elected
municipal officials do not have the latitude associated with the me-
chanism of special authorisations. Thus, every zoning request is poten-
tially subject to a referendum process, which implies a high level of in-
volvement by planning authorities and by residents. Provincial legisla-
tion provides for the direct participation of residents who have specific
institutional instruments for expressing their position on zoning
changes.
The possibility of a referendum can also be a major constraint for re-
ligious officials. Indeed, as explained by Qadeer (1997: 491): ‘[I]roni-
cally, the very participatory procedures meant to give citizens a voice in
planning provide the convenient means for some local groups to resist
the accommodation of others’. In many cases, ‘[p]ublic hearings on
planning regulations have often turned into the tools of NIMBYism
and ethno-racism’ (Qadeer 1997: 491).
The process associated with this case is as follows. In 1999, a Mus-
lim association of Laval bought a building situated in a commercial
sector. They sought to increase the size of the building in order to set
up a Muslim cultural centre, but the hoped-for renovations to enlarge
the premises involved extending part of the building into a residential
zone (Germain et al. 2003a: 32). Therefore, it would have been neces-
sary to amend a municipal by-law and zoning plan.
The claimant filed an application in 2000 for a zoning change in or-
der to accommodate a Muslim cultural centre. They felt the public
would more easily understand a cultural centre than a mosque.36 From
the moment the application was submitted to the planning authority, it
was controlled by very specific regulatory procedures. First, the applica-
tion for the cultural centre expansion was submitted to the planning
authority, which recommended that the City of Laval Executive Com-
mittee accept the zoning change. The Executive Committee followed
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the recommendation, and the municipal council adopted it. Laval resi-
dents were notified of a public meeting to consider the zoning change,
while residents directly affected by the rezoning received a letter from
the Clerk’s Department. For their part, the Muslim leaders carefully se-
lected their representatives, an architect and an engineer, to explain the
plan both to elected officials and during the public meeting.
Municipal councillors attended the public meeting, the mayor of La-
val presided over it, and the engineer from the Islamic community
spoke about the centre.37 As the minutes show, right from the start of
the meeting, residents were opposed to amending the zoning by-law.
The fears expressed were typical of this kind of exercise. Examples in-
cluded the fear that the neighbourhood’s residential character would
disappear, that parking problems would mount along with increased
road traffic, and that residents would be bothered by noise, given that
there would be five periods of prayer a day, including one early in the
morning.
Faced with this hostility and the numerous questions raised, the re-
presentative of the Islamic community tried to reassure the residents.
The mayor proposed that the by-law would stipulate that: (i) all activ-
ities would be held inside38 and (ii) a working group composed of five
citizens of Laval, in addition to elected officials and municipal employ-
ees, would devise a plan acceptable to all.
No doubt, the elected officials had little interest in either embarking
upon a referendum process, given the residents’ hostility, or withdraw-
ing the proposed by-law. If either of these options were adopted, they
could pay a high price at election time. While the universalistic view of
the City of Laval was not always well received by Laval’s ethnic and eth-
no-religious groups,39 a lack of support for this view on the part of the
elected officials could have been interpreted as a form of Islamophobia.
A solution was found by inviting the residents to two additional public
meetings. These damped down any interest in a referendum and led to
a second draft regulation, limiting the surface area of the cultural cen-
tre and part of the land used for parking. Regulations proved accepta-
ble to both sides and were carried by the municipal council. 40
The mechanisms of personal mediation between the elected officials
and the ethno-religious community worked in favour of a positive out-
come to this process. Efforts made at meetings by Laval’s mayor and
municipal council in aid of the group’s application41 provided political
support. Without such support, it is likely the plan would have been
rejected.
Since this controversy was settled, the personalised mediation that
took hold continues into the present: the opinions of these religious lea-
ders are solicited when issues touching on Islam arise and they meet
elected officials at several occasions. This was the case, for example, dur-
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ing the controversy in 2006 surrounding cartoons of the Prophet pub-
lished in Denmark and discussed around the world. These religious
authorities are keen to maintain this personalised mediation, and indeed
go out of their way to enthuse about their relationship with the city.42
Lastly, in terms of institutionalising Islam in Laval, this cultural cen-
tre serves as the ‘head mosque’ and is recognised as such by other
Muslim religious associations.43 This has had the effect of putting the
other Islamic associations into a different position to that of the ‘head
mosque’ within the institutional configuration. These associations
emerged more recently, and were created to meet a particular need,
namely, having places of worship close to the homes of believers which
are widely distributed across Laval. Given Laval’s universalistic dis-
course, they did not expect to be recognised by the city as religious as-
sociations.44 In their case, relations with elected officials and municipal
employees are practically non-existent, and commercial types of media-
tion dominate. Indeed, these associations, which operate as de facto
prayer rooms, are located in commercial spaces rented to individuals.45
For this case, I would hypothesise that mediation mechanisms via the
market result in a type of commercial relationship in which the media-
tion is between owner and renter. That said, the hypothesis still needs
to be tested empirically.
5 Conclusion
In 1969, Bourassa wrote the following about Quebec municipalities,
with the exception of Montreal:
Obviously, they do not exemplify well-organised bureaucracies;
most problems are solved thanks to a personal relationship, more
often than not characterised by arbitrariness, and dominated al-
most entirely by a powerful elite. Thus, the municipal government
rapidly becomes an oligarchy based not only on money and social
status, but also on religious leaders. (T, Bourassa 1969: 342)
While obviously it would be unacceptable to artificially apply Bouras-
sa’s quotation to the present situation, his analysis touches upon an
important point in our argument, namely, almost 40 years later, the
mechanism for personalising channels of mediation between munici-
pal and religious authorities.
I have demonstrated that the strategies of municipal and religious
actors are shaped by institutional configurations, which in turn are re-
lated to four specific factors. The cities find themselves in a new situa-
tion characterised by a new religious pluralism, especially as a result of
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the diversity of immigration flows. Aside from the fact that municipali-
ties have direct responsibility for approving places of worship, they
have also developed discourses on ethno-cultural and ethno-religious
diversity through which they convey their perception of their role in
fostering social cohesion. Cities are now quite aware of their responsi-
bility – in conjunction with the federal and provincial governments –
in managing the new religious pluralism. However, inter-governmental
relations are specific to each city, because in Quebec the status of mu-
nicipalities varies. This variation has consequences for the relationship
between elected officials and municipal employees, in the processes as-
sociated with land-use regulation. However, ethno-religious groups well
understand the diversity of mediation channels and some seek to have
a personal relationship with elected officials.
In these distinct institutional configurations, mediation between mu-
nicipalities and religious leaders, whether personalised or not, is the
mechanism that determines the institutionalisation processes. I have
shown that the personalisation of mediation leads to a political process
of institutionalisation, whereas the non-personalisation of mediation
links leads to an administrative one.
Going beyond these two cases what are some of the lessons that
could be drawn? One is that the theoretical framework is by no means
limited to Quebec. It could be used to study European cases as well. In-
deed, recent research in France also points to the importance of perso-
nal mediation channels in the creation of places of worship. It is inter-
esting to note, moreover, that it is not only the ethno-religious group
that seeks to use such a channel. Studies in France identify local
elected officials who favour personal mediation channels, sometimes
because they thereby gain symbolic resources (De Galembert 2006) or
sometimes because they operate with a clientelistic form of regulation
(Fre´gosi 2006). Systematic comparisons of mechanisms and institu-
tional configurations across countries and continents could thereby im-
prove our understanding of the way religious pluralism is managed by
cities.
Notes
1 This chapter received financial support from the Law Commission of Canada (the
Nathalie Des Rosiers Award for Audacity of Imagination) and the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I wish to thank holder of the Canada
Research Chair in Citizenship and Governance Jane Jenson and the other members
of the Chair for their comments and advice when I presented this work in a seminar.
2 The Supreme Court of Canada recognised reasonable accommodation in the case ofOn-
tario Human Rights Commission and O’Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd. (1985) 2 S.C.R. 536.
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3 In Canada, the number of Muslims increased from 253,300 in 1991, to 579,600 in
2001. Of the total number of immigrants who arrived from 1991 to 2001, 15 per cent
were Muslim (Canada 2003).
4 Muslim immigration expanded in the late 1950s and further increased as of 1975
with an intake of refugees (Rousseau & Castel 2006: 240).
5 According to Statistics Canada, a CMA consists of one or more adjacent municipali-
ties centred on a large urban area (known as the urban core). The census population
count of the urban core is at least 50,000 and the area must have a population of at
least 100,000 to form a CMA. The census population count of the urban core is at
least 100,000. Laval and Montreal are part of the Montreal CMA.
6 Algeria and Morocco represent, respectively, the first and third leading countries of
birth of immigrants admitted to Quebec from 1996 to 2005 and residing in the ad-
ministrative region of Montreal in January 2007 (Quebec 2007: 22).
7 Lebanon, Morocco and Algeria provided a large proportion of these immigrants
(Quebec 2007: 36)
8 However, this count is still approximate. There are no up-to-date, systematic lists of
places of worship in the Montreal CMA. While some City of Montreal boroughs,
through their taxation teams, have compiled exhaustive details on places of worship,
this information is not available to the public (interview with an employee of a Mon-
treal borough, 20 March 2006).
9 Interview with Montreal mosque imam Jaziri, 8 May 2006; interview with a member
of a Laval Islamic association, 28 April 2006.
10 Interview with an official of the Socie´te´ de Transports de Montre´al, 2 March 2007.
11 In this article, T indicates that the quote has been translated from French by the author.
12 This analysis is shared by Germain et al. (2003b).
13 To mitigate conflicts surrounding the creation of mosques, Qadeer and Chaudhry
(2000) have made recommendations to Muslim groups and municipal planners.
These recommendations are found in discussions on land-use planning and the
way it adapts to cultural and religious diversity (see e.g. Hoernig 2006; Qadeer
1997).
14 For more details on recognition strategies of ethno-religious communities in the
CMA of Montreal, see e.g. Germain et al. (2003b).
15 See also Gagnon (2005).
16 Such observations are not that dissimilar to those made a number of years ago by
feminists who understood that identities and space are always traversed by power re-
lations (Jenson 1994).
17 Since 9/11, Canada has experienced an increase in acts of racial hatred towards Mus-
lims (or those thought to be Muslim) (Helly 2004).
18 While Montreal mosques frequently exceed their legal capacity, which explains the at-
tempts to expand and set up new mosques, we should not attribute this crowding to
an increase in or extraordinary level of religious practice. On the contrary, Muslims
born abroad and living in Canada constitute
the group that is, proportionally, the most inclined to never participate in col-
lective religious activities (…). In Quebec, the proportion of Muslim immi-
grants never participating in collective religious activities has reached a re-
cord high of 62.1 per cent. (T, Eid 2007: 35)
Thus, the surpassing of capacities could derive from the unfavourable ratio of places
of worship to the number of believers.
19 Interview with a policy advisor, City of Montreal, 5 June 2006. Interview with a mu-
nicipal employee, City of Montreal, 3 May 2006.
20 For several municipalities, including the City of Montreal (with their amalgamations
and de-amalgamations), municipal restructuring refers to a long and complex process.
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Given the timing of the two cases treated here, this article will not consider them. For
an analysis of municipal restructuring in Quebec, see e.g. Bherer (2006), Hamel
(2005), Sancton (2006).
21 According to an observer of municipal politics in Laval, the mayor ‘is a colossus of
political life in Laval, with a strong and well-oiled machine behind him’ and if ‘others
are disputing his leadership or his domination in the town hall, (…) no one dares to
say so. It’s a fact.’ (T, in Corriveau 2005: A1).
22 The prayer went: ‘Dear Lord, please bestow your grace upon us and give us the ne-
cessary enlightment to lead our meeting and the good administration of our city’ (T).
23 In 2003, the Commission on Human Rights and Youth Rights (Commission des
Droits de la Personne et des Droits de la Jeunesse) recommended that the City of La-
val cease saying the prayer. In 2006, the Human Rights Tribunal (Tribunal des
Droits de la Personne) ordered the City of Laval to stop reciting the prayer and the
city conformed to the judgment.
24 The buildings were bought by Islamic associations in 2000 in Montreal and in 1999
in Laval.
25 Known at the time as the Association Pierres Vivantes.
26 Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 23 March 2006; interview with
an elected official of the City of Montreal, 12 April 2006.
27 Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 23 March 2006. See also Je´ze´-
quel (2004: 4).
28 Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 23 March 2006; interview with
an elected official of the City of Montreal, 12 April 2006.
29 Interview with Saı¨d Jaziri, 8 May 2006. Unless indicated to the contrary, this inter-
view is the source of all quotes by the imam in the present article. As the interview
was conducted in French, all quotes by Jaziri have been translated.
30 Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 3 March 2008.
31 According to an employee in Urban Planning, the decision-making process was ac-
celerated as the request was already under consideration, and the permit was granted
in October 2001. Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 3 March 2008.
32 The request for a day care centre dated from May 2001.
33 Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 3 March 2008.
34 This plan was not the first in Montreal, since the creation of a grand mosque had
been announced twice before, in 1989 and 1999 (Be´liveau 1989; Berger 1999).
Nevertheless, there is still no grand mosque in Montreal after the fashion of those in
Paris or London.
35 He ‘lost his refugee status because he concealed a criminal record in France’. In
2007, Jaziri was deported to Tunisia (Block 2007).
36 Interview with leading members of a Laval Islamic association, 14 May 2006.
37 In this matter, the decision to find mediators from professions conferring a certain
prestige is consistent with a strategy increasingly employed by ethno-religious
groups. Most of the time, it is practising professionals (engineers, architects, etc.)
who present the project rather than the directly responsible religious official. The eth-
no-religious groups assume that these professionals give it greater credibility and le-
gitimacy. Interview with an employee of the City of Montreal, 23 March 2006.
38 Compromises with residents and measures requested by municipal employees often
have an impact on the way the ethno-religious community’s activities are organised,
such as end times of activities.
39 Interview with a member of a Laval association, 29 June 2006; interview with a
member of a Laval Islamic association, 28 April 2006.
40 However, this agreement about the zoning change differs from the issue of the occu-
pancy certificate.
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41 Interview with leading members of a Laval Islamic association, 14 May 2006. See
also Germain et al. (2003b: 33).
42 Interview with leading members of a Laval Islamic association, 14 May 2006.
43 Interview with a member of a Laval Islamic association, 28 April 2006.
44 Interview with a member of a Laval Islamic association, 28 April 2006.
45 In Laval, a Muslim association has disbanded recently, probably because the rent was
too high.
References
Andrew, C., K. A. Graham & S. D. Phillips (eds.) (2002), Urban affairs. Back on the policy
agenda. Montreal: McGill University Press.
Arteau, R. (2000), ‘Les dieux dans la ville: multiplication des lieux de culte et diversite´ re-
ligieuse a` Montre´al. Les de´fis pose´s a` l’ame´nagement urbain’, paper presented at the
Forum urbain, Centre canadien d’architecture, 20 March 2000.
Beck, H. (2002), ‘A hidden agenda or hidden prejudices? Building a Turkish mosque in
Tilburg’, in W. Shadid & S. van Koningsveld (eds.), Intercultural relations and religious
authorities: Muslims in the European Union, 49-66. Leuven: Peeters.
Be´liveau, J. (1989), ‘Montre´al aura bientoˆt sa grande mosque´e,’ La Presse 20 April, D15.
Bennett, A. & A. L. George. (1997), ‘Process tracing in case study research’, paper pre-
sented at the MacArthur Foundation Workshop on Case Study Methods, Harvard
University, 17-19 October 1997.
Berger, F. (1999), ‘Les musulmans veulent leur grande mosque´e a` Montre´al
[RECTIFICATIF]’. La Presse 7 February, A5.
Bherer, L. (2003), Une lecture institutionnaliste du phe´nome`ne participatif: La politique con-
sultative de la Ville de Que´bec, PhD Thesis, Universite´ Montesquieu Bordeaux IV,
Bordeaux.
Bherer, L. (2006), ‘Les valeurs libe´rales, la de´mocratie locale et les de´fusions munici-
pales: Des citoyens sans ville ou des villes sans citoyen?’, in F. Pe´try, E´. Be´langer &
L. M. Imbeau (eds.), Le Parti libe´ral: Enqueˆte sur les re´alisations du gouvernement
Charest, 339-360. Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de l’Universite´ Laval.
Block, I. (2007), ‘Imam ordered detained until he is deported Monday,’ The Gazette 18
October.
www2.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=e1944395-203e-4baa-bee5-ed448651b91f.
Boumaza, M. & A. Campana (2007), ‘Enqueˆter en milieu “difficile”: Introduction’, Revue
franc¸aise de science politique 57 (1): 5-26.
Bourassa, G. (1969), ‘Le syste`me municipal que´be´cois’, in L. Sabourin (ed.), Le syste`me po-
litique du Canada, 337-348. Ottawa: E´ditions de l’Universite´ d’Ottawa.
Canada. Statistics Canada. (2003), ‘2001 Census: Analysis Series. Religions in Canada’.
Ottawa: Minister of Industry.
Canada. Statistics Canada. (2007), Population by immigrant status and period of immigra-
tion, 2006 counts, for Canada and census subdivisions (municipalities) with 5,000-plus po-
pulation – 20% sample data.
www12.statcan.ca/english/census06/data/highlights/Immigration/Table403.cfm?Lan-
g=E&T=403&GH=3&GF=0&G5=1&SC=8&RPP=100&SR=1&S=10&O=D&D1=1.
Cesari, J. (2005), ‘Mosque conflicts in European cities: Introduction’, Journal of Ethnic
and Migration Studies 31 (6): 1015-1024.
Cesari, J., S. Bargach & D. Moore (2002), ‘L’islamisation de l’espace public franc¸ais. Vers
la fin du conflit?’, Cahiers d’e´tudes sur la Me´diterrane´e orientale et le monde turco-iranien
33: 23-37.
MANAGING RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN CANADIAN CITIES 155
Chandra, K. (2006), ‘Mechanisms and outcomes’, Qualitative Methods Newsletter Spring.
American Political Science Association.
Charbonneau, J. & A. Germain. 2002. ‘Les banlieues de l’immigration’, Recherches socio-
graphiques 43 (2) : 311-328.
Chauchy, C. (2005), ‘Une grande mosque´e verra le jour si Montre´al, Que´bec et Ottawa y
investissent’, Le Devoir 24 September, A7.
Collin, J.-P. & J. Le´veille´e (2003), L’organisation municipale au Canada. Un re´gime a` ge´ome´-
trie variable, entre tradition et transformation. Montreal: Villes Re´gions Monde.
Corriveau, J. (2005), ‘Vaillancourt, maire de Laval a` vie?’, Le Devoir 21 April, A1.
De Galembert, C. (2006), ‘La construction de l’islam comme ressource d’autorite´ publi-
que du pouvoir local: La parabole de Mantes-la-Jolie’, in B. Jouve & A.-G. Gagnon
(eds.), Les me´tropoles au de´fi de la diversite´ culturelle, 69-94. Grenoble: Presses Univer-
sitaires de Grenoble.
De Pierrebourg, F. (2007), Montre´alistan. Enqueˆte sur la mouvance islamiste. Montreal:
Stanke´.
Eckardt, F. (2006), ‘La “Moscheenstreit”: La pole´mique autour des mosque´es dans les
villes allemandes’, Les cahiers de la se´curite´ 62: 161-184.
Eid, P. (2007), La ferveur religieuse et les demandes d’accommodement religieux: Une compar-
aison intergroupe. Montreal: Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la
jeunesse. Cat. 2.120-4.21.
Etienne, B. (1989), La France et l’Islam. Paris : Hachette.
Fre´gosi, F. (2006), ‘Regards contraste´s sur la re´gulation municipale de l’islam’, Les cahiers
de la se´curite´ 62: 71-92.
Gagnon, J.-E. (2005), L’ame´nagement des lieux de culte minoritaires dans la re´gion montre´a-
laise: Transactions sociales et enjeux urbains, PhD thesis, E´tudes urbaines, Universite´
du Que´bec, Montreal: INRS Urbanisation, Culture et Socie´te´.
Gagnon, J.-E. & A. Germain (2002), ‘Espace urbain et religion: Esquisse d’une ge´ogra-
phie des lieux de culte minoritaires de la re´gion de Montre´al’, Cahiers de ge´ographie
du Que´bec 46 (128): 143-163.
Gagnon, L. (2006a), ‘Le de´lire religieux’, La Presse, 6 June 2006, A21.
Gagnon, L. (2006b), ‘Que faire contre les extre´mistes?’, La Presse 8 June, A21.
Gale, R. (2004), ‘The multicultural city and the politics of religious architecture: Urban
planning, mosques and meaning-making in Birmingham, UK’, Built Environment 30
(1): 30-44.
Gale, R. (2007), ‘The place of Islam in the geography of religion: Trends and intersec-
tions’, Geography Compass 1 (5): 1015-1036.
Garbaye, R. (2006), ‘La monte´e en puissance du “pouvoir musulman” dans les villes brit-
anniques et franc¸aises: Vingt ans d’e´volution paralle`le’, in B. Jouve & A.-G. Gagnon
(eds.), Les me´tropoles au de´fi de la diversite´ culturelle, 49-68. Grenoble: Presses Univer-
sitaires de Grenoble.
George, A. L. & A. Bennett (2005), Case studies and theory development in the social sciences.
Cambridge: MIT Press.
Germain, A. & M. Alain (2006), ‘La gestion de la diversite´ a` l’e´preuve de la me´tropole ou
les vertus de l’adhocatrisme montre´alais’, in B. Jouve & A.-G. Gagnon (eds.), Les me´-
tropoles au de´fi de la diversite´ culturelle, 245-262. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de
Grenoble.
Germain, A., J.-E. Gagnon & A.-L. (2003a), Les pratiques de gestion municipale de la diversite´
a` Montre´al. Montreal: Institut national de la recherche scientifique, Urbanisation,
Culture et Socie´te´.
Germain, A., J.-E. Gagnon & A.-L. Polo (2003b), L’ame´nagement des lieux de culte des min-
orite´s ethniques: Enjeux et dynamiques locales. Montreal: Institut national de la re-
cherche scientifique, Urbanisation, Culture et Socie´te´.
156 AUDE-CLAIRE FOUROT
Gerring, J. & C. W. Thomas (2005), ‘Comparability: A key issue in research design’, Com-
mittee on Concepts and Methods. Working Paper Series 4: 1-20.
Graham, K., S. D. Phillips & A.M. Maslove (eds.) (1998), Urban governance in Canada. Re-
presentation, resources and restructuring. Toronto: Harcourt Brace and Company
Canada.
Graham, K. A. & S. D. Phillips (2007), ‘Another fine balance: Managing diversity in Ca-
nadian cities’, in K. Banting, T.J. Courchene & F.L. Seidle (eds.), Belonging? Diversity,
recognition and shared citizenship in Canada, 155-194. Montreal: Institut de recherche
en politiques publiques.
Hall, P. A. (2003), ‘Aligning ontology and methodology in comparative research’, in J.
Mahoney & D. Ru¨schemeyer (eds.), Comparative historical analysis in the social sciences,
373-404. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hall, P. A. & R. Taylor (1996), ‘Political science and the three new institutionalisms’, Poli-
tical Studies 44: 936-957.
Hamel, P. (2005), ‘Municipal reform in Que´bec: The trade-off between centralization and
decentralization’, in J. Garcea & E. C. Lesage (eds.), Municipal reform in Canada. Re-
configuration, re-empowerment, and rebalancing, 149-173. Don Mills: Oxford University
Press.
Helly, D. (2004), ‘Are Muslims discriminated against in Canada since September 2001?’,
Canadian Ethnic Studies 36 (1): 24-47.
Helly, D. (2007), ‘Traitement de la diffe´rence musulmane: Demandes de lieux de prie`res’,
Immigration et Me´tropoles – Capsule Recherche 5, http://im.metropolis.net/research-
policy/research_content/bilans_02_05/FicheVolet5HELLYetOUESLATI_1.2.pdf.
Hoernig, H. (2006), Worship in the suburbs: The development experience of recent immigrant
religious communities, PhD thesis, Planning: Waterloo, University of Waterloo.
Hoffmann-Martinot, V. (2007), Le gouvernement des villes. Une comparaison internationale.
Paris: L’Harmattan.
Isin, E. & M. Siemiatycki (1999), ‘Fate and faith: Claiming urban citizenship in immi-
grant Toronto’, CERIS Working Papers 8.
Janhevich, D. & H. Ibrahim (2004), ‘Muslims in Canada: An Illustrative and Demo-
graphic Profile’, Our Diverse Cities 1: 49-57.
Jenson, J. (1994), ‘Understanding politics: Contested concepts of identity in political
science’, in J. P. Bickerton & A.-G. Gagnon (eds.), Canadian politics 2nd edition, 54-74.
Peterborough: Broadview Press.
Je´ze´quel, M. (2004), Cadre d’analyse juridique en matie`re d’ame´nagement ou de reconversion
des lieux de culte par les municipalite´s du Que´bec. Montreal: Conseil des relations inter-
culturelles.
Jouve, B. (2006), ‘De´fusion municipale et de´centralisation a` Montre´al: Vers une recom-
position des relations entre les groupes ethnoculturels et la municipalite´’, Canadian
Journal of Political Science 39 (1): 77-96.
Katznelson, I. (1997), ‘Structure and configuration in comparative politics’, in M. I. Lich-
bach & A. S. Zuckerman (eds.), Comparative politics. Rationality, culture, and structure,
81-112. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Keating, M. (1991), Comparative urban politics: Power and the city in the United States, Ca-
nada, Britain and France. Aldershot: Edward Elgar.
Lefebvre, S. (2005), ‘La religion dans la sphe`re publique’, Canadian Issues Spring: 97-101.
Le Gale`s, P. (1995), ‘Du gouvernement des villes a` la gouvernance urbaine’, Revue fran-
c¸aise de science politique 45 (1): 57-95.
Lustiger-Thaler, H. (1993), ‘Les limites de la de´mocratie, les frontie`res de l’autonomie’,
Recherches sociographiques 34 (3): 469-485.
MANAGING RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN CANADIAN CITIES 157
Mahoney, J. (2003), ‘Strategies of causal assessment in comparative historical analysis’,
in J. Mahoney & D. Ru¨schemeyer (eds.), Comparative historical analysis in the social
sciences, 337-372. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Manco, U. & M. Kanmaz (2002), ‘De la pathologie au traitement. La gestion municipale
de l’Islam et des musulmans en Belgique’, Cahiers d’e´tudes sur la Me´diterrane´e orien-
tale et le monde turco-iranien 33: 58-89.
Maussen, M. (2005), ‘Making Muslim presence meaningful. Studies on Islam and mos-
ques in Western Europe’, Amsterdam School for Social Science Research Working
Paper 05/03.
Maussen, M. (2007), ‘The governance of Islam in Western Europe: A state of the art’,
IMISCOE Working Paper 16. www.imiscoe.org/publications/workingpapers.
McDonough, S. (1994), ‘Muslims of Montreal’, in Y. Haddad & J. I. Smith (eds.), Muslim
communities in North America, 317–333. Albany: State University of New York Press.
Moreras, J. (2002), ‘Les enjeux de la “demande d’islam” a` Barcelone’, in R. Leveau, C.
Wihtol de Wenden & K. Mohsen-Finan (eds.), De la citoyennete´ locale, 141-159. Paris:
IFRI.
Myles, B. (1994), ‘La manne ce´leste tombe sur les E´glises.’ Le Devoir 30 July, A3.
Naylor, S. & J. R. Ryan. (2002), ‘The Mosque in the suburbs: Negotiating religion and
ethnicity in South London’, Social and Cultural Geography 3 (1): 39-59.
Poirier, C. (2005), ‘Ethnocultural diversity, democracy, and intergovernmental relations in
Canadian cities’, in R. Young & C. Leuprecht (eds.), Canada: The state of the federation,
2004: Municipal-federal-provincial relations in Canada, 201-220. Montreal & Kingston:
McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Qadeer, M. (1997), ‘Pluralistic planning for multicultural cities: The Canadian practice’,
Journal of the American Planning Association 63 (4): 481-494.
Qadeer, M. & M. Chaudhry (2000), ‘The planning system and the development of mos-
ques in the Greater Toronto Area’, Plan Canada 40 (2):17-21.
Que´bec. Immigration et Communaute´s culturelles. (2006), Bulletin statistique trimestriel
sur l’immigration permanente au Que´bec. 3e`me trimestre 2006. Montreal: Direction de la
recherche et de l’analyse prospective.
Que´bec. Immigration et Communaute´s culturelles. (2007), Portraits re´gionaux 1996-2005.
Caracte´ristiques des immigrants e´tablis au Que´bec et dans les re´gions en 2007. Montreal:
Direction de la recherche et de l’analyse prospective.
Ragin, C. (2000), Fuzzy-set social science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rousseau, L. & F. Castel. (2006), ‘Un de´fi de la recomposition identitaire au Que´bec: le
nouveau pluralisme religieux’, in B. Gagnon, A.-G. Gagnon & J. Palard (eds.), Diver-
site´ et identite´s au Que´bec et dans les re´gions d’Europe, 217-250. Laval-Brussels: Les
Presses Universitaires de Laval – P. I. E. Peter Lang.
Rowat, D. (1969), The Canadian municipal system. Essays on the improvement of local gov-
ernment. Montrwal: McClelland and Stewart.
Sancton, A. (2004), ‘Beyond the municipal: Governance for Canadian cities’, Policy Op-
tions February: 26-31.
Sancton, A. (2006). ‘Fusions et de´fusions municipales au Que´bec et en Ontario’, in F.
Pe´try, E´. Be´langer & L. M. Imbeau (eds.), Le Parti libe´ral: Enqueˆte sur les re´alisations du
gouvernement Charest, 321-338. Sainte-Foy: Les Presses de l’Universite´ Laval
Sandercock, L. (2000), ‘Cities of (in)difference and the challenge for planning’, DISP
140: 7-15.
Sandercock, L. (2003), Cosmopolis II: Mongrel cities. London & New York: Continuum.
Sunier, T. (2005). ‘Constructing Islam: Places of worship and the politics of space in The
Netherlands’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 13 (3): 317-334.
158 AUDE-CLAIRE FOUROT
Thelen, K. & S. Steinmo. (1992). ‘Historical institutionalism in comparative politics’,
in K. Thelen, S. Steinmo & F. Longstreth (eds.), Structuring politics. Historical institu-
tionalism in comparative analysis, 1-32. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Tindal, C. R. & S. N. Tindal. (1990). Local government in Canada. Toronto: McGraw-Hill
Ryerson.
Torrekens, C. (2006). ‘La gestion locale de l’islam a` Bruxelles’, Les cahiers de la se´curite´
62: 139-160.
Ville de Laval. (1997). Ensemble a` Laval. De l’accessibilite´ a` la participation. Projet visant la
participation de tous les Lavallois au mieux-eˆtre de leur collectivite´. Cadre conceptuel et
mode`les d’activite´s. Laval: Service de communications de Ville de Laval.
Ville de Montre´al. (2000). Sommaire de´cisionnel. Orientation, e´nonce´ de politique. Nume´ro
de dossier S000599001, Montreal: Archives de la Ville de Montre´al.
Woehrling, J. (1998). ‘L’obligation d’accommodement raisonnable et l’adaptation de la so-
cie´te´ a` la diversite´ religieuse’, McGill Law Journal 43 (2): 325-401.
MANAGING RELIGIOUS PLURALISM IN CANADIAN CITIES 159

Conclusion: making sense of local
migration policy arenas
Tiziana Caponio
1 Introduction
As pointed out in a recent literature review on the multilevel govern-
ance of migration carried out in the context of IMISCOE Cluster C9’s
research on immigrant and immigration policymaking can be consid-
ered as still in its infancy (Zincone & Caponio 2006). This is even
more the case when the local level is considered: not only is research
on local immigrant and immigration policy very recent, but the policy-
making dimension is only rarely addressed (see also the introduction
chapter in this volume). Given the lack of systematic empirical ac-
counts, theorising also appears to be still poorly developed.
Such an important gap in the literature cannot of course be filled
overnight. More theoretically driven empirical work is needed, which
can only be achieved through joint research programmes. As a conse-
quence, the ambition of making sense of the local dimension of migra-
tion policymaking is beyond the scope of this book, which is the pro-
duct of a far more modest effort: that of gathering together the contri-
butions of a group of migration scholars looking at this under-
researched topic from very different research questions and perspec-
tives. Nevertheless, we undertake, at least in a tentative manner, a first
comparative exercise aimed at elucidating the relevance and the main
characteristics of the local dimension of migration policymaking in the
five countries considered in this book: Switzerland, Germany, the Neth-
erlands, Italy and Canada.
At first glance, such an exercise may be regarded as highly question-
able from a methodological point of view. The fact that the studies pre-
sented in this book analyse different dimensions of integration policy
is puzzling: how to compare local citizenship policy and politics in
Swiss cantons with vocational training in German and Dutch cities? Or
access to services in Italian cities with mosque-building issues in Que-
bec? The risk of comparing apples to oranges is evident. In order to
avoid methodological nonsense, in the first section of this chapter I
shall try to devise a minimum set of theoretically relevant concepts
drawing on both the general policymaking literature and specific work
on local immigrant policy. This latter body of research has already ela-
borated a number of categories and typologies to account for the ex-
treme diversity of local responses to immigrant presence, among which
the one proposed by Alexander (2007) stands out as particularly com-
pelling. Nonetheless, the dynamics and specific characters of local pol-
icymaking processes are not adequately considered. This is why I re-
sorted to the classic notion of policy arena: first introduced by Lowi
(1972) in order to account for power relations in policymaking, this ca-
tegory will be loosely interpreted and adapted to the study of local mi-
gration policymaking. More precisely, I shall speak of local policy arenas
as policymaking fields arising around specific issue areas or dimensions
of migration policy. The challenge is to understand how local migration
policy is worked out through local policy arenas across the five coun-
tries considered, and what patterns of similarities and differences can
be singled out in terms of dynamics of policymaking processes, actors
involved and their reciprocal relations.
Of course, local migration policy arenas cannot be considered in a
void, since they take shape in specific national contexts and systems of
state-periphery relations. This is why in the second section, models of
administrative centralisation/decentralisation in the five countries will
be briefly described, and the role played in each one by sub-national
authorities in the context of immigration and immigrant policy and
policymaking1 will be considered. This is a crucial step if we are to un-
derstand the different institutional contexts in which local migration
policy arenas may find themselves to take shape.
Based on the evidence provided by the case studies presented in this
book and on other relevant pieces of literature, in the third section I
shall provide some comparative analysis of local-level responses and
policymaking processes in the three issue areas of migration policy ana-
lysed in the contributions to this book, i.e. citizenship, welfare services
and religious diversity. These issue areas will be conceptualised as
three different local policy arenas, of which I shall point out the specific
stakes, networks of actors involved and patterns of policymaking rela-
tions. Given the heterogeneity of the empirical material on which the
analysis is built, this should be considered more as a tentative exercise
than as a systematic account.
In the fourth section the relevance of the local dimension of policy-
making across the five countries considered will be assessed: to what
extent do local policymaking arenas matter in migration policy? What
is the impact of different state structures? Are there significant differ-
ences between centralised and decentralised countries? Or, on the
contrary, can similar decision-making patterns be pointed out? And, if
so, what are the common mechanisms lying behind local policymak-
ing on migration? Of course, answers to these queries cannot but be
provisory, confirming the need for systematic, theoretically driven re-
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search on this – so far – neglected dimension of migration
policymaking.
2 Looking for commonality in extreme difference: local policy
arenas in the migration field
From a policymaking perspective, locality represents a crucial dimen-
sion for the study of policy processes, since it is at this level that the
very essence of policy as a peculiar combination of decision and action
in relation to some collective – more or less clearly – perceived issue
takes shape. Different institutions and organisations usually operate in
a specific territorial context, either of a public or private nature, with
generic or specific tasks, political or executive functions, etc. Regardless
of the investigated policy field, complexity is indeed intrinsically linked
to local policymaking, a complexity given by the closeness and continu-
ous overlapping and intertwining of decision and implementation,
autonomy and execution.
Such complexity has not been sufficiently tackled in the existing lit-
erature on migration local policy. While often acknowledged, research
on its consequences in terms of policymaking structures and processes
is lacking. Alexander (2007), for instance, distinguishes between
espoused and enacted policies, which recalls the classic distinction in
policymaking studies between decision and implementation. Yet, what
the relationship is between the two is not investigated. As pointed out
by a number of contributions in this book (see in particular Vermeulen
& Stotijn; Caponio ch. 2; Fourot), implementation is a dynamic pro-
cess, in which various actors are involved, and through which official
policy may undergo profound transformation and reinterpretation. In
order to look carefully at these processes, appropriate theoretical tools
are needed: these might be borrowed from classic policy analysis,
which emerged specifically with the purpose of looking inside Easton’s
‘black-box’ (1965) to shed new light on policymaking processes.
In particular, here I draw on Lowi’s seminal concept of policy arena,
which, in my view, can be reinterpreted in a loose way and fruitfully
applied to make sense of the complexity of local migration policymak-
ing. Two features of Lowi’s approach appear particularly relevant: 1) the
incorporation of the element of power, which is not always explicitly ac-
knowledged in most of the metaphors and analytical tools used in im-
plementation research (see, for instance, implementation structures,
policy networks, advocacy coalitions, etc.); and 2) the ‘policy determines
politics’ challenging argument, according to which different types of
policy engender different power relationships among individuals and
groups, and these relationships can be described and predicted on the
CONCLUSION 163
basis of different policy types. Below we examine why these two axes of
Lowi’s reasoning may contribute to the analysis of local migration
policymaking.
First, the element of power is central in local policymaking on mi-
gration since these policies have to be formally discussed and agreed
upon by local representative and/or executive institutions, such as city
councils, regional parliaments, municipal governments, etc. Confronta-
tion between opposite ideologies and political framing of migration
can be expected. Migration is usually a hot issue, one on which mass
media attention is very high and public opinion, while divided, is more
likely to be negatively oriented. As a consequence, local migration pol-
icymaking can hardly be depicted as characterised just by negotiation
and pragmatic orientation. Such an orientation may happen under spe-
cific circumstances,2 but is not the rule. On the contrary, power rela-
tions and politicisation are very likely to occur.
Secondly, as for the ‘policy determines politics’ argument – while
this has been the object of much criticism – it can still be regarded as
an intriguing analytical perspective. In other terms, the challenge is
that of analysing policymaking bottom-up, starting from the policy
stakes and looking at how decision-making and implementation pro-
cesses take shape across different cities in different countries. Of
course, one must be aware that local policy, of whatever kind – migra-
tion policy included – does not take place in a void, but rather in com-
plex institutional environments that impinge on different models of
state/periphery relations. Depending on the specific issues or issue
areas (Alexander 2007), local authorities may be assigned a crucial role
in a given country while having just negligible competence in another.
This is the case of, for instance, citizenship in Switzerland as com-
pared to the other four countries considered in this study. Institutional
settings cannot be dismissed, and thus I investigate them in the chap-
ter’s second section. Nevertheless, to reverse the perspective and start
from the issues at hand may help to identify common patterns of pol-
icymaking despite considerable institutional differentiation, and to an-
swer to more general questions like: when and under what conditions
does politicisation occur? What factors account for patterns of conver-
gence in local policymaking on migration?
The concept of policy arenas, by emphasising both negotiation and
power and by looking at policy processes from the bottom up, may
help to overcome the risk of just concluding that each city/region is a
case apart. This would inevitably follow if one adheres simply to the
analysis of formal policymaking structures and institutional settings.
Yet, by looking at how, despite differences, involved actors interact on
specific issues, common features of local migration policymaking can
be highlighted and accounted for. In this respect, the issue of politicisa-
164 TIZIANA CAPONIO
tion, i.e. of the wielding of political power as opposed to the search for
negotiation and pragmatic solutions, is indeed a crucial point. By fo-
cusing on the policy arenas around different migration policy stakes,
and by comparing them carefully, my purpose is to isolate those me-
chanisms and processes that may lead to the prevailing of the coercive,
or on the contrary, the consensual side of policymaking. If institutional
settings provide the structure for the exercise of power and negotiation
in relation to migration, local governments and policy networks may
still engage in different patterns of relationships, depending on the is-
sues at hand.
Of course, in order to undertake such an analysis, we need a clear
specification of possible local policy issues related to migration and of
their main characteristics. In this respect, Alexander’s (2007: 48-50)
classification of policy domains and issue areas appears to be of particu-
lar relevance. He has identified four policy domains of local migrant
policy: the legal-political domain, which addresses the civic incorpora-
tion of migrants/ethnic minorities in the host polity; the socio-econom-
ic domain, which concerns social inclusion policies; the cultural-reli-
gious domain, which includes policies related to minority religious and
cultural practices as well as to inter-group cultural relations; and the
spatial domain, which groups policies with a strong spatial dimension
(housing, urban renovation, etc.). Each policy domain is then divided
into more specific issue areas, representing ‘all the (potential and ac-
tual) local migrant policy’ (Alexander 2007: 48). The contributions col-
lected in this book allow for the analysis of policymaking processes in
three policy domains and four issue areas: Helbling’s account of Swiss
local citizenship policy is an instance of the migrant civic status issue
area, in the legal-political domain; Caponio ch. 2 on Italian cities, Ay-
bek and Vermeulen and Stotijn on youth employment policies in Ger-
man and Dutch cities illustrate two closely related issue areas in the so-
cio-economic domain, i.e. welfare services and vocational training;
Fourot’s essay on mosque-building in Quebec addresses the issue area
of local authorities relations towards religious institutions and
practices.
However, contrary to Alexander’s typological approach, the methodo-
logical path that will be followed here is not a deductive, but rather, an
inductive one. Drawing on the contributions collected in this book as
well as on other relevant pieces of literature, I shall attempt to analyse
the local migration policy arenas structured around the three main is-
sue areas specified to find, in each issue area, common patterns of pol-
icymaking across different cities.
The search for common patterns represents a key task for research
on local migration policy and policymaking, since this is a condition
for understanding how a relevant part of migration policy actually
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works, and under what conditions it might eventually work better.
The debate on ‘good’ or ‘best’ practices, which informs much of pol-
icy-practitioners’ literature on migration today,3 has shifted from an
emphasis on exceptionality and uniqueness to a search for basic me-
chanisms that may allow for the transferability of a certain practice in
different contexts. What these mechanisms are and what factors may
have an impact on their – correct – functioning is an empirical ques-
tion, to which only research can provide systematic and evidence-
based answers.
3 The contexts: the role of local authorities in migration
policymaking in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Switzerland and Canada
The relevance of the local dimension of migration policymaking varies
considerably across European and non-European countries, depending
on different state structures and, as a consequence, on the institutional
role assigned to territorial levels (regional/provincial/local) of authority
in shaping immigration and immigrant policy. In the following sec-
tion, I shall first reconstruct general models of centre/periphery rela-
tions and levels of administrative centralisation/decentralisation, look-
ing closely at sub-national levels in the context of migration policy and
policymaking. As will be noted, the five different countries dealt with
in the chapters of this book – from different points of view – maximise
difference on the independent variable, in the sense that they provide
distinct instances of state structures and administrative settings, both
in general and in relation to migration.
In the classic terms of Lipset and Rokkan (1967), state structures
and levels of decentralisation are the products of processes of state
building, and reflect arrangements to the state/periphery cleavage in
Europe and to the cultural/linguistic conflict between the anglophone
majority and francophone minority in Canada.4 In this sense, the five
countries considered represent different solutions to these historical
challenges: Switzerland, Canada and Germany stand for different in-
stances of federalism; Italy can be regarded as a case of a regionalised
state structure in transition towards a quasi-federalist form; the Nether-
lands is a prototype of a unitary state, although with a non-negligible
degree of administrative decentralisation.
As for federalist systems, the three countries considered present dif-
ferent forms of centre/periphery relations (McKay 2001; Watts 2008).
First of all, Switzerland is a confederation characterised by a high de-
gree of separation between the federal state and the cantons (so-called
dual federalism), these latter enjoying exclusive authority on a signifi-
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cant number of matters such as public order, health care, education,
territorial organisation, state-church relations and taxation. In this con-
text, municipalities raise their own taxes and autonomously organise
themselves. While the degree of local autonomy may depend on the
cantons, in general this is very high when compared with other coun-
tries (Kriesi 1998; Linder 2005). Similarly, Canada is also a case of dual
federalism, based on two distinct jurisdictions, the federal parliament
and the legislative assemblies of the provinces, with separate areas of
legislative authority and a few shared ones (Rocher & Smith 2003).
However, in contrast to Switzerland, the federal parliament has always
enjoyed a certain primacy over the provincial ones, as pointed out, for
instance, by the fact that the residuary powers are attributed to the cen-
tral government (Be´langer 2001a). As for centre/periphery relations,
these are more of an asymmetric kind: according to the so-called ‘opt-
ing-out formula’, provinces can decide not to participate in a federal
programme and receive tax compensation for withdrawal. Currently,
only Quebec availed itself of such an opportunity, which is part of the
special status accorded to this province since the British North America
Act of 1867 to accommodate its linguistic and cultural diversity (Be´lan-
ger 2001b). Municipal legislation falls within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the provinces, and city administrations have no constitutionally guar-
anteed autonomy: at this level, asymmetry is the rule, so the exercise of
prerogatives in one city does not necessarily apply in another (see Four-
ot in this volume).
Germany, on the other hand, has been depicted as a case of adminis-
trative federalism or cooperative federalism: the federal government has a
very broad range of exclusive, concurrent (with federal law prevailing)
and framework legislative jurisdiction, while the La¨nder have a manda-
tory constitutional responsibility for applying and administering most
of these federal laws5 (Leonardy 1999: 12), as pointed out by the fact
that public service is mainly organised and employed by Land govern-
ments. In contrast to Canada and similar to Switzerland, local govern-
ments enjoy constitutionally guaranteed autonomy: they carry out most
of the administrative tasks attributed to La¨nder, who have legislative re-
sponsibility for their organisation and supervision (Leonardy 1999;
Jeffery 2002).
Italy can be considered a case of a unitary state that has, in the last
twenty years, undertaken a process of increasing devolution of author-
ity to the periphery and, in particular, to the regions. The regional state
structure was already envisaged in the 1948 Constitution, which also
recognised municipal autonomy. Nevertheless, this was a kind of
highly centralised and asymmetric regionalism: the fifteen ordinary re-
gions could enjoy legislative powers only within state law limits, while
the five regions with a special statute (i.e. the border regions Aosta Val-
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ley, Friuli Venezia Giulia and Trentino Alto Adige, and the two insular
regions Sicily and Sardinia) were accorded greater administrative and
legislative autonomy (Ventura 2002: 114). Ordinary regions were im-
plemented only in the mid-1970s and their functioning showed from
the very beginning limits and contradictions. Reforms in the sense of
decentralisation took place only in the early 1990s. In 2001, the reform
of Title V of the Constitution, sanctioned by popular referendum, has
substantially modified the originally unitary state structure in a federal-
ist sense: areas of exclusive state legislative authority and shared ones
have been specified, while legislative power on residuary matters has
been assigned to the regions; yet, contrary to classic federalist models,
Italy still lacks an institution allowing regions to participate in the na-
tional legislative process (Ventura 2002: 118-119). Administrative func-
tions are the prerogative of the municipalities even though, according
to the principle of subsidiarity, the provinces and the regions may inter-
vene where deemed necessary.
In our sample, the Netherlands represents the only pure unitary state
structure: Lijphart (1968) described it as a ‘centralised consensus de-
mocracy’. As such, provinces and municipalities, which represent the
lowest tiers of government, are essentially responsible for the imple-
mentation of national policies. Whereas the twelve provinces have lim-
ited authority, municipalities are multi-purpose territorial governments
and they outweigh provinces in terms of tasks, level of expenditure and
number of personnel. Actually, municipalities do not only have execu-
tive responsibility but, according to the Constitution, also have the right
to take the initiative in the administration of their territory (Toonen
1990). This ensures municipalities a considerable degree of autonomy.
Different state/periphery structures impinge of course on the treat-
ment of migration in the countries considered. Generally speaking, im-
migration policy, according to Hammar (1985) the regulation of interna-
tional migration flows, falls within the jurisdiction of central state
authorities, with the notable exception of Canada, where immigration
is a matter of shared jurisdiction with the provinces. Most provinces
have agreements with the Canadian government that allow them to
participate in the selection of immigrants to be admitted within the
scope of federal programmes6 (Birrel & McIssac 2006: 103). On the
other hand, the primacy of state authorities in Europe might be consid-
ered a reflection of the immigration history of the old continent, where
international flows represent a relatively new phenomenon taking place
in the context of established and supposedly homogeneous nation
states. However, a more close attention to centre/periphery relation-
ships on issues of immigration regulation highlights interesting differ-
ences across the four European countries considered in this chapter.
As for the two federal systems, Germany and Switzerland, the La¨nder
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and the cantons have a considerable say both in national decision-mak-
ing and implementation. On the former, influence on immigration
laws and regulations can be exerted through the regional legislative
chambers (respectively, the Bundestag and the Sta¨nderat) and through
the regional ministers’ conferences.7 As for implementation, in both
countries regional authorities enjoy extensive powers in carrying out
admission policies, especially as far as the issuing of residence permits
is concerned, while in Switzerland cantons are also responsible for the
alien police and for enforcing repatriation decisions (D’Amato 2006).
On the other hand, in more centralised state structures such as Italy
and the Netherlands, the influence of sub-national levels on immigra-
tion policy is far less extensive, even though local authorities may play
a non-negligible discretional role in the issuing and renewal of resi-
dence permits,8 as well as in tolerating irregular migrants.9 The afore-
mentioned quasi-federalist turn in Italy is still far from endowing the
regions with the kind of direct influence in national legislation that
can be found in the other federal states, since there is no legislative
chamber representing the regions at a national level. Yet, according to
the 2002 Immigration Law, the regions can take advantage of the pos-
sibility to organise, in collaboration with the Minister of Education,
training courses in the countries of origin: these courses offer the re-
gions an instrument of selection of immigrants, to fill shortages in lo-
cal labour markets. However, the national quota assigned for this
category of entries is negligible and, furthermore, the regions have not
taken advantage of this opportunity (Caponio 2007).
As is clear, different state structures and institutionalised centre/per-
iphery relations set the formal framework of opportunities and con-
straints against which sub-national authorities may take action in im-
migration policy and policymaking. Their role may range from direct
involvement in immigrant recruitment (Canada) and repatriation (Swit-
zerland) to mere discretion in the implementation of elements of the
national legislation (the Netherlands). Discretion, while not institution-
ally recognised as part of the implementation process, is nevertheless
relevant for the effects it produces both for those who are subject to a
certain law or regulation and for immigration policy as a whole. The
case of Italy is in this sense paradigmatic: the toleration of illegal stays
would have been impossible without considerable discretion on the
part of local authorities in allowing access to services to all immigrants,
including irregular ones. This, coupled with the absence of opportu-
nities of legal entry and with an increasing demand in the labour mar-
ket for low-qualified, highly flexible workers (especially in agriculture
and for care and domestic services), has contributed to the consoli-
dation of a so-called ‘half-closed/half-open door’ immigration policy
(Colombo & Sciortino 2004).
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As for immigrant policy, which has been the main focus of the contri-
butions presented in this book, the picture is much more scattered and,
along with the institutional division of responsibility in welfare policy,
integration rhetoric and official immigrant policy must be considered.
This is a clear point of distinction among the three federalist countries:
whereas Switzerland never promoted a national integration policy, and
Germany did so only in 2005, when the first national integration pro-
gramme was introduced, the Canadian central government looks far
more interventionist. As a consequence, whereas immigrant policy is es-
sentially cantonal/regional policy in the first two countries, this is not
the case in Canada. In 1971 the Multiculturalist Act established the basic
principles of Canadian immigrant policy by recognising the right to dif-
ference and proclaiming cultural diversity as a national value. Moreover,
federal programmes aimed at supporting first settlement, especially
through English and French language instruction, are carried out by the
Department of Citizenship and Immigration in the context of various
agreements with the provinces (Simmons 1999; Birrell & McIsaac
2006). The only exception is represented by Quebec, which under the
terms of the Canada-Quebec Accord signed in 1991, has exclusive re-
sponsibility for welcoming and integrating immigrants who settle in the
province, thus enjoying full autonomy in the management of federal
funds allocated for immigrant policy. As for the other provinces, immi-
grant policy is composed of a mix of federal and provincial programmes,
often overlapping each other. Depending on the provincial statutes, mu-
nicipalities have been assigned varying degrees of influence in these po-
licies, which are often implemented by NGOs selected on the basis of
public bids. However, since the late-1990s, budget constraints and wel-
fare retrenchment have been accompanied by a strengthening of provin-
cial responsibility in immigrants’ accommodation and reception (see
Fourot in this volume): in the case of Vancouver (Leaf 2005: 289), this
led to an increased centrality of municipal authorities in dealing with
non-governmental and community organisations.
As for Italy, beginning in 1998 immigrant policy became a regional
matter. Law no. 40/1998, established a National Integration Fund to be
allocated to the regions, which were actually responsible for approving
annual integration programmes, in collaboration with provincial and lo-
cal authorities. Throughout the 1990s, local administrations had played
a crucial role – especially in the north – in providing first assistance and
various integration projects (in this volume ch. 2), given the autonomy
Italian municipalities enjoy in the organisation of public services deliv-
ery and implementation. The recent federal reforms have reinforced re-
gional responsibility in welfare policy, and it is actually up to the regions
now to decide whether to establish ad hoc immigrant integration pro-
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grammes to be implemented by provincial and/or municipal
authorities.
In the Netherlands, on the other hand, immigrant policy has been for-
mulated and developed in a centralised way by the national govern-
ment,10 which introduced an Ethnic Minority Policy as early as 1983. Lo-
cal authorities, though, have enjoyed considerable autonomy in imple-
mentation throughout the 1990s, a trend that has been contradicted by
the introduction, in 2003 of a national integration programme assign-
ing to the central state control over integration courses and exams.
Nevertheless, consistent with the general structure of the Dutch welfare
state described above, many integration measures continue to be carried
out by municipalities, which has produced a growing gap between na-
tional-level symbolic politics and local-level integration policies (Bruque-
tas-Callejo et al. 2008).
Figure 6.1 sums up the results of the analysis carried out so far. A first
picture of the relevance of the local dimension of migration policymak-
ing in our five countries can be identified by crossing the two dimen-
sions of: 1) local/regional degree of autonomy in immigration policy and
2) local/regional autonomy in immigrant policy in the formal division
of responsibility between centre and periphery. According to the figure,
the local dimension is likely to be extremely critical in Switzerland,
while it will be of a minor relevance in the Netherlands, with the excep-
tion at least in part of immigrant policy.
Figure 6.1 The local dimension of policymaking in Canada, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands and Switzerland: dimensions of analysis
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State/periphery institutional arrangements described so far represent
sets of rules that shape local policymakers’ opportunities and con-
straints. Yet, if we are to understand how immigrant local policies actu-
ally work, the compilation of an inventory of opportunities and con-
straints is insufficient. I shall focus on the local dimension of migra-
tion policy per se, to find out if, and to what extent, there are common
mechanisms at work behind – and maybe in spite of – extreme differ-
ences in formal state/local authority arrangements.
4 Policymaking patterns in local migration policy arenas:
evidence from case studies
In this section I turn my attention to local migration policy arenas, parti-
cularly to the three local arenas that can be identified on the basis of
the contributions collected in this book, i.e.: the legal status – namely
citizenship – policy arena; the social welfare and employment policy
arenas; the religious diversity arena. For each, I shall first identify the
main structural differences across the five countries considered in
terms of the local authorities concerned and the formal responsibility
assigned to them. In a second step, I will focus on elements of similar-
ity in the functioning of the local arenas with particular attention to
the actors taking part in policymaking processes and the logic behind
their actions.
As already mentioned, such an assessment can only be tentative: not
only do the contributions collected in this book look at local policymak-
ing from very different perspectives and with varying methodological
approaches, but existing literature on local policy has unevenly ad-
dressed such a dimension. Moreover, while much has been written on
various aspects of local socio-economic and religious diversity issue
areas, a serious gap exists when considering the local dimension of citi-
zenship policy. As a consequence, the following analysis has to be con-
sidered as a preliminary attempt to build an original heuristic perspec-
tive on the local dimension of policymaking rather than as an accom-
plished study.
4.1 Citizenship policy: an invisible local migration arena
According to Alexander (2007: 49), citizenship relates to the migrant
civic status, which is a crucial issue area in the legal-political policy do-
main. In general, it is taken for granted that citizenship is the goal par
excellence of national policymaking. It is up to national laws to draw
the boundaries between citizens and non-citizens and to decide under
which conditions the latter may aspire to become members of the na-
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tional community. Even EU supra-national citizenship is currently
based on membership in a nation state, i.e. one of the EU-27 member
states.
However, as Helbling points out in this book, if in Switzerland na-
tional citizenship is explicitly based on membership in a local commu-
nity, i.e. in the municipality, in other countries, centralised France in-
cluded, regional differences in the implementation of naturalisation
laws can be observed. This clearly indicates the relevance of local/regio-
nal authorities’ attitudes towards the question of who has the right to
become a citizen (see also Helbling 2008: 18-19). The local dimension
of citizenship policy, while only rarely acknowledged and studied, may
nevertheless represent a crucial migration policymaking arena in con-
temporary receiving countries, since it is at a local level that criteria for
membership in a certain community acquire social meaning.
How does the citizenship local policy arena look across the five coun-
tries considered in this study? What are the main differences and simi-
larities? Answering such questions, even in a tentative manner, is ex-
tremely difficult since here a serious gap in the migration policy litera-
ture has to be faced: studies on citizenship policy have been carried out
essentially in a taken-for-granted nation state perspective, with a pre-
vailing macro-sociological and structural approach (Helbling 2008: 50).
Consequently, the local dimension of citizenship policy can be consid-
ered as an invisible arena, i.e. one which cannot be noticed and ac-
counted for through the theoretical and methodological lens character-
ising mainstream immigration and citizenship literature.
This does not mean that such a local arena does not exist or that it is
relevant only in the few countries where it has received some attention.
Probably more research is needed, especially if one considers that, ac-
cording to an NGO survey carried out in the fifteen ‘old’ EU member
states in the context of the NATAC study,11 one of the main complaints
was the degree of discretion and power of decision left to administra-
tive authorities (Chopin 2006: 229).
Notwithstanding the scarce literature and empirical evidence avail-
able, I shall try to point out some possible characterising features of
the local citizenship policymaking arena across the five countries con-
sidered. We begin by identifying the main differences. Drawing on
Helbling’s literature review in this book (see also Helbling 2008), a
first distinction can be made between political local citizenship arenas
and essentially administrative ones. Switzerland is the best example,
and probably unique, of a political local citizenship arena, since final
decisions on naturalisation applications are taken at a municipal level
by a political body, i.e. the local parliament, the executive, or even the
entire population through direct ballot. Politicians are also involved in
various stages of the procedure, even if it is generally the local adminis-
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tration that keeps in touch with the applicants, informs them about the
formal aspects of the process, checks to see if the main criteria are ful-
filled and makes a first assessment of the candidate’s chances of ob-
taining a Swiss passport. Officials also deliver recommendations to the
political bodies involved in the process (Helbling 2008: 13).
On the other hand, administrative local citizenship arenas can be
further distinguished according to the type of bureaucracy responsible
for handling applications and/or making final decisions. Only in Ger-
many and Austria such responsibility falls entirely within, respectively,
regional (La¨nder) and provincial authorities, while in the other EU-15
states applications are handled by local branches of the central execu-
tive authority that has the final say (Waldrauch 2006: 145). This is
the case of the Ministry of the Interior12 in Italy, where the prefec-
tures (local branches of the Ministry of the Interior) have the task of
collecting applications and checking the documents, and of the Immi-
gration and Naturalisation Service in the Netherlands (which is an
authority subordinate to the Ministry of Alien Affairs and Integra-
tion). In the latter country, though, preliminary investigation and re-
gistration of applications is carried out by municipal authorities (Van
Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2006: 422-423). A similar centralised
institutional setting can be found in Canada, where the administra-
tion of citizenship falls under the authority of Citizenship and Immi-
gration Canada (CIC), a federal-level department (Bloemraad 2006:
107). At a local level, citizenship judges operate as officials of CIC to
interview applicants, to organise promotional events and to preside
over citizenship ceremonies.13
To sum up, three different structures of local citizenship policy are-
nas can be identified: the political policymaking arena, where proce-
dures and decisions are dealt with locally and with a relevant involve-
ment of political actors (Switzerland); administrative decentralised are-
nas, where naturalisation procedures and decisions are essentially
administrative matters carried out at a sub-national level (as in the case
of Germany and Austria); administrative centralised arenas, where local
authorities have just executive functions and operate on behalf of a na-
tional decision-making institution, as pointed out in the cases of Italy,
the Netherlands and Canada.
Having clarified the differences in the structures of the local citizen-
ship policy arena, I now turn my attention to the possible elements of
similarity in their functioning across the five countries considered. A
first common element in all the arenas considered, both political and
administrative, centralised and decentralised, is the key role played by
local public officials in the crucial stages of the naturalisation proce-
dure. Apart from the cases of Switzerland and Germany, treated exten-
sively by Helbling elsewhere in this book, this seems to be the case in
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the other three countries, although systematic accounts are lacking. In
Canada, for instance, citizenship judges operating at a local level are re-
sponsible for interviewing applicants and ensuring that they meet the
requirements of the Citizenship Act and regulations. In the Nether-
lands, under the 1984 Act, civil servants of the municipality were re-
sponsible for examining language and integration requirements, thus
enjoying a considerable margin of manoeuvre which was drastically re-
stricted though after the introduction in April 2003 of a standardised
naturalisation exam (Van Oers, De Hart & Groenendijk 2006: 423). As
for Italy, it is assumed that the local branches of the Ministry of the In-
terior (prefectures) enforce the rules. Yet, the few studies available on
the implementation of regularisation laws (Triandafyllidou 2003; Zuc-
chini 1998) and on access to residence permits (Fasano & Zucchini
2001; Caponio 2007), show a high degree of differentiation in the atti-
tudes and practices of local officials. Such differences can also be rea-
sonably expected in relation to the implementation of citizenship policy
by the prefectures.
It is extremely difficult, on the basis of the scarce empirical evidence
available, to show the logic of action of local officials in the citizenship
policymaking arena. However, drawing on existing research on the
practices carried out by local-level bureaucrats in the migrant status is-
sue area (see Jordan, Stra˚th & Triandafyllidou 2003), the need to inves-
tigate administrative cultures comes to the fore. Attitudes towards im-
migrants’ legal status take shape in the daily routines of the bureau-
cracy and in the way this copes with new challenges.
Given this pre-eminence of bureaucratic actors and their administra-
tive culture in the local citizenship arena, one might hypothesise that
politics will not play a relevant role with the exception of Swiss munici-
palities, where local governments are formally part of the decision-
making process. Yet, this might be another common thread across the
cases considered: political influence, either of a direct or indirect type,
cannot be completely ruled out. In the case of Germany, studies have
documented considerable variation in naturalisation rates and citizen-
ship policies between progressive and conservative La¨nder (Hagerdorn
2001), these latter applying stricter requirements and criteria of exami-
nation. Hailbronner (2006: 241), for instance, points out how until
2005 the requirement of constitutional loyalty on the part of the appli-
cant was interpreted differently by the La¨nder responsible authorities.
While Christian Democratic La¨nder made it compulsory to have a for-
mal consultation with security services, in other La¨nder such a consul-
tation was required only in particular cases.14
In her comparative assessment of bureaucratic practices and struc-
tures of Canadian and United States citizenship policy, Bloemraad
(2006) points out how different political views on migration, primarily
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centred on security in the US and on integration in Canada, inform
the organisational cultures of the agencies administering citizenship in
the two countries. The analysis does not take into account the local di-
mension within the two systems, even though this has been noted as
relatively important, at least in the US (see Helbling in this volume).
As for Canada, it should be recalled that provinces have considerable
influence on the selection of immigrants, and Quebec enjoys full
autonomy. The selection of future, would-be citizens can be directly in-
fluenced by political preferences, as pointed out by the Quebec selec-
tion criteria favourable towards francophone immigrants, which are
consistent with the political goal of preserving and reinforcing the
French-speaking community.
Moreover, political actors may also attempt to play a role in adminis-
trative local citizenship arenas by promoting various measures aimed
at favouring immigrants’ naturalisation. Language courses, information
to would-be citizens and/or specific preparation to pass citizenship
tests or examinations can be regarded as part of a local political strat-
egy aimed at fostering access to citizenship. The naturalisation cam-
paigns carried out in some German cities such as Berlin or Hesse
(Chopin 2006: 226) are a case in point. In the Netherlands and Cana-
da, national programmes explicitly assign to sub-national-level authori-
ties the task of undertaking citizenship promotion. Meanwhile in Italy,
the picture is far more scattered, and much depends on regional/local
authorities, who might decide to start such programmes in the context
of their integration policies. Political attitudes that are pro- or anti-im-
migrant are likely to influence the propensity for undertaking such po-
licies. Hence, even if, in general (the only exception being Switzer-
land), local politicians are not formally involved in citizenship policy,
they still seem to be able to exert indirect influence. This can be more
or less significant depending on the kind of authority responsible for
the final decision, i.e. if it is placed at a sub-national or national level.
Moreover, much will depend on the authorities’ interest in the politici-
sation of the citizenship issue. Since political action is driven by a con-
sensus-maximising logic (Mahnig 2004; Caponio ch. 2 in this volume),
which is at the base of the ‘democratic impatience’ described by Ver-
meulen and Penninx (1994) – the political desire to achieve quick solu-
tions for problems and processes of a long-term character – one can
hypothesise that local political actors will enter into the local citizen-
ship arena only insofar as they perceive some gain in terms of consen-
sus in the party/coalition electorate. The kind of measures undertaken
will depend on the party ideology or views of migration, and range
from non-policy to support for the introduction of administrative re-
strictions (see the aforementioned conservative German La¨nder), to im-
migrants’ selection (e.g. preference for French-speaking immigrants in
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Quebec), to facilitating programmes (e.g. naturalisation campaigns,
language and culture courses, etc.). Favourable measures will be sup-
ported only when they are consistent with the perception of a consen-
sus in the actual and potential electorate.
A third actor appears to have some relevance in the local citizenship
arena: NGOs. These groups can mobilise at a local level to provide in-
formation and support to applicants on the basis of specific public pro-
grammes, as is the case in Canada and, at least in part of Germany
and the Netherlands, or independently of municipal authorities (Cho-
pin 2006: 221). Independent action is likely to be particularly promi-
nent in those countries, such as Italy, where public authorities do not
offer any counselling, and also initiatives on the part of local adminis-
trations are few and discontinued. NGOs’ logic of action generally
leans in the direction of supporting their constituencies, i.e. immi-
grants. However, their role in the local citizenship arena arguably also
depends on the relevance that naturalisation has in their perception of
immigrants’ needs and interests. Where emergency issues prevail and
basic needs are emphasised, especially by organisations traditionally vo-
lunteering for poor people as is the case of a considerable number of
Catholic NGOs in Italy, citizenship will not be regarded as a priority.
Hence, despite the scarce existing literature, we can assert that the
local dimension of citizenship policymaking is not of a minor rele-
vance, even in countries where the crucial decisions are taken at a na-
tional level, such as Canada, the Netherlands and Italy. The local arena
appears to be essentially of an administrative kind, even if the – in
most cases, indirect – role and influence of political actors should not
be disregarded. Moreover, the local conditions may be more or less fa-
vourable to naturalisation depending also on NGOs’ propensity to mo-
bilise and campaign independently on this issue, which cannot always
be taken for granted.
4.2 The social welfare migration policy arena: decision making versus
implementation?
In Alexander’s (2007) classification, the socio-economic policy domain
includes four issue areas that relate to the overall social inclusion of
immigrants and access to welfare. In particular, on the basis of the con-
tributions collected in this book, I shall focus on two such issues areas:
social services and the labour market. These appear to be strictly inter-
connected at a local level, since labour market measures are usually
part of broader local strategies of social inclusion composed of a mix of
welfare services. After an assessment of the main differences in the
structure of local socio-economic policymaking arenas, I turn my atten-
tion to an analysis of similarities in the functioning patterns.
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As for the first point – access to social and employment services
being a crucial element of immigrant policy – the importance of the lo-
cal dimension will depend on the degree of administrative decentralisa-
tion of the welfare state overall and, in particular, of immigrant policy.
Looking more closely at the institutions involved and at their respective
authority, especially in terms of separation between decision-making
and implementation, different models can be identified. The first mod-
el, which is prevalent in the four European countries considered in this
book, is essentially bottom-up, since it is based on the principle of local
autonomy, according to which municipalities enjoy considerable discre-
tionary power in the implementation of national/regional/cantonal pol-
icy. General policy objectives and guidelines are translated by local
authorities into specific measures and initiatives, a process which im-
plies a relevant margin of manoeuvre in the choice of what services to
deliver and how.
On the other hand, the second model, which reflects the case of Ca-
nada, is more top-down and characterised by a certain degree of com-
petition between the federal and the provincial level, especially as far
as labour market programmes are concerned15 (Birrell & McIsaac
2006: 111). Moreover, administrative arrangements for the delivery of
services may vary considerably among Canadian provinces: while in
Ontario and Manitoba, for instance, services are delivered by an exten-
sive network of NGOs, in Quebec the local branches of the provincial
government are also involved (Birrell & McIsaac 2006: 112). The role
of municipalities depends on provincial jurisdiction, though, in gener-
al, it does not seem to be crucial.
Despite differences in the local policymaking structures, similarities
can be noted in relation to the mechanisms of functioning of the local
socio-economic immigrant arena. In all the countries considered, it
constitutes a ‘new’ social policy arena which intersects with more es-
tablished local welfare policies such as labour employment and voca-
tional training, housing, social assistance, etc. Relations between ‘old’
and – relatively – ‘new’ arenas appear to be a particularly critical point.
Established bureaucratic structures tend to resist innovation and to
boycott new administrative units dealing with immigrants’ integration.
In the cases of Munich and Frankfurt described in this book by Aybek,
the ad hoc institutional bodies created by municipal authorities have
encountered difficulties in cooperating with other administrative units
as well as with the corporative policy networks dealing with vocational
education and training. An even more separate system – setting apart
immigrant settlement programmes and labour market development
services – can be found in Canada, where federal and provincial depart-
ments working on these issues have just begun to address the problem
of coordination (Birrell & McIsaac 2006: 111).
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Similar issues are pointed out in this book by Vermeulen and Sto-
tijn’s comparison of integration policies in Amsterdam and Berlin, and
by Caponio (ch. 2) in relation to Italian cities (see also Caponio 2006).
In Amsterdam, for instance, the role of the minority advisory councils
in the developing of immigrant local policy has been often ques-
tioned,16 as has been the case with the commissioner for foreigners
(Ausla¨nderbeauftragte) in Berlin, the Institution for Immigrant Ser-
vices in Bologna and the Foreigners’ Office in Milan.17
To explain such difficulties in the everyday operating of integration
policy, micro-level relations within the socio-economic immigrant arena
could be revealing. Three categories of actors must be considered:
elected political actors, the bureaucratic apparatus and civil society or-
ganisations, immigrant associations included. At first glance, we can
hypothesise a straightforward separation between the political, deci-
sion-making sphere and the administrative-plus-NGOs implementation
sphere. Yet, relations appear to be far more complicated, and have to
be considered in the context of the different policymaking structures
highlighted above.
First of all, elected politicians play a crucial role in setting the policy
frame according to which the socio-economic integration of immi-
grants is defined and dealt with by the administrative apparatus. This
may be regarded as a purely symbolic function, loosely related to the
actual working of services. Yet, the confrontation between the cases of
Vancouver and Toronto in Canada (Good 2009) and the European ci-
ties analysed by the contributions collected in this book can better clari-
fy the fundamental relevance of frame-setting in the local immigrant’
socio-economic arena. Multicultural policies undertaken by the munici-
palities of Vancouver and Toronto have been actively promoted by the
political leadership in the context of strategies aimed at, respectively,
fostering Vancouver’s economic linkages with the Pacific Rim and af-
firming the city of Toronto’s autonomy vis-a`-vis attempts to centralise
power in the hands of the Ontario province (Good 2009: 277-280). By
contrast, in most European cities, elected politicians show more reluc-
tant and ambiguous attitudes, which casts doubts on the relevance and
scope of action of the offices charged with the implementation of im-
migrant policy. Regardless of the political ideology of the governing
majority (i.e. left-wing- or right-wing-oriented), ad hoc offices and insti-
tutions established by political actors in the Italian, Dutch and German
cities analysed in this book are usually assigned a subordinate position
in the administrative structure, signalling an uncertain political legiti-
macy of the city’s integration policy. In the case of Zurich described by
Mahnig (2004), ambiguities in the local political frame, oscillating be-
tween openings to immigrants’ participation and requests for adapta-
tion to the Swiss society, have to be understood vis-a`-vis a political sys-
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tem that, through the instruments of direct democracy, allows the poli-
tical mobilisation of hostile segments in the population.
Political actors also set the legitimising frame for the action of civil
society organisations in the local immigrant socio-economic arena. In
the case of Amsterdam, for instance, Vermeulen and Stotijn point out
how even in the context of the present-day ‘diversity policy’, which fails
to acknowledge the relevance of groups in the policymaking process,
the mayor continues to regard immigrant religious organisations as an
important counterpart. Such an accommodative stance is also evident
in the new Berlin Senate integration policy, which opened new oppor-
tunities for immigrant organisations’ participation in 2005 and, as far
as Italian cities are concerned, in Bologna and Naples where the em-
powerment of immigrant groups is a centre-left-wing official policy
priority. In contrast, in Milan the political policy frame appears to be
far more oriented towards sustaining the action of traditional Catholic
NGOs working in the field.
Once the official policy frame is set by elected politicians, adminis-
trative bureaucracies and civil society organisations are, in order to im-
plement it, supposed to act accordingly. As the chapters presented in
this book currently signal, more attention should be paid to what hap-
pens in policy implementation. The local socio-economic arena cannot
be identified just by political official priorities and attitudes towards im-
migrant integration. As pointed out by Vermeulen and Stotijn as well
as by Caponio ch. 2, street-level bureaucrats and policy practitioners re-
present a crucial category of policymakers insofar as they are able to ac-
commodate the original policy objectives in order to better cope with
immigrant needs and/or to overcome obstacles in the delivery of exist-
ing services to foreign users. As is clear, if politicians follow a consen-
sus-driven – electoral – logic, which accounts for the ambiguity of offi-
cial policy priorities and frames, practitioners appear to be more user-
oriented. Such an attitude on the part of practitioners and officials can
be either the result of a strong professional ethos and commitment,
consistent with Weber’s duty of office, or of more prosaic strategies to
come to terms with everyday disparate users’ demands challenging es-
tablished routines. More research on the administrative backgrounds
and cultures of public officials operating in the local socio-economic
immigrant policy arena might be revealing.18
Civil society organisations also play a crucial role in the local immi-
grant socio-economic arena. These can be of different kinds, and may
include traditional charity organisations, often of a religious type, pro-
fessional NGOs working in partnership with public authorities, com-
munity and immigrant associations, etc. In the area of vocational train-
ing and youth employment, the unions and employers’ organisations
would also be expected to play a role. However, this is not necessarily
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the case, as pointed out by Aybek in this book. In both Frankfurt and
Munich, social partners seem more interested in sticking to established
practices of labour market regulation rather than tackling the issue of
immigrant youth disadvantage.
Different configurations of civil society mobilisation will depend es-
sentially on two factors: 1) the legitimate political policy frame, which
can materially and/or symbolically support certain types of organisa-
tions; and 2) the more general local welfare policy context and legacy.
In the Italian cities analysed by Caponio ch. 2 in this book (see also
Caponio 2006), two different welfare policy legacies can be identified:
one organised around the unions and the workers’ cooperatives in Bo-
logna, these latter becoming over the course of time increasingly pro-
fessional NGOs specialised in providing social services; and one
centred on the primacy of Catholic charities and voluntary organisa-
tions in Milan and Naples. Whereas in Milan, thanks to the close rela-
tions with the regional and local administrations, they have developed
into professional NGOs delivering services on the basis of public con-
tracts, in Naples, the scarcity of public resources accounts for their
less professional profile. However, in all three cities, these prominent
autochthonous organisations appear to crowd out newer immigrant
associations, which face difficulties in access to public funding and to
policymaking processes (Caponio 2005). By contrast, in the case of
Amsterdam, the combination of the pillarisation-policy legacy (see
also Alexander 2007) and the political-legitimising framework re-
ported above, seem to account for a greater opportunity policy struc-
ture for immigrant organisations, even in the present context of a ‘di-
versity policy’. Also in the cases of Berlin, Frankfurt and Munich, im-
migrant organisations seem to enjoy more leverage than in the
aforementioned Italian cities. In particular, as far as Frankfurt and
Munich are concerned, innovative approached to the German voca-
tional education and training (VET) system, are started at the grass-
roots level and rely upon the direct involvement of NGOs specialised
in providing social services to immigrants (IG in the case of Munich)
and of municipal institutions working with immigrant associations
(AMKA in Frankfurt).
In Canada, if policy development, planning and priority-setting hap-
pens at both the federal and provincial level, services are delivered at
a local level essentially through NGOs. Consequently, a multitude of
organisations can be found in the various provinces competing for
public funding and catering to different clienteles, either people of an
immigrant background in general or of a specific national commu-
nity. At the same time, federal multicultural policy started in the early
1970s provides a political-legitimising framework for ethnic commu-
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nity and immigrant organisations (Bloemraad 2006: 125), even if
grants tend to be modest.
Along with the three main categories of policymakers mentioned so
far – i.e. elected political actors, public officials and civil society orga-
nisations – a fourth category must be considered: that of experts. Pol-
icymaking processes concerning the socio-economic integration of im-
migrants in the German, Dutch and Italian cities analysed in this
book, often refer to scientific reports, white papers, advisory councils,
individual consultants, etc. External actors whose legitimacy is based
on their knowledge of the issues at hand, can play a non-negligible
role in influencing local policy and giving certain direction to it. Ac-
cording to Caponio’s accounts of Milan, Bologna and Naples in this
volume (ch. 2), experts are personalities who are well known for their
competence in the field and usually pursue a problem-solving-oriented
logic, i.e. one aimed at providing sound solutions to perceived pro-
blems. This is likely to enter into conflict with elected politicians’ con-
sensus-driven logic, which is more oriented towards favouring popular
solutions regardless of their efficacy in dealing with problems. How-
ever, evidence in the contributions to this book is too sparse to allow
any further analysis. The local research-policy nexus appears to still be
a neglected topic. It deserves more focused attention, especially at a
time when the plea for policy evaluation and more knowledge-driven
intervention is commonplace.
4.3 A potentially contentious arena: mosque-building
In the cultural-religious domain, a primary issue area is represented
by religious and cultural minorities’ practices and institutions (Alexan-
der 2007: 51). These usually are at the basis of specific demands and
interests at a local level: one such demand regards the establishment
of appropriate places of worship such as mosques for Muslim immi-
grant groups. Muslim minorities in Western Europe and North Amer-
ica are essentially the product of migration flows. Thus, the demand
for the establishment of a mosque has a clear symbolic relevance,
marking the evolution of Islam from the private space of a prayer
room to the public sphere, making its presence open and visible (Ce-
sari 2005a: 1018; Allievi 2009: 51). Notwithstanding national differ-
ences in state/religion legislation and cultural traditions (Aluffi Beck-
Pecoz & Zincone 2004), a great wealth of literature has pointed out
the crucial relevance of the local dimension in the accommodation of
religious demands in Europe19 (Maussen 2007). In Canada, too, ac-
cording to Fourot in this book, cities are regarded as having de facto
responsibility for the management of religious pluralism in the con-
text of official multiculturalism.
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Next I shall attempt to identify the main actors and mechanisms of
functioning in the local religious diversity arena. Following Landman
and Wessels’ (2005) analysis of decisions on mosque-building in Dutch
towns, three main categories of actors can be regarded as relevant: the
mosque committees or, more generally, the promoters of the initiative;
the municipality, as composed of two different actors – local elected po-
liticians and political parties represented in the city council versus mu-
nicipal bureaucrats; and the neighbours concerned by the new mos-
que’s plan. Attention has focused so far on the contentious cases, see-
ing a strong opposition by neighbours and a NIMBY-type mobilisation.
However, Landman and Wessels (2005) point out how contentiousness
is not always the case. Currently, under the general rubric of ‘mosque-
building’ very different requests and demands are considered by re-
searchers, from the granting of free land or premises, to funding and
permissions and/or exemptions from specific rules such as parking.
As suggested by Maussen (2007: 17-18), developing a more detailed ty-
pology of mosques in Europe and, it could be added, of the main re-
lated requests on the part of Islamic organisations, could be extremely
helpful in identifying the main characteristics of the local mosque-
building policy arena, as well as the factors and conditions that are
likely to lead to politicisation and conflict. This would require a sys-
tematic research programme comparing purposely selected cases in
different countries. Here, I shall simply attempt to draw some com-
parative observations starting from existing case studies carried out in
the five countries considered.
As for the first category of actors taking part in the local mosque-
building policy arena, the promoters of the initiative are usually identi-
fied with a mosque committee or an Islamic cultural association taking
steps to establish a new mosque or to ameliorate/expand an existing
one. Yet, this is a very heterogeneous and stratified category, since a
number of factors are likely to influence the strategies and logic of ac-
tion of the mosques’ promoters. First of all, the constitution of a com-
mittee or an organisation is not the rule: as pointed out by Fourot in
the case of Montreal, action can also be taken by individual leaders
loosely connected with the local Muslim community.20
Associations and/or leaders may differ in terms of their personal
characteristics. Their level of education and knowledge of legal rules
and the political climate of the receiving context can make the differ-
ence: in the two Quebec cities analysed by Fourot, for instance, promo-
ters initially avoided openly declaring their intention of establishing a
place of worship, fearing a refusal because of the universalistic orienta-
tion of local policy and public discourse. In a similar vein, according to
Cesari (2005a: 1019), the new generation of highly educated and mid-
dle-class Muslim leaders emerging especially in France and the United
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Kingdom knows how to frame requests in an appropriate manner and
to pursue a successful negotiation strategy. Currently, Muslim commu-
nities composed mainly of citizens are more likely to be perceived as
legitimate counterparts by local politicians, since they are also voters,
as pointed out in the Dutch cities analysed by Landman and Wessels
(2005), as well as in Brussels’ Schaerbeek mosque decision-making
process analysed by Manc¸o and Kanmaz (2005).
In contrast, first-generation communities of non-citizen Muslim im-
migrants inevitably encounter more difficulties in articulating their
needs and demands. Mosque-building in Germany (Jonker 2005),
Switzerland21 (Cattacin et al. 2003) and Italy22 (Saint Blancat &
Schmidt di Friedberg 2005; Allievi 2009) are similar in this respect.
Yet, the strategies adopted by the promoting groups in these contexts
appear to be quite different: whereas recently established Muslim asso-
ciations in north-east Italian cities such as Lodi have decided to assume
a low profile role (Saint Blancat & Schmidt di Friedberg 2005), either
abandoning their requests or accepting the relocation of the projected
mosques to very marginalised areas outside the cities or, as in the case
of Berlin described by Jonker (2005), openly confronting the Kreuzberg
authorities, leading the two parties to judicial courts.
As is thus clear, different strategies are likely to be undertaken and
pursued by a mosque’s promoters, according to the specific socio-eco-
nomic profile and legal status of the leadership. The more the leaders
hold established positions in the local society, the more they will be
able to downplay conflicts and undertake negotiations. In contrast,
weak groups, either from a socio-economic or a legal-political point of
view, will find it more difficult to articulate their requests through es-
tablished participative channels. Risks of marginalisation or radicalisa-
tion appear to be particularly evident.
This does not mean, however, that well-established leadership will
prove successful. Division and conflict within the community is a cru-
cial factor with respect to outcomes of the policymaking processes. The
demand for a grand or ‘cathedral’ mosque is more likely to raise issues
of representativeness, as pointed out in the case of Montreal described
in this book as well as in the studies on Marseille and Toulouse carried
out by Cesari (2005b).
Municipality is the second actor involved in the local mosque-build-
ing policy arena. Yet, at a more micro-level analysis, here again we find
two distinct actors usually pursuing different strategies and logic of ac-
tion: politicians and municipal civil servants. These latter, generally
identified as city planners and technical officers, are particularly rele-
vant, since, according to Landman and Wessels (2005: 1135), they are
the ones able to suggest suitable sites for the planned mosques, which
places the municipality on the side of the Muslim association if a con-
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flict does arise. However, their willingness to collaborate with the
group promoting the mosque’s project cannot be taken for granted,
and much depends, once again, on administrative cultures and, more
specifically, on formal institutions or more informal practices of partici-
pative city planning. In the Dutch cities analysed by Landman and
Wessels (2005), the town planners, while not sympathetic to the cause
of Muslims, still accept as legitimate their claim for an adequate wor-
ship place. This does not seem to be the case in Berlin (Jonker 2005),
where the impersonal, bureaucratic attitude of civil servants consider-
ably contributed to reinforcing the lack of comprehension between the
municipality and the Mevlana mosque committee. Also in the Italian
cities analysed by Saint Blancat and Schmidt di Friedberg (2005), plan-
ning offices usually adopted a neutral and distant stance, just checking
for the administrative conformity of the application. Such an imperso-
nal style is not necessarily detrimental to Muslim groups: in the case
of Milan, in 2000, the technical office accorded to an Italian convert
permission to renovate a building of his own to be used as an Islamic
cultural centre, despite the negative attitude of the then centre-right
mayor. Bureaucracy acted essentially in a neutral way in the two Que-
bec cities analysed by Fourot as well, even though the specific institu-
tional configuration governing the decision-making process in Laval,
where zoning changes have to be approved by the resident population,
gave offices a secondary role vis-a`-vis political actors.
To sum up, if city planners do generally pursue a logic oriented to-
wards rule enforcement and formal conformity, it may be hypothesised
that different administrative cultures, as well as formal and informal
rules and practices – particularly with reference to participative planning
– have an impact on this category of actors will interpret their role. This
may range from active support of the applicant whose requests are
judged to be legitimate, to the impersonal, neutral treatment of mos-
ques’ dossiers. However, a positive decision on the formal correctness of
an application usually represents an important constraint for local politi-
cians, since it is more complicate to oppose a building plan that respects
existing urban planning rules and satisfies technical requirements.
Currently, when speaking of local politicians in such a potentially
contentious arena as mosque-building, a distinction has to be made be-
tween the local governing majority and the opposition parties repre-
sented in the city council (see also Allievi 2009: 64). Even though the
action of both is driven by the prospective electoral consensus, the ac-
tion of the first group is subject to a specific set of constraints. Govern-
ing politicians have to deal first of all with the ‘neutral’ decisions taken
by civil servants. As pointed out in the case of Milan, a positive techni-
cal decision cannot be easily overturned, unless one is willing to be ex-
posed to accusations of open discrimination and Islamophobia.23 An-
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other constraint is represented by the possibility of turning to a refer-
endum. In order to avoid this, governing politicians will embark in a
long negotiation process leading to a high level of personalisation of
the policymaking process, as pointed out by Fourot in the case of Laval.
A similar situation is described by Saint Blancat and Schmidt di Fried-
berg (2005) in the case of Lodi: the left-wing mayor initially supported
the building of a mosque in a commercial area of the city.24 And yet,
the Northern League threatened to promote a referendum (in addition
to opposition encountered in the neighbourhood), leading the mayor to
reconsider the location of the mosque to the very outskirts of the city.
Generally speaking, the level of openness of the local governing ma-
jority to accommodation depends on the legal status of the local Mus-
lim population. Both Landman and Wessel (2005: 1135) on the case of
the Netherlands and Fourot (in this volume) on the case of Quebec, ob-
serve that militating against the demands of the mosque committees
would have implied a cost in terms of useful votes for re-election. On
the other hand, in the case of Italy, foreign Muslims, as well as third-
country nationals overall, can only become voters upon naturalisation,
after ten years of regular residence. As is clear, the search for political
consensus will be likely to sacrifice Muslim claims.
Radical political parties sitting in the opposition ranks are of course
free from any of the constraints mentioned, and may take an active role
in mobilising opposition to the mosque’s plans in the concerned neigh-
bourhoods. This is the case, for instance, of the Northern League in
Lodi, as well as of the Interest Party in Deventer (Landman & Wessel
2005: 1136). However, protests may assume very different forms and in-
tensity, and as pointed out in this book by Fourot in her study on Mon-
treal and Laval, they may range from a demand letter to heated discus-
sions in public hearings. According to Landman and Wessel (2005), fac-
tors such as the demographic distribution of the Muslim population in
the urban area, the immigration history of the city, as well as the social
class of the opponent group, account for differences in the levels and
fierceness of the opposition in the two small cities of Deventer and Drie-
bergen and the city of Utrecht. In Utrecht, a town with a longer history
of immigration, mosques are usually located in districts where Muslims
represent a strong and numerous group, while the rest of the resident
population come from socially weaker strata, lacking the personal and
economic resources to mobilise the protest. Yet, more attention should
be paid to the supply-side of the protest: populist parties with a radical
stance towards immigration as well as religious authorities – for in-
stance, in Italy, pre-eminent Catholic bishops expressing radicalised
views – can be regarded as protest entrepreneurs (see the aforemen-
tioned case of Lodi), able to mobilise generic sentiments of aversion
around political slogans and vocal opposition. At the same time, the
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media may also play a role in giving wind to opposition campaigns: as
pointed out by Triandafyllidou (2006) again regarding Lodi, a clear im-
balance in the representation of the various social and political actors by
the press can be identified, with political parties monopolising the dis-
course and Muslim voices being in contrast under-represented.
As a consequence, protest cannot be simply interpreted as a sort of
inevitable, more or less fierce, reaction to change by the neighbours.
Different actors taking part in the protests may pursue different strate-
gies and have different goals. More comparative research on the local
conditions leading to NIMBY mobilisation is of extreme interest in or-
der to have a clearer understanding of the functioning of the local mos-
que-building policy arena.
5 Conclusion
In order to make sense of the local dimension in migration policymak-
ing, this chapter has attempted to propose a theoretical toolkit to cast
the chapters of this book into a more unitary and consistent frame-
work. This can only be regarded as a tentative exercise, which draws its
strength on the extreme variance between the national cases consid-
ered, but has also some weaknesses. First of all, the countries analysed
represent a limited sample of contemporary migration receiving con-
texts: a major gap is the lack of an Eastern European case, which would
have shed light on the local dimension of policymaking in an impor-
tant transition – from emigration to immigration – area.25 Moreover,
the studies presented in the chapters of this book are very different in
terms of objects of analysis, research demands, theoretical backgrounds
and methodological approaches. This poses a serious limit to systema-
tic comparative analysis, which I have attempted to overcome by resort-
ing to other relevant empirical studies and pieces of literature.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the introduction of the notion of
a local migration policy arena – here intended as a policymaking field
structured around specific issue areas or dimensions of migration pol-
icy – has enabled me to focus on patterns of similarities and differ-
ences in the local-level responses and policymaking processes across
the five countries considered and in the three issue areas of migration
policy analysed by the contributions to this book: citizenship, welfare
services and religious diversity.
On the basis of this analysis, I now return to the questions set at the
beginning to provide some provisional answers. First, it can be main-
tained that the local dimension of migration policymaking has a non-
negligible relevance in all the countries considered, despite significant
differences in the state structures and models of centre/periphery rela-
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tions. Local policymaking arenas matter, and more attention should be
devoted to their analysis in migration policy-oriented studies. The rele-
vance of the local dimension does not seem to be strictly dependent on
the five countries’ state structures, but the way a specific issue is trea-
ted in each country should also be taken into account. In the case of
Canada, for instance, federalism goes hand in hand with a strong inter-
ventionist stance on the part of the central government and a highly
centralised policymaking structure as far as citizenship is concerned.
This may contradict expectations based on a state-structures institu-
tional analysis, yet it is consistent with the historical legacy of a nation
based on the compromise between the English-speaking majority and
the French-speaking minority. In this context, citizenship acquires the
meaning of a republican style social contract (Bloemraad 2006), unify-
ing in a modern constitutional polity different cultural and linguistic
groups.
On the other hand, a strong tradition of local autonomy accounts for
the leeway that local authorities enjoy both in the centralised Dutch
state and in the regionalised Italian one, especially as far as the imple-
mentation of social policy is concerned, giving particular pre-eminence
to the local immigrant welfare arena in these countries. In contrast,
municipalities are subject to different provincial rules and statutes in
Canada, where the very crucial sub-national authority in welfare policy
is represented by the province.
In the case of religious diversity, the city emerges in all the five
countries as the key arena for accommodation. Despite legal differ-
ences in national legislation and relations with Islam, demands for ap-
propriate places of worship usually arise at the local level and touch
upon issues such as the use of public space and urban planning, which
are the exclusive responsibility of local administrations.
Clearly, state structures and systems of centre/periphery relations set
the general framework of opportunities and constraints for sub-na-
tional authorities’ action in relation to immigration. Yet this is not a
fixed framework: rather, it may change according to the specific issues,
as pointed out in the case of citizenship policy in Canada. Moreover,
the analysis of national institutional patterns does not tell us how poli-
cies are actually worked out. The case of accommodation of religious
diversity is in this respect revealing.
Having analysed the specific decision-making structures characteris-
ing each issue area policy arena, I now turn my attention to the identi-
fication of similarities and differences across the three policy arenas in
terms of policymaking dynamics, actors involved and logic of action. A
first important element indicated by the analysis is the complex nature
of local government, which is composed of at least two actors not ne-
cessarily sharing the same views on immigration. Politicians, on the
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one hand, pursue a consensus-building strategy, and will thus favour
those measures that are considered to be in line with their electorate’s
perceived interests and preferences. Civil servants, on the other hand,
are likely to conceive differently their role and goals in policymaking,
according to the specific administrative cultures they have been socia-
lised to in their office and institutions. Pragmatic accommodation of
clients’ demands is not necessarily the rule, since indifference, neutral-
ity and even instrumental attitudes have been noted. More systematic
analyses of different local offices’ organisational cultures might contri-
bute to a redefinition of the terms of the debate on convergence/diver-
gence in local immigrant policy by drawing scholars’ attention to the
constellations of factors that can lead to different types of answers to
immigrants’ needs and demands.
But local policy and policymaking cannot be identified just with the
action of local governmental actors. The contributions to this book and
the discussion in this chapter indicate a far more complex picture.
NGOs, immigrant associations, experts, media as well as neighbours
may all play a role in local policymaking. In particular, NGOs appear to
be crucially involved in the citizenship and social welfare arenas, usual-
ly showing a client-oriented logic of action, i.e. one aimed at support-
ing immigrants’ integration and access to rights. Yet, such a category
needs more specification: in Italy, for instance, NGOs are usually iden-
tified with autochthonous traditional non-profit organisations, whose
actions often crowd out newer and less organised immigrant ones; in
the other countries considered in this book, with more established im-
migrant communities, NGOs often include immigrant organisations
catering to their constituencies. As is clear, the different configurations
assumed by NGOs working on migration in different countries may in-
fluence considerably the openness of local policy and policymaking to
immigrants. Nevertheless, if a common trend towards the increasing
incorporation of NGOs in local policymaking can be identified across
the five countries considered, this does not necessarily imply greater
inclusion of immigrants, who may well be at the margins of estab-
lished welfare organisations and networks.26
Immigrant stakeholders necessarily play a central role in the reli-
gious diversity policy arena, as pointed out in the analysis of mosque-
building policymaking. Here we find either specific organisations (Isla-
mic cultural associations and/or mosque committees) or individual lea-
ders all pursuing a similar strategy oriented towards obtaining recogni-
tion from the local authorities. Nonetheless, the more or less estab-
lished presence of Islam in the city, the socio-demographic
composition and the legal status of the leadership and of their constitu-
encies, as well as the content of their specific demands (public soil,
funding etc.), can influence considerably policymaking dynamics and
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outcomes. More systematic comparative analyses might shed new light
on how relations are actually structured in such a potentially conten-
tious policy arena, as well as on the specific forms of mobilisation
neighbours can assume in different contexts.
Last, a lack of attention to the role of experts and media in local pol-
icymaking has already been noted. As far as the media are concerned,
these have sometimes been considered in relation to mosque-building
conflicts. However, their way of communicating about immigration
and immigrants’ integration into the city can influence the establish-
ment of a more or less inclusive public discourse and public opinion
climate. The role of local media in other issue areas should also be con-
sidered, since public discourse has a crucial relevance in the framing
of the migration issue.
As is clear, three is still much to do in the study of the local dimen-
sion of migration policymaking. This book should be considered as a
first effort to identify the main gaps in the literature and to propose
possible future research paths that would help to fill them. More sys-
tematic and theoretically oriented research programmes are needed to
tackle the issues considered so far, since existing literature has often
developed in a disconnected way, through case studies that hardly inter-
act with each other. Once again, comparison across cities in different
countries should be regarded as a difficult yet necessary challenge for
policy migration scholars. It is clear that empirically based knowledge
on how immigration and immigrant-integration issues are presently
treated and resolved day by day cannot be derived from comparison of
national legal frameworks.
Notes
1 The distinction between immigration and immigrant policymaking recalls Hammar’s
(1985) classic definitions of immigration and immigrant politics. Whereas immigra-
tion politics is concerned with the conditions of entry and admission on the state’s
territory, immigrant politics deals with issues of access to citizenship rights for those
immigrants who are admitted to reside and work in the country.
2 With reference to the cases of Sweden and the Netherlands, Penninx and Martiniello
(2004) point out how local politicisation was avoided in the 1970s thanks to the in-
troduction of a consistent framework for national integration policy to which local ad-
ministrations had to adhere.
3 See, for instance, the EU Handbook on Integration for Policy-makers and Practitioners, a
second edition of which was published in 2007 (Niessen & Shibel 2007).
4 Currently identifiable in the case of Canada is a centre/periphery cleavage between
Quebec and Ontario versus the West Atlantic provinces. The latter are less populated
yet rich with feedstocks and commodities, and have always perceived their position
in the federation as subordinated by the most populated provinces’ interests in indus-
trial development (Kent 1992).
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5 However, it must be pointed out that the La¨nder participate actively in national deci-
sion-making through the Bundesrat, which is composed of Land first ministers and
senior ministers and which possesses an absolute veto on all federal legislation affect-
ing the La¨nder.
6 In the case of Quebec, such agreements date back to the 1970s and currently provide
this province with a unique role in the selection of immigrants. It is directly carried
out by provincial authorities in the context of selection and eligibility criteria set by
the central government (Birrel & McIsaac 2006).
7 This is the case in Switzerland of the Conference of Cantonal Ministers of Justice
and Police, which is particularly vocal on issues of interior security and asylum
(D’Amato 2006).
8 For Italy, see studies on local implementation of regularisation procedures (Zucchini
1998; Triandafyllidou 2003), as well as those on local practices of residence permits’
renewal (Caponio 2007).
9 For the Netherlands, various studies have pointed out the tension between national
and local policy with respect to the Amsterdam-based garment industry, employing
predominantly undocumented Turkish workers tolerated by the city administration
(Raes 2000). As for Italy, see, for instance, local administrations’ practices in dealing
with immigrants’ reception and first accommodation described by Ponzo (2008).
10 For the main shifts in Dutch national integration policy since its start in the 1970s,
see Bruquetas-Callejo et al. (2008: 11-19).
11 NATAC is an acronym for the project ‘Acquisition of Nationality in EU Member
States: Rules, Practices and Quantitative Developments’. This specific targeted re-
search project was co-funded by the European Community’s Sixth Framework Pro-
gramme and the Austrian Ministry for Education, Science and Culture in the period
2004-2006. It was coordinated by the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Insti-
tute for European Integration Research of Vienna.
12 Actually, in Italy the decision is up to the President of the Republic on the recom-
mendation of the Minister of the Interior. For details, see Arena, Nascimbene and
Zincone (2006).
13 Applications are decided upon by the Citizenship Commission which is formed by
all citizenship judges. For details, see www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/publications/
cit-ann-report-2006.asp#mandate.
14 As of January 2005, with the entering into force of the Immigration Act of 2004, the
naturalisation authorities have to transmit all personal data of applicants to the secur-
ity services (Hailbronner 2006: 241).
15 Basic policies are set by the federal government and implemented on the basis of var-
ious agreements signed with individual provinces, with the exception of Quebec that
– as mentioned in the third section of this chapter –enjoys full autonomy in the defi-
nition and management of settlement and labour market programmes.
16 In the case of Amsterdam, Alexander (2008) points out the substantial isolation
faced first by the Minorities Policy Coordination Bureau during the Minorities Policy
period (i.e. 1980s to mid-1990s) and then by the Diversity Unit created in the mid-
1990s under the new Diversity Policy Programme. He attributes this to bureaucratic
resistance to change.
17 The same holds true as far as Swiss cities are concerned. See, for instance, Mahnig
(2004) on the case of Zurich.
18 Campomori (2007), for instance, on the basis of a survey on the attitudes of public
officials dealing with immigrants in the municipalities of the Lombardy regions, has
pointed out how the accommodative and open attitude of these street-level bureau-
crats is related to their personal and professional backgrounds, often characterised by
voluntary work in Catholic charitable associations.
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19 I am fully aware that more sophisticated models of explanation of Islam institutiona-
lisation in Europe have been elaborated (see e.g. Rath et al. 2001; Koenig 2005; Fet-
zer & Soper 2005). Here I just highlight the main institutional elements affecting lo-
cal policymaking arenas on mosque-building.
20 This is also the case in various episodes reported in Italy. In Turin, for instance, a re-
cent plan to establish a grand Moroccan mosque founded by the Moroccan govern-
ment has encountered opposition on the part of other Moroccan Muslim associations
and from other Islamic groups more generally.
21 On Switzerland, see also the highly politicised dispute over minarets (Stu¨ssi 2008).
22 The critical relevance of citizenship is evident if one considers that the promoters of
a mosque project in Italian cities are usually either naturalised citizens or Italian con-
verts to Islam, relying upon their personal social relations in the local political con-
text (Saint Blancat & Schmidt di Friedberg 2005). Nevertheless, the personal ties of
the leaders do not always prove to be sufficient in order to receive positive decisions.
23 On the other hand, a negative decision by planning authorities also serves as a major
impediment for – supposedly – sympathetic politicians. On this point, see the case of
Berlin’s Kreuzberg mosque described by Jonker (2005: 1075).
24 The municipality would have granted a piece of land at a favourable, off-market price.
25 For reasons explaining the lacunae, see the introduction chapter in this book.
26 This appears to be the case in the German cities analysed by Aybek in this book,
since immigrant organisations do not take part in local vocational education and
training policy networks.
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